So far, Saudi Arabia’s push for OPEC+ restraint appears to be working. If projections of a gradual demand recovery in 2020 are accurate, the Saudis should be able to reaffirm their centrality as market stabilizers.
When OPEC+ ministers hold their next monthly meetings on July 14-15, the Saudis are likely to be a strong voice pushing for the continuation of production limits, for both economic and political reasons.
During three major crises, each happening under a different administration, the U.S.-Gulf partnership failed to effectively address the security concerns of the Gulf states. While no partnership is perfect, such major and persistent breakdowns in coordination among longstanding security partners are uncommon, and can be deadly if left unresolved.
Leaders of Arab Gulf regimes now decry the attempt to implement the vision of the Israeli Right, which aims to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. But it is exactly the policies of the Arab Gulf regimes, through their normalization of ties with Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, that directly contributed to the rise of the Israeli Right and made this annexation more likely.
As MbS approaches three years as Saudi Arabia’s crown prince and, in the eyes of many, the de facto ruler of the kingdom, he remains an enigmatic figure on the world stage.
What happened in al-Awadh illustrates how the tribes are increasingly caught between the brutality of the Houthis and the incompetence of the Yemeni government.
Turkish support for the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) in the Libyan civil war has added a new dimension to relations between Turkey and Gulf countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. But what impact have the growing geopolitical divides and diplomatic disagreements had on Turkish-Emirati and Turkish-Saudi economic relations?
While COVID-19 and historically low oil prices are disrupting the Gulf’s political economy, the pandemic has demonstrated the region’s tech resilience.
A perceived lessening of the U.S. security umbrella would leave the Saudis far more vulnerable regionally and could force additional policy adjustments.
On April 30, roughly a week after the Southern Transitional Council (STC) declared self-administration in Aden, a military confrontation broke out on the remote Yemeni island of Socotra between members of the STC and government forces. After just a few days, the situation was diffused when the island’s governor and the STC asked the Saudis to intervene. Although an agreement was reached quickly, it is likely to be fragile because the causes of the conflict are not entirely local. The island of Socotra is simply too important to multiple international players that are not willing to let it easily slip outside their sphere of influence.
The best way to describe the Trump administration’s decision to remove Patriot missile defense systems from Saudi Arabia is by highlighting its military irrelevance and political significance.
The tensions between the two sides are unlikely to ease anytime soon.
Until a new round of UN talks begins, the cycle of violence on the ground is more than likely to continue.
President Vladimir Putin’s plans to change Russia’s Constitution and stay in power beyond 2024 have been hampered by COVID-19 and the oil price crash.
Despite the expressed Saudi aim of bringing about a respite in the fighting, there has been little change in the dynamics of the conflict.