“Carpet weaving” east of the Euphrates: Iranian proxy groups expand their influence in Syria’s Hasakah Province
On Aug. 22, the northeastern Syrian city of al-Hasakah was inundated with leaflets condemning creeping Iranian influence in the area. The printed messages were plastered around several highly sensitive locations in the city center, including the local branch of the Ba’ath Party, the neighborhoods of al-Matar and al-Mahatah, as well as near the Great Mosque and market streets.
From Tiger Forces to the 16th Brigade: Russia’s evolving Syrian proxies
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine renewed focus on Moscow’s earlier military intervention in Syria, which often became framed as a “testing ground” for the weapons and tactics it now employs against Ukrainian cities. But crucially, the Russian forces backing Assad’s embattled regime also understood the importance of rebuilding the broken Syrian security forces into more effective fighting units.
On Sept. 2, the United Nations appointed a new special envoy for Libya, Senegalese diplomat Abdoulaye Bathily. But to have any chance of success, Bathily will need to reach out to local-level Libyan leaders who oppose the status quo preferred by Libya’s national politicians.
The renewal of the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program does not undermine Israeli national security per se but rather a longstanding tenet of Israel’s strategic thinking: that it must be able to fully eradicate any challenge to its military superiority deep inside enemy territory.
Syrian foreign policy in the Caucasus and Ukraine: An unbalanced, Russia-centered approach
The embattled Syrian regime’s need to preserve Russian military and political support has compelled Damascus to adopt the Kremlin line in its foreign policy positions toward the former Soviet space.
What’s next for Libya’s Great Man-Made River Project?
The Middle East and North Africa are well known for their severe water scarcity. The region’s lack of water resources is the result of many factors, including the harsh climate, intense heat, high evaporation rates, and increasing population growth. Libya is no exception in this regard. According to the World Resources Institute, it ranks 6th among the top countries worldwide facing “extremely high baseline” water stress.
Industry analysts widely agree that OPEC+ production levels are currently well below the members’ authorized quotas and that any production increases will mainly be met by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The challenges facing the group are daunting, but if met, seven major OPEC countries could feasibly raise crude oil production while utilizing existing infrastructure, significantly narrowing the global demand-supply gap.
الأسباب التي تجعل الإدارة الذاتية الخيار المرحلي الأفضل للمجتمع المحلي
هذا يضعنا أمام تسأل مهم، لماذا باتت ردود الفعل للمجتمعات المحلية على الإدارة الذاتية وجناحها العسكري ردود محدودة أو منعدمة في كثير من الأحيان؟، رغم أن هذه المجتمعات خاضت معارك طاحنة ضد النظام و تنظيم “داعش” لذات هذه الأسباب.
Why the AANES is the best interim option for local communities in northeastern Syria
In early June, the SDF, the military wing of the AANES, raided the al-Mouh neighborhood in Abu Hamam in eastern Deir ez-Zor. They burned down several houses under the pretext that their owners were wanted for smuggling oil derivatives to areas under Syrian regime control, but the incident did not provoke any response from the al-Shaitat tribe affected. This raises an important question: Why do local communities respond to attacks by the AANES and its military wing in at most a limited way when these same communities fought fierce battles against the Syrian regime and ISIS when they carried out similar attacks?
Erdoğan’s opportunism in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is notorious for pursuing a one-man foreign policy strategy to consolidate his popularity with his nationalist voter base. He has utilized bold, and sometimes reckless, foreign policy as a vehicle for his political ambitions. Now, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has opened up new high-risk opportunities for Erdoğan to improve his domestic image, especially as the next Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections approach.
