Defense and Security, Terrorism, US Policy in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Turkey
استفسارات الصحافة: [email protected]
Charles Lister is a senior fellow and the director of the Syria Initiative at the Middle East Institute (MEI), where he focuses on Syria, terrorism, and insurgency across the Levant. His work also covers broader regional security dynamics and the evolution of jihadist movements, including al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS). Mr. Lister is concurrently a Senior Consultant to the Karam Shaar Advisory; the Founder of Syria Weekly; and a consultant to the United Nations’ International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) for Syria. Mr. Lister also serves as an expert witness and advisor on counterterrorism for US, European, and Australian law enforcement and judicial bodies.
At MEI, Mr. Lister leads two major international initiatives. The Resolving the Detainee Crisis project, a joint effort with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), brings together governments and NGOs to address the challenges of detaining thousands of terrorist fighters and their families in northeast Syria. Separately, the Syria Strategy Project, in collaboration with the Atlantic Council and the European Institute of Peace, engages over 80 experts and 25 governments and Syrian entities to shape multilateral approaches to resolving Syria’s conflict. In March 2025, the project published a report, “Reimagining Syria: A Roadmap for Peace and Prosperity Beyond Assad.”
Before joining MEI, he was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in Doha and a senior consultant to the multinationally backed Syria Track II Dialogue Initiative, where he led years of direct engagement with the leadership of more than 100 Syrian armed opposition groups.
He is the author of The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (Oxford University Press, 2016), The Islamic State: A Brief Introduction (Brookings Press, 2015), and the editor of Winning the Battle, Losing the War: Addressing the Drivers of Non-State Armed Actors and Extremist Groups (MEI, 2019). His next book, also on Syria, is forthcoming from Oxford University Press.
He holds a first-class MA (Hons) in International Relations from the University of St. Andrews.
He is fluent in French.
Assad appeared increasingly secure — and confident — in his presidential palace, but also remained a deeply isolated global pariah.
Had America’s posture in Syria not been so uncertain, and if President Trump had not effectively green-lighted a Turkish incursion into the northeast, we would have a much better chance of capitalizing on Baghdadi’s death.
That some in Washington think another about-turn in policy allowing us to stay in negligible numbers, in a smaller piece of territory, would somehow enable us to sustain an anti-ISIS campaign and control Syria’s oil fields is nothing short of a fantasy.
Turkey’s cross-border incursion into northeastern Syria has stirred up a hornet’s nest of instability and threats. If left unchecked, this latest “war within a war” will have deeply destabilizing consequences for many years.
In one fell swoop, the U.S. has found itself evacuating a third of the country; breaking away from a 100,000-strong partner we trained and equipped; and watching it surrender to the regime that we have stood against from day one. In the chaos that has ensued, ISIS prisoners have been let loose, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced, and a once relatively stable northeastern Syria has been thrown into a potentially intractable pit of ethnic, sectarian, and political conflict. The consequences of America’s self-destruction in Syria will be felt for many, many years to come.
While President Trump might think he’s protecting American interests by leaving Syria, he’s actually granting ISIS the gift of rebirth. What looks set to follow from this is a dream scenario for the group.
After a long-drawn-out series of negotiations, Turkey has successfully convinced more than 40 armed opposition groups in northern Syria to unite under a single umbrella, directly under the command of the Syrian Interim Government’s Ministry of Defense.
As ISIS’s territorial “state” was simultaneously rolled back and then defeated, an international consensus increasingly emerged that claimed Syria’s war was “winding down.” There is no doubt that the geographic scope and intensity of conflict is not what it was at the height of hostilities in 2014 and 2015, but it is certainly not finished either.
In its final report, the congressionally-mandated Syria Study Group (SSG) provided a bleak but wholly realistic assessment of the state of the crisis in Syria. When it comes to policy prescriptions, however, the SSG falls short. Despite clearly identifying the “means and ends” gap as one of two core problems with U.S. policy in Syria, the “recommendations” suggested by the SSG differ little, if at all, from those already in place.
This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Ruba Husari, Paul Salem, Gerald Feierstein, Amal Kandeel, Grace Wermenbol, Robert S. Ford, Charles Lister, and Gonul Tol.
One important dynamic that is not acknowledged enough is the intensifying competition between Russia and Iran to determine the future shape of Syria and their position in it. While the very real competitive dynamic between Moscow and Tehran will never transition to hostility, it is beginning to have a very real effect on the evolution of major aspects of the crisis — from active conflict theaters, to the structures of the state, control over resources, and the prospect of intra-state conflict on Syrian soil.
On Aug. 12, an explosion took place inside an ammunition warehouse in the al-Saqr military base in southern Baghdad, triggering hundreds of mortars and rockets to fire off in all directions throughout urban, populated areas. One person was killed and 29 wounded, as munitions and debris scattered as far as 5 kilometers away.
Responding to Daniel Serwer’s “not so progressive case for withdrawing from Syria,” Charles Lister makes the case that the U.S. should remain in Syria — at the very least for long enough to secure conditions in which a realistic set of objectives could be achieved, including the existing counter-ISIS mission.
According to American intelligence officials, Osama bin Laden’s favorite son, Hamza, has been killed. Ever since his emergence in August 2015, Hamza bin Laden was perceived by many as being positioned to take over as al-Qaeda’s next global leader. While the group’s next steps in light of his death are unclear, for now al-Qaeda continues to move toward greater decentralization and “localism,” creating new challenges for governments seeking to confront it.
This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region including the Turkish-U.S. crisis meeting in Ankara on Syria, the resumption of U.S.-Taliban negotiations, Trump’s creation of a new “dovish” line on Iran, a rise in Egypt’s poverty levels, Sudan’s democratic transition, the easing of female guardianship rules in Saudi Arabia, and the end of the ceasefire in Idlib, featuring Charles Lister, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Paul Salem, W. Robert Pearson, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Thomas W. Lippman, and Robert S. Ford.
