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Attiya Ahmad is Georgetown University’s 2009-10 Center for International and Regional Studies Post-Doctoral Fellow. She recently completed her PhD in Cultural Anthropology at Duke University. Dr. Ahmad’s work brings together scholarship on Islamic studies, globalization, diaspora and migration studies, economic anthropology, and political economy.
What further diplomatic steps should the U.S. take to respond to the Israel-Hamas war and its broadening regional reverberations? MEI has asked a group of former U.S. ambassadors and senior government officials specializing in the region to weigh in.
The Israeli government does its military no favours when it says that the goal of a ground invasion of Gaza is to “wipe out” or “destroy” Hamas. Such maximalist and eminently unrealistic objectives puts the Israel army in a bind: how to translate this political bluster into practical and achievable military objectives.
For the better part of a decade, Turkey and the U.S. have been locked in what might be considered an unhappy marriage, marked by bitter misunderstandings and growing distrust. Some optimists had hoped that something of a reset might be possible, but recent events, both in Turkey’s ongoing conflict with the PKK and because of the ripple effects from Israel’s war with Hamas, likely mean that U.S.-Turkish relations, far from improving, will get colder yet in the months to come.
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Did the IDF rely too heavily on advanced technologies in its effort to secure and fortify Israel’s border with Gaza? That is one of many questions that have arisen in the days since Hamas’ Oct. 7 incursion into Israel and attacks on Israeli forces and civilians. The absence of early warnings from data collected via sensors, cameras, and surveillance drones along the border’s “smart fence,” as well as the penetration of the Iron Dome missile defense system, has led to a sense that Israel experienced a tragic “high-tech failure.”
The Israeli lack of preparedness for, and weak initial response to, the Hamas attack on Oct. 7 encompassed four key failures. But its consequences may bring far-reaching political changes and internal reforms.
Russia, historically viewed as a major stakeholder and player in the Middle East since the Cold War, is seeing its leverage eroding as the Hamas-Israel war enters its third week, and the Kremlin is absent despite attempts to mediate the conflict.
On Oct. 19, the Pentagon press secretary confirmed that the Iran-backed Houthi militia targeted the USS Carney, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, in the Red Sea. The USS Carney reportedly intercepted three cruise missiles and several drones without sustaining any damage or casualties. Although the Houthis have yet to claim responsibility for the attack, the drones and missiles were likely fired from north-western, Houthi-held positions in Hodeida and Hajjah governorates on Yemen’s Red Sea coast and were headed “north,” most likely toward Israel.
Increasing deployment of large-scale grid-integrated Energy Storage Systems (EES) in Gulf Arab states is being driven by the implementation of renewable energy systems. More and more, variable renewable energies are being integrated into the grid as upgrades to transmission and distribution networks are being deferred. As a result, demand for ESS is likely to grow.
U.S. security cooperation has undergone monumental changes over the past six years.
There is political logic behind the Israeli government’s declaration that it will ‘wipe Hamas off the Earth’.
The Israeli public want to see Hamas destroyed once and for all, given the unprecedented mass murder it just committed.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his colleagues, already under intense pressure for allowing the attack to take place (and for putting Israel in a vulnerable position by pursuing anti-democratic policies) were compelled to make big promises. Their maximalist goals reflect the stakes in their fight for political survival.
China has long sought to brand itself as a “neutral” player and force for peace in the Middle East and elsewhere, willing and able to talk to “all sides.” Beijing’s nascent ambition to play the role of peacemaker and its potential to shape regional events was on display when it succeeded last March in brokering the détente between Riyadh and Tehran. The Israel-Hamas war offers no such low-hanging fruit. On the contrary, it poses a major test of China’s Middle East peace diplomacy — and an opportunity to examine some of our own, perhaps faulty assumptions.
