فيناي كورا

Peace talks between the Kabul government and the Taliban resumed in Doha on Jan. 5 amid a sharp resurgence in violence and controversy over a video shared on various social media platforms by pro-Taliban elements.

On October, 16, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif set his country’s politics ablaze by offering a withering critique of the military establishment. Calling in from London via video conference, Sharif addressed a crowd of over 20,000 protestors at a rally in the Punjabi city of Gujranwalla organized by the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PMD), a recently formed coalition that brings together all major opposition parties. Under the PMD’s banner, erstwhile rivals like the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam–Fazlur (JUI-F) have joined forces to achieve two goals that they see as intertwined: unseating Prime Minister Imran Khan and regaining power from the military.

On Sept. 13, Bahrain recognized Israel at a ceremony attended by US President Donald Trump at the White House. With the stroke of a pen, Bahrain became the fourth Arab state to have forged official ties with Israel, following in the footsteps of Egypt (1979), Jordan (1994), and most recently, the UAE (Aug. 13, 2020).

The ongoing intra-Afghan talks confirm, without a doubt, that the Taliban is negotiating from a position of remarkable strength. After being overthrown by the military of the world’s sole superpower two decades ago, the Taliban’s resurgence is a perfect example of what happens when a counterinsurgency campaign fails to eliminate its target’s safe havens. The Doha negotiations have also underlined the ugly reality of the Afghan conflict — that firepower alone cannot crush an insurgency when its narrative has some resonance with the local people.

The Durand Line, as the British-Empire-drawn border that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan is known, continues to haunt the region and its leaders. On Sept. 7, Afghanistan’s first vice president, Amrullah Saleh, opened Pandora’s box by saying in an interview that “No Afghan politician of national stature can overlook the issue of Durand Line.”

The hurdles encountered in kick-starting the intra-Afghan talks seem to be more daunting than anticipated. This has not only delayed a process that was scheduled to begin immediately after the Doha agreement in February, but has also underlined the bumpy road that lies ahead for various stakeholders to reach a consensus on Afghanistan’s national destiny.

All is not well in Pakistan-Saudi relations, which seem to have gone into a tailspin. In order to repair the fractured ties with one of the country’s strongest allies, Pakistan’s army has swung into action and its chief, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, will travel to Saudi Arabia for talks this weekend.

On July 27, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a video conference with his counterparts from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nepal to suggest expanding their pandemic cooperation and proposed extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor into Afghanistan. Although the details about what this quadrilateral framework would entail and how it would work are unclear, any movement toward its institutionalization would be a serious challenge for the United States.

Multiple signs point to a crisis of confidence in Afghanistan. Ever since the publication of a sensational report alleging that a Russian military intelligence unit secretly offered bounties to the Taliban to kill American soldiers, there has been an intense debate about the possibility of peace in Afghanistan following the U.S. exit.

Despite strong religious and cultural ties and a long shared border, Iran has a somewhat complicated relationship with Afghanistan. Since the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan some four decades ago, Iran’s attempts to preserve its interests in conflict-ridden Afghanistan have not received much attention from the outside world, but it remains one of the most important neighboring countries for Tehran’s foreign policy.

Frantic efforts are being made to clear the way for intra-Afghan talks, the logical next step forward in the implementation of the February U.S.-Taliban deal.

There was no other way to end the political logjam in conflict-ridden Afghanistan than to make current President Ashraf Ghani and the outgoing Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah agree to share power. The deal announced on May 17 has been widely welcomed by the international community because the political tensions between the two rivals were viewed as one of the major hurdles to the advancement of an intra-Afghan reconciliation process. The political jockeying in Kabul is far from the only impediment to reconciliation though and there are deeper obstacles to the peace process.

On March 9, Afghanistan’s sitting president, Ashraf Ghani, took the oath of office for a second term. However, on the same day the country’s chief executive, Abdullah Abdullah, also declared himself president at a rival swearing-in ceremony. The controversy has plunged the country into further political uncertainty and potential chaos, dashing hopes of an immediate return to peace following the historic U.S.-Taliban deal on Feb. 29.

Understanding a state and its society involves understanding how the state treats its military, its record of governance, and the relationship between the military and civilian politicians. By all accounts, Pakistan, a state founded in 1947 as a homeland for the Muslim population of British India, is a unique case where the military dominates all other institutions in both state and society. This was on clear display in the recent court battle over the extension of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa’s tenure.

Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, has been paralyzed in recent days by supporters of Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F), a well-entrenched Islamist party. The protestors are seeking the resignation of the military-backed Prime Minister Imran Khan and fresh elections, and the demonstration has emerged as an existential problem for Khan.