Nabil Mohsen

Dear MEI Community,

Like so many of you, I was horrified by the killing of George Floyd, and I share this message to reflect on the meaning of this crisis and what has become a pivotal moment for the United States in the world. Many of you have been deeply shaken by recent events, and spurred to action. This crisis heralds the need — and opportunity — for positive change.

One cannot apply democratic principles selectively, but the opposition has long done exactly that.

The Taliban’s military and diplomatic strategies are intended to work in tandem, one leveraging the other. Each has as its ultimate goal the Taliban’s recovery of an emirate lost in 2001.

Charities are useful fronts for all sorts of activities in Syria, but above all perhaps, they are vehicles of control. The Assads have long understood that the biggest danger to their rule comes from within, from a civil society that rejects their governance — never more so than today.

Of all the challenges to the OPEC+ effort, Iraq remains the biggest and most daunting.

As the GNA’s Sirte offensive shows, the confrontation is hardly over and meaningful talks will only start when military gains have been exhausted.

Steven Kenney and Ross Harrison join host Alistair Taylor to discuss their recent policy paper, “Conflict in the Middle East and COVID-19 — A View from 2025.” The COVID-19 crisis is disrupting the status quo on nearly everything, including regional conflict. How will that disruption worsen — or possibly improve — the trendlines of regional conflicts as we head toward 2025?

The impact of COVID-19 on Iran-linked forces in Syria has provided Russia with an opportunity to expand its influence through its proxy forces, particularly in eastern Syria, as Iranian and pro-Iranian forces redeploy elsewhere in the country.

World leaders have long stressed the need to maintain Syria’s territorial integrity, but at the moment, such a goal is unrealistic. Syria first needs a transitional phase in which the country will be divided into three zones of foreign influence to allow for reconstruction, the return of refugees and IDPs, and a gradual process of reconciliation.

Since 2017, Iran has seen several waves of protests rooted in political, social, and, most importantly, economic grievances. In light of COVID and the post-pandemic fallout, there is every indication that unrest will continue to grow, and even accelerate. Until now, the regime’s coercive apparatus has had both the capacity and the willingness of its members to successfully suppress anti-regime unrest. But has COVID-19 changed this balance? What impact, if any, has the pandemic had on the regime’s security capacity?

As Lebanese protesters look to advance the systemic reforms they seek and contend with an entrenched ruling elite with little incentive to change, they can draw on their Algerian peers’ successes and shortcomings.