This individual is a guest contributor. MEI is not able to assist with contact requests.
Ibrahim Jalal is a former non-resident scholar with the Middle East Institute’s (MEI) Arabian Peninsula Program, and a non-resident at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.
He has worked with donors and international organizations including the United Nations, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and Sussex University’s Institute of Development Studies in research and advisory capacities; occasionally briefs audiences, including think tanks, diplomatic corps, U.N. officials, the private sector, and humanitarian organizations; and takes part in Track II events related to Yemen and the MENA region.
His research examines third-party-led peace and dialogue processes in Yemen, the proliferation of armed non-state actors and implications on peace agreements’ implementation, post-war security orders and stabilization efforts, the politics of social assistance in fragile and conflict-affected states, violent extremism, and the foreign and defense policies of the Gulf and Western states in Yemen. Prior to joining MEI, Ibrahim was a Visiting Scholar at Macquarie University’s Department of Security Studies and Criminology in Australia.
تحليل إقليمي متخصص من قبل باحثي ومساهمي معهد الشرق الأوسط.
“لم تحقق الولايات المُتحدة أي نتائج، بل وجهت إشارات خاطئة عندما تراجعت عن دورها في مواجهة الحوثيين”.
On December 18, Yemeni President Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi announced a new cabinet as part of his efforts to implement the political annex of the Riyadh Agreement (RA) signed on November 5, 2019 between the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC). The agreement included several political, security and economic provisions such as: the formation of a new government that includes the STC; the disarmament and integration of militias and military formations under the auspices of the ministries of defense and interior; support of the Yemeni economy; and the demilitarization of Aden.
As long as weapons transfers to armed non-state actors are not adequately restricted and the monopoly of violence is not exclusively in the hands of the government, it will be impossible to build sustainable peace in Yemen.
Now in its sixth year, the war in Yemen shows no signs of abating. The country faces what is widely considered the world’s worst humanitarian crisis — a situation that has only been exacerbated by the global coronavirus pandemic. As a new administration prepares to take over in Washington, it is a natural time to assess U.S. policy toward the country. We asked 9 experts to provide their perspective and answer the following question: How should the Biden administration approach Yemen?
This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Maxim A. Suchkov, Ibrahim Jalal, Eliza Campbell, Alex Vatanka, and Marvin G. Weinbaum.
As unimportant as the move may seem for Yemen, the UAE’s normalization of relations with Israel and patronage of the STC, if left unaddressed, may ultimately lead to undesirable outcomes for both Yemen and the broader Arab world
On Feb. 16, 2015, then British Ambassador to Yemen Jane Marriott wrote an article titled “Yemen: the ball is in the Houthis’ court,” asserting that the future of the country and its stability were dependent on the Houthis.
Having given Yemen’s Houthi rebels control over the ports of Hodeida governorate on humanitarian grounds as part of the December 2018 Stockholm Agreement, the international community has failed to address the looming environmental, economic, and political threats presented by the decaying Safer oil tanker sitting offshore — a “floating bomb” waiting to explode.
On April 2, 2020, the Houthi version of Saba News Agency in Sanaa announced the first coronavirus case in Yemen, but shortly afterwards it retracted the news and the deputy chairman of the agency’s board of directors was fired. Many Yemenis had hoped the Saudi-led coalition’s blockade of the country and its resulting isolation might have helped to prevent an outbreak.
A few hours before Ramadan’s pre-fasting suhoor meal on April 25, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a UAE-sponsored regional secessionist movement, abruptly announced self-administration in Yemen’s South and a state of emergency.
Despite the Houthis’ rejection of the Saudi-led coalition’s two-week unilateral cease-fire, on April 24 the coalition’s Joint Forces Command announced an extension throughout the holy month of Ramadan.
During the Munich Security Conference in February 2020, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, signaled that the Saudi-Houthi backchannel talks were not “ready to move to the highest level.” However, the situation changed following the Houthi ballistic missile attack on Jazan and Riyadh in late March, and on April 8, the coalition’s Joint Forces Command
On March 26, 2015, the former Saudi ambassador to the U.S., Adel al-Jubeir, announced the beginning of a Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen to curtail Iran’s influence in the country, reinstate the regime of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi in Sanaa, and deter the Iranian-backed Houthi threat. Five years on, however, the objectives of Operation Decisive Storm are far from realized, and the situation on the ground is as volatile as ever.
Just a week after Houthi rebels took control of al-Hazm, the capital of al-Jawf Province, on March 1, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths paid an unprecedented, one-day visit to the Houthis’ likely next target, oil-and-gas-rich Marib, reiterating the urgent need for de-escalation.
