اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
Even as the Iran-backed Houthi rebels pursue back-channel talks with Saudi Arabia as Riyadh looks for a major de-escalation in the coming weeks, they have also been ratcheting up the pressure on the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government. The Houthis’ strikes on government-controlled critical infrastructure exhibit the same strategic use of Iranian-supported non-conventional warfare tactics seen in their previous cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Today marks the one-year anniversary of the war in Ukraine — a war of choice by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia has failed on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The Ukrainians have defied the odds. No one will likely underestimate them again, including Russia.
The difficulty of quickly providing mechanized and armored equipment to Ukraine, training Ukraine to employ this equipment in combined arms operations, and ensuring Ukraine can maintain and sustain combat power should not be underestimated. As the examples of Turkey’s 2016 military operation in Syria and the U.S. operation in Fallujah in 2004 illustrate, dislodging Russia from its prepared defensive positions will be a daunting task for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Although U.S.-Saudi bilateral ties are on the mend, ambiguities and the transactional nature of the 1945 oil-for-security covenant contribute to mistrust and tensions. The burden of fixing or stabilizing the relationship is a shared responsibility. It’s time for Washington and Riyadh to reconfigure their security ties in accordance with new U.S. geopolitical priorities and new Saudi defense requirements. This report lays out such a process.
For the first time in several months, Iranian critical military infrastructure again came under attack from an unknown assailant. The Jan. 28 drone attack on a Ministry of Defense workshop complex appeared designed to deliver a politico-strategic message. The strike may mark the beginning of a more unstable post-JCPOA security environment in the Middle East characterized by a return of deterrence and risk-taking behavior.
Despite formal agreements and vast financial resources, Saudi Arabia has largely failed to integrate the various armed groups in Aden and southern Yemen under one national security sector. This adds to Riyadh’s ineffectiveness in establishing military-political influence in southern Yemen or in limiting the UAE’s continuing leverage. In an effort to boost its influence, since late 2022 Saudi Arabia has established new armed formations in Aden and nearby governorates, such as the Nation Shield Force.
This week, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) concluded what it called on social media, “the largest ever U.S.-Israel combined exercise.” The drills reasserted U.S. support for partnerships, deterrence, and integration, despite posture reductions and continued concern among partners about Washington’s commitment to the Middle East.
As Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine turned into protracted positional and attrition warfare, often speculative reports emerged about the imminent reduction of the Russian military presence in Syria. Several factors may explain the changes in the Russian military presence in Syria and its future.
Kremlin-linked oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the notorious Wagner Group PMC, is taking power away from the traditional Russian military establishment and fostering President Putin’s dependence on his resources and advice. This trend will undoubtedly propel the escalation of the war in Ukraine and possibly inflict irrevocable damage to the future utility of the Russian Armed Forces.
A vital part of Iran’s long-running grey zone warfare strategy is plausible deniability, as they most often work through proxies in the Middle East. And so the easiest way to keep Iran from taking action is to make sure the Islamic Republic knows the spotlight is on them.
On Nov. 21, the Iranian-backed Houthi militia launched a drone attack against the Dhabba Oil Terminal in Yemen’s Hadramawt Governorate. The threat of further attacks on oil ports and military targets remains high as the militant group tests the tolerance and response of Yemen’s government and the international community while increasing its demands.
Should the Turkish government make good on its threats to launch yet another military incursion into northern Syria, it would lead to a sharp escalation in violence in a country afflicted by a more-than-decade-long brutal conflict. Not only would Turkey’s military incursion have significant immediate effects on civilians and combatants in Syria, but it could also reverberate further throughout the region and world.
Under what conditions is the United States likely or unlikely to intervene militarily on behalf of a close partner with which it may have defense arrangements short of a formal alliance? This is an increasingly relevant question for the United States as it engages in strategic competition with China and Russia for regional partners, as well as for resources and broader influence.
In recent years, the United States has stepped up its efforts to promote a Middle East security order in which cooperation is more widely preached and effectively practiced among like-minded nations. Nowhere has this multilateral approach to regional security been more credible and fruitful than in the maritime domain.