Research & Commentary Results

On March 4, OPEC+ members agreed to maintain their current production cut levels into April, and the Saudi- and Russia-led cartel’s decision further strengthened the upward trajectory of oil prices. While there were differing opinions among the OPEC+ members regarding the state of the global economy, the group’s unanimous decision reflects Riyadh’s current take on the markets, which is that the health of the world’s economy remains fragile as the recovery from the pandemic continues.

Relations between the U.S. and Black Sea countries are complex. The Western-oriented Georgia and Romania have shown unconditional support for greater U.S. involvement. Others, like Turkey and Russia, will continue to challenge Western involvement. And while relations between Black Sea countries reflect similarly complex cooperation and conflict patterns, common among them is a hope that the Biden Administration will bring a shift in U.S. policy in the region.

Frontier Europe Initiative’s new report, Alternative Futures for the Black Sea Region, is designed to inform the development of a U.S. strategy for the Black Sea region by considering a range of alternative future scenarios.

The following article addresses the question of how the Middle East might develop in the coming decade. Long-term and detailed strategic predictions are a thankless task and are often doomed to failure. Therefore, this article refrains from attempts at prophecy but deals instead with “thinking about the future.” It opens with an analytical framework for scenario development, supplemented by “trends impact” and “horizon scanning.” The second section studies “the futures of the past,” in terms of what we might learn about the pitfalls of future projection and scenario-building from those outlining possible futures for 2020 from years past. Then, on the basis of the first two sections, four scenarios elaborate some distinctly different pathways that the Middle East might take to 2030. Finally, the article concludes with several key takeaways for Israeli decision makers.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region plays a central role in the global oil and natural gas markets. The region is home to more than 52 and 42 percent of global crude oil and natural gas proven reserves, respectively. In the past decade, the region generated 36 and 22 percent of global crude oil and natural gas, respectively. The abundance of hydrocarbons has sometimes been a mixed blessing for the economies of MENA countries, which have been reluctant to promote energy efficiency or sector diversification. Around the globe, energy intensity —energy use (kg of oil equivalent) per $1,000 GDP— became 15% more efficient between 2001 and 2018. In contrast, MENA became 8% less energy efficient according to the same measure during that period.

Iran’s attempts to achieve cyber dominance both within the MENA region and around the world have been well documented, particularly its efforts to spread pro-Iranian messaging and “tell Iran’s story.” This strategy is shaped by the challenging international context facing Tehran, which is suffering economically under U.S. sanctions and largely constrained from purchasing weapons under a recently expired U.N. arms embargo.

Ongoing conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen are expected to continue to destabilize the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 2021. However, technology will likely add another layer of complexity to these conflicts and reshape the region throughout the 2020s. When the Arab Spring began a decade ago, the biggest challenge facing long-standing Arab autocrats was grappling with the power of social media and the rise of online political opposition by tech-savvy millennial activists. In the 2020s, however, regional governments are now facing a new set of emerging technologies that will shape not only domestic politics but also regional geopolitical dynamics. These advancing technologies include: drone, cyber, and space technologies.

Since its founding the IRGC has evolved into a significant military and financial player in Iran. Khatam al-Anbiya, its construction arm, gets funding from the government for all kinds of major building projects. It is particularly actively in water management projects, like dam construction and water transfer schemes, and it forms a key part of Iran’s “Water Mafia.”

When it comes to the Persian Gulf, saving the environment might seem like it would be the last item on the to-do lists of the region’s Iranian and Arab rivals. It is an urgent matter, however — and one that could help turn these foes into friends. The United States can play an important role in this: It has helped the region to resolve conflicts over water in the past, and it could do so again.

باحث ومدير برنامج الفضاء الإلكتروني بمعهد الشرق الأوسط

One underrecognized aspect of Houthi operations that the recent FTO designation brings under scrutiny is their online presence. Ansar Allah maintains accounts on YouTube and Twitter, with 26,300 followers and 16,800 followers respectively. It also has an active group with over 22,000 participants on Telegram, an instant messaging service legally headquartered in London with servers in Dubai. The group even has its own official website.

The Biden administration will face a number of major challenges in the Middle East over the next four years, from great power competition and climate change to cybersecurity and refugees and migration. But what realistically can it achieve in that time on the policy front? To better understand what’s possible, we asked 10 experts from across MEI to weigh in with their thoughts.

Keeping up with and making sense of the flood of information about the COVID-19 pandemic is a challenge. It doesn’t help that much of that information is misleading, often by design. The “infodemic” surrounding the coronavirus, described as such by the World Health Organization (WHO) as early as February 2020, “spreads faster and more easily than the virus” itself. A recent joint statement by WHO, UN, UNICEF, UNDP, UNESCO, UNAIDS, ITU, UN Global Pulse, and IFRC noted grave consequences. It is “undermining the public health response and advancing alternative agendas of groups [and] individuals,” in ways that “cost lives … and threaten long-term prospects for advancing democracy, human rights, and social cohesion.”

Rapid and unprecedented transformation in the Middle East, whether political, social, or technological, is forcing governments to reckon with enormous changes. Many governments are responding by attempting to pursue two contradictory paths forward — cyber sovereignty and digital transformation — and they might end up not achieving either.

Ownership of economic resources is integral to exercising agency and to assuring the human security needed to live free from fear, want, and indignity. In agrarian societies, land and its natural resources are instrumental to financial, physical, and psychological wellbeing. Yet in half the world, secure land ownership is out of reach for most females. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), there is a huge gender-based gap in holding agricultural land, including where agriculture is a vital source of livelihood. In Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Jordan, most females, regardless of their education or socio-economic status are landless. Gender-based inequalities are often rooted in cultural norms that permit and exacerbate patterns of discrimination against females within the family and in economic transactions. These discriminatory attitudes trump humanistic and moral considerations, creating and reinforcing inequality. Discrimination against females in resource ownership has far-reaching implications for their lives, their families, and society. It is imperative to combat this regressive practice to ensure a dignified life for all.