Iraq's Political Shift
Randa Slim is joined by Farhad Alaadin and Marsin Alshamary to discuss the latest political events in Iraqi Parliament, Muqtada al-Sadr, and what the future of Iraqi politics could look like moving forward.
Randa Slim is joined by Farhad Alaadin and Marsin Alshamary to discuss the latest political events in Iraqi Parliament, Muqtada al-Sadr, and what the future of Iraqi politics could look like moving forward.
تهدف هذه الورقة البحثية إلى مقاربة النفوذ الإيراني داخل المجتمع الشيعي في السعودية من خلال التركيز على أتباع مرجعية المرشد الأعلى والمعروفين بـ “خط الإمام” والجناح العسكري المنسوب للتيار والمعروف دوليًا بـ “حزب الله الحجاز” أو “حزب الله السعودي” والذي تتوجه له أصابع الاتهام بتنفيذ تفجير الخبر ١٩٩٦.
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia has been concerned about the potential influence of Iran’s supreme leader among its Shi’a population, especially since Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei took on the title of Vali-ye faqih, or “guardian-jurist.” Such concern is understandable given that the two countries are both neighbors and rivals: Khamenei is a marj’a, the highest-ranking Shi’a religious authority, but he is also the commander-in-chief of the Iranian Armed Forces. This paper aims to investigate the Iranian influence within the Shi’a community in Saudi Arabia by focusing on the followers of the supreme leader’s marj’aiyyah, known as “Khat al-Imam,” and its military wing, “Hezbollah Al-Hejaz,” often held responsible for carrying out the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing.
To identify pathways to deal with demands for economic reform and volatility in resource revenue in Iraq, in November 2021 the Middle East Institute (MEI) and Iraq Policy Group (IPG) convened a high-level workshop on the side-lines of the American University of Kurdistan’s annual Middle East Peace and Security Forum. This report provides the insights and analyses of a select group of participants, and forms part of a series of forthcoming Iraq- and Gulf-focused reports and initiatives that MEI and IPG will be convening.
Since the launch of Vision 2030 six years ago, Saudi Arabia has made considerable progress in reducing the labor-cost gap between national and foreign workers in the private sector. While the total unemployment rate has declined recently among nationals, it remains high at 11%. Drawing on evidence from Bahrain’s experience with labor market reform, this can be significantly reduced through policies designed to bridge the cost gap between citizens and foreign labor in the private sector.
For Iraqis, two key events last week will shape the rest of this year, but hopefully not many more to come. First, on June 8 the divided parliament voted in surprising harmony to pass the so-called “Food Security and Development Bill,” a controversial piece of legislation with a $17 billion price tag. Second, this was followed, almost overnight on June 9, by a call from firebrand populist Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to lawmakers loyal to his movement to “prepare their resignations.” On June 12, the 73 MPs of the Sadrist Movement tendered their resignations, and Iraq leapt even deeper into the void of political uncertainty.
Water is slowly emerging as yet another potential cause for dispute between Ankara and Tehran. As of late, the two neighboring states have been at loggerheads over a number of issues, including Syria and Iraq, where they have opposing interests. After years of quiet diplomatic juggling, the issue of transboundary water management is gradually taking center stage in the two countries’ relations, a development that could, in the medium run, have serious repercussions for regional security.
Partnering is a practical necessity for both countries but need not come at the cost of abandoning core values. The U.S. continues to exercise significant leverage and its own interests are better served globally by demonstrating credibility in what it stands for and reliability in its commitments. The U.S.-Saudi relationship has ample room to bend before it risks breaking.
تحليل إقليمي متخصص من قبل باحثي ومساهمي معهد الشرق الأوسط.
In collaboration with regional and international experts and organizations, the Middle East Institute is implementing a program aimed at promoting regional approaches to solve climactic and anthropogenic challenges to the waters of the Gulf.
Relations between Washington and some of its traditional Gulf Arab partners, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are at their lowest point in history, which is why the Biden administration on Monday sent a high-level delegation to Abu Dhabi: specifically to pay respects upon the death of former UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan and to congratulate his successor, Mohamed bin Zayed, but more generally to try to heal those ties.
This article describes Saudi Arabia’s historic and arduous journey to national-defense transformation, launched around 2015. It analyzes the challenges and opportunities of defense reform in the kingdom while highlighting the role of the United States in this process. Last, the article discusses the future of US-Saudi defense relations.
The Dorra Gas Field, located in shallow waters offshore in the northern Arabian Gulf, lies at the junction of competing territorial claims by Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. With the growing gas demand in these countries, any production will be absorbed into the domestic network and the impact of production on the global gas and LNG market will be insignificant. However, the development of the field, if it occurs, may serve as a bellwether for regional relations.
When architect Mustafa Mofaq first started working on heritage restoration at Erbil’s citadel last year, it was with a great sense of personal connection. “My great-grandfather had a house here,” explains the 27-year-old, who is employed by an EU-UNESCO partnership aimed at supporting livelihoods through cultural heritage development in Iraq and Jordan.
Making the most of Iran’s reserves will require it to develop shared fields like Dorra/Arash, a gas field located offshore in the northern Gulf, where Iran must vie with competing claims from neighboring Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In the past, Iran has often neglected its joint gas fields as a result of sanctions and focused instead on meeting its rapidly growing domestic needs through exploiting non-shared fields, but the country says this must change going forward.