الخليج وشبه الجزيرة العربية

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Marvin G. Weinbaum, Hafsa Halawa, Robert S. Ford, and Thomas W. Lippman.

Joe Biden is no stranger to Iraq and this informs how Iraqi politicians have responded to his victory in the U.S. presidential election. Some have welcomed the news, while others are more cautious given concerns that a Biden presidency might lead to greater Iranian influence in the country. Indeed, Biden has a mixed record on Iraq. Though a Democrat, he voted for the 2003 Iraq War. But later as vice president, he was President Barack Obama’s right hand and fast-tracked their campaign promise to withdraw U.S. troops in 2011. Looking ahead to his presidency, his familiarity with the political class in Baghdad, forthright proposals about Iraq’s territorial integrity, and previous role in tipping power between major actors may falsely lead to a conclusion that Iraq will be a focus for his upcoming administration. The reality, however, is much different.

What does a Biden presidency mean for the economy of Iran? The short answer is: not much. While the Iranian public considers his election good news for the country, these sentiments are fleeting and will soon fade. The reason is simple: Even if Joe Biden decides to reengage with Iran or reenter the 2015 nuclear deal on his first day in office, a Biden presidency will not change many crippling realities for the Iranian economy.

The War for Tripoli, launched by Gen. Khalifa Hifter in April 2019, came to an abrupt end in June 2020 after extensive Turkish military capabilities were introduced to the theater at the beginning of the year. This research paper seeks to drill down into the military, logistical, and technological aspects of the war, highlighting the unique role of drones, soft-kill and hard-kill air defense technologies, private military contractors, and extraterritorial military professionals in determining its final outcome. 

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Paul Salem, Alex Vatanka, Gonul Tol, Gerald Feierstein, Randa Slim, Khaled Elgindy, Charles Lister, Mirette F. Mabrouk, and Marvin G. Weinbaum.

At a rally in Florida, Donald Trump stated that Iran will be the first country to call to him after his reelection because the Iranians are “dying for a deal.” National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien added that “it is very difficult for Iran to refuse to negotiate” because “Iran cannot sustain economic pain much longer and… we don’t think they can hang in there for another four years.”

There is no doubt that the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign has had serious negative impacts on Iran’s economy and that the country is experiencing a crisis. But, if the past is any indication, the sanctions or economic pressure will not be the main drivers of Tehran’s decision-making if it decides to compromise with the United States. To imagine that a deal is in the offing due to Iran’s dire economic straits seems simplistic.  

While most experts believe that the recent normalization of ties between Israel and the UAE will not lead to a significant change in the regional balance of power, there are indications that it has the potential to bring about such a change in the long run.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Paul Salem, Michael Sexton, Alex Vatanka, and Gerald Feierstein.

Iraq’s economic and fiscal crises, which came to the forefront this year following the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, were bound to happen at some point. What corona and the ensuing drop in oil prices and declining demand for oil did is accelerate the timing, according to the recently released Iraqi government white paper, a report of the Emergency Cell for Financial Reform. What the paper doesn’t predict is that in the next 6-12 months, and possibly beyond, we could see a worsening of the crisis with both current and future governments trying to adjust oil production and revenues in an effort to contain public discontent.

As the U.S. prepares to head to the polls to choose its next president, Iran finds itself at a dead end. Hit hard by American sanctions and its own mismanagement of the economy, Tehran needs to negotiate with Washington to get out of its current economic crisis and shore up its waning popular legitimacy. With an eye to addressing these issues and mindful of the steady erosion of support for the government, President Hassan Rouhani has obtained permission from Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to negotiate with the U.S. While the news has not yet been made public, Rouhani has told Ayatollah Khamenei that he will begin talks to reach an agreement with the winner of the upcoming election — regardless of who it is — and the Iranian leader has given his initial consent.

Nazila Fathi, Nazee Moinian, and Alex Vatanka join host Alistair Taylor to discuss Iran, U.S. policy, and the potential impact of the upcoming presidential election.

The Islamic Republic of Iran recently announced that it is now welcoming the possibility of women’s leadership at the highest levels of government. Optimists are celebrating this development in the belief that it could reinvigorate weak voter turnout and lead to much-needed reforms in the country. But a more realistic analysis finds that this is little more than a cynical ploy. There is an overwhelming body of evidence that suggests not much has happened to truly advance women’s rights in the Islamic Republic in years.

Since Aug. 13, speculation has been rife that the Sultanate of Oman will soon follow the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) lead and formalize full-fledged ties with Israel. Yet, at least thus far, Muscat has refused to join the UAE, Bahrain, and now Sudan in normalizing relations with Tel Aviv. As a moderate Arab country, where tolerance is firmly embedded into the national ethos and the Ibadi sect of Islam, Oman appears to be maintaining a balanced position on the overall Arab trend toward normalizing relations with Israel. Muscat’s positive reaction to the Abraham Accords is not a major change in strategy and is more illustrative of Oman’s longstanding position on normalization.

The upcoming American presidential election is top of mind for the Arab Gulf states. This is no surprise as there is so much at stake for them. As the race enters its final critical week, all eyes are on who will occupy the White House for the next four years — and the Arab Gulf states have their preferences. America is still indispensable to Gulf security, but the Gulf is also becoming an indispensable regional partner for whoever wants to lead the world in the 21st century. Today both sides need each other more than ever before.