المشرق العربي

After more than 50 years of brutal dictatorial rule and 13 years of civil conflict, the first year of Syria’s transition has been complex, imperfect, and fraught with difficulties. However, despite some significant challenges, Syria is clearly stabilizing. To sustain this progress, the United States must remain engaged.

Dramatic developments in Syria have delivered a major blow to Kurdish ambitions for self-rule. In a rapid offensive, Damascus moved into northeast Syria, forcing the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) out and effectively dismantling the autonomous region the Kurds had built during the civil war.

The United States is Israel’s closest ally, and its support is a central pillar of Israel’s national security. The US provides Israel access to purchase advanced weapon systems, ammunition and weapon emergency supplies in times of war, intelligence sharing, opportunities for cooperation in defense technology, and crucial diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council and elsewhere. It also provides Israel with regular security aid, to be spent in the United States, currently at an annual rate of $3.8bn (under an MOU that expires in 2028). Since October 2023, the US also offered active military support, in a break from the historical norm. It contributed substantially to Israel’s defense against Iranian ballistic missiles, in conjunction with Arab regional partners, and bombed nuclear sites in Iran in support of Israel’s campaign in the “12 Day War” of June 2025.

The Abraham Accords have represented a remarkable shift in U.S. Middle East policy. They reframed Arab-Israeli normalization as a result of shared interests – within the Middle East and directly with the US, rather than as a byproduct of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Signed in September 2020, on the last leg of the first Trump administration, the Accords brokered by Washington normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, followed by framework agreements with Morocco and Sudan. From the American perspective, the Accords were intended to break decades of diplomatic stagnation in the Middle East in order to establish a regional framework aligned with American strategic objectives.

Syria’s transition still faces a formidable array of challenges — from the implementation of the deal to integrate the SDF into state structures and the military, to the economy, reconstruction, transitional justice and accountability, refugee returns, and geopolitical tensions with Israel. However, a steady and significant decline in violence offers perhaps the most encouraging and consequential metric.

Trying to capture US President Donald Trump’s proudly unpredictable approach to foreign policy in fixed policy documents is inherently difficult. Surprise, leverage and improvisation are not bugs in Mr Trump’s world view; they are features. Yet the administration has now attempted this exercise twice: with the release of the National Security Strategy last December and the National Defence Strategy this January.

In November 2025, the United States sought and obtained approval for a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 2803) endorsing the formation of a Board of Peace (BoP) and International Stabilization Force (ISF) to support the implementation of the 20-point peace plan agreed to by Israel and Hamas the previous month. The ISF’s stated role is to help secure and demilitarize the Gaza Strip, primarily by facilitating the decommissioning of weapons, protecting civilians, and training and advising burgeoning Palestinian police forces. In the intervening months, however, progress on standing up the ISF has stalled, and conflicting messaging from US officials provides more questions than answers.

Donald Trump’s first year of his second presidential term has been a roller coaster of twists and turns both at home and abroad—particularly in the Middle East. His regional focus was driven by two main factors: first, Trump’s own ego and sense of possible place in history; and second, the volatile, dynamic events driven by actors in the region.

In the first year of his second term in office, US President Donald Trump focused considerable time and energy on the Middle East, but the results so far have been uneven. This report assesses the US government’s actions in the region over the past 12 months, from January 2025 through January 2026.

After 10 months of US-mediated talks failed to achieve an integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into Syria’s transitional state, hostilities erupted in early January. US diplomacy stepped in to try to calm tensions and force through the integration of the SDF’s Kurdish core into the Syrian state. Here are 10 key takeaways and indications of where things could go next.

MEI Senior Fellow Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to discuss the latest developments in Gaza. Nearly four months after the Israeli government and Hamas agreed to President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, Washington has announced that phase two of the process is now underway. Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Taylor, and Czekaj examine the humanitarian situation in the devastated coastal strip, assess what phase two could entail, break down how international actors are responding, and explore what would need to happen to realize the plan’s aspirations.

Media and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are hyping the idea that President Trump’s attempt to gain sovereign control of Greenland has caused unprecedented and irreparable damage to the over 75 year-old Transatlantic Alliance.  This “analysis” stems from multiple sources.  On both sides of the ocean, there are those who pounce on any deviation from the norm by Trump as evidence the world as we know it is ending. And in Europe, there is the human but unattractive reaction of weak, dependent states against their one powerful ally when it rejects Europe’s preferred script. Much of the US media criticism is summarized by the concept that our other NATO allies can never again “trust” the US.