Research & Commentary Results

One of the most consequential changes in the Middle East’s geopolitical map is happening at the water’s edge. Along the entire eastern rim of the Mediterranean basin, global and regional actors are engaging in a spate of port capacity expansions, new private port construction, and the sell-off of major state-owned ports that will determine who sits atop the region’s global trade flows for decades to come. The international competition to rebuild Beirut’s port is one key puzzle piece in this larger process that is reconfiguring the Levant’s maritime commercial architecture and, as a consequence, the geopolitical contours of the Middle East.

The possibility that the Lebanese government could opt for China to reconstruct Beirut’s port has raised alarm in Washington and European capitals given China’s already outsized commercial port presence in Egypt, Israel, and Greece. Increased Chinese involvement in Lebanon’s port operations could consolidate Beijing’s hold over the commercial connectivity architecture of the Levant. Re-orienting global commercial flows between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia according to Beijing’s priorities would make China’s Belt and Road Initiative a dominant organizing principle in the international relations of the Middle East. The most effective way to offset China’s ambition may be to facilitate Mediterranean rivals France and Turkey to jointly rebuild Beirut’s port.

In June 2021, southern Syria once again dominated the headlines when the regime laid siege to the Daraa al-Balad area of Daraa city. A few days after the monthlong siege, an agreement to end the escalation collapsed and the Syrian army’s Fourth Division spearheaded a major military push in the area. Intense clashes broke out as groups of unreconciled rebels violently repelled the advancement of Syrian military forces. Armed confrontations spread into eastern and western Daraa amid heavy bombardment via missiles, artillery, and mortar shells, marking the deadliest and most intense fighting in Syria’s south-west since the conclusion of the 2018 “reconciliation” agreements.

President Kais Saied’s July 25 decisions to suspend parliament and the government appear to have been largely popular, despite sharp criticism from those denouncing them as a coup, unconstitutional, or a dangerous overstep of his authority. The mass celebrations in the streets that broke out immediately after his televised announcement — in spite of a nighttime curfew — are evidence of the popularity of his moves. Some polling since then, which although unclear in their methodology, also seem to indicate that large majorities approve of Saied’s measures — for now.

Despite being largely low-key and limited in nature, ties between pro-Al Qaeda jihadists operating in Indonesia and Syria respectively continue to exist. Recent activity involving Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other militant Indonesian groups illustrates the potential security risks from this nexus, which should not be overlooked.

The subject of Western sanctions on Syria is a divisive one among analysts and policymakers interested in ending the misery of the country’s citizens. The division comes at a time when, more than ever, the country needs a comprehensive policy that ends the agony of most Syrians. This study assesses the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on the regime of Bashar al-Assad by conducting a comprehensive review of their history, evaluating shortcomings in the current setup, and recommending ways to move forward.

The debate over what Saied did, while important because of the legal and political implications, obscures the way in which his actions are themselves an indication of how Tunisian democracy has not been working for Tunisians. And what Saied did is, in the short term, unlikely to yield the results Tunisia needs.

اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.

EU institutions and individual member states remain committed to the peaceful settlement of the Syrian conflict, but after 10 years the question of what to do next seems most pressing. Will the EU be a passive bystander, idly watching the actions of other international players like Russia, China, Iran, or Saudi Arabia, or will it take on a more active role? And what would such a role look like?

Intissar Fakir and Fadil Aliriza of MEI’s Program on North Africa and the Sahel discuss the context and consequences of Tunisian President Kais Saied’s political maneuvers earlier this week, which opponents were quick to label a “coup.”

سارع خصوم الرئيس التونسي قيس سعيّد والمعلقون الدوليون الأكثر دراية بمصر إلى إدانة ما وصفوه بـ “الانقلاب”. هنا، إلى جانب الحاجة إلى تقييم الوضع التونسي وفقًا لطبيعته الخاصة، قد يكون من المفيد تنحية التصنيفات القانونية وتلك المرتبطة بالعلوم السياسية جانبًا في الوقت الحالي والتفكر بدلًا من ذلك في سبب احتفال الكثيرين في تونس بقرارات الرئيس الأخيرة.

اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.

Tunisian President Kais Saied’s opponents and international commentators more familiar with Egypt have been quick to condemn what they are calling a “coup.” In addition to the need to assess the Tunisian situation on its own unique terms, it may be useful to set aside legalistic and political science taxonomy for the moment and consider instead why many in Tunisia have celebrated the president’s recent decisions.

As a Lebanese actor ideologically tied to Iran, Hezbollah has multiple allegiances and objectives that do not always align symmetrically. Hezbollah’s regional activities are a reflection of the group’s increasingly close alignment with Iran, rather than the interests of the Lebanese state or citizenry. Today, Hezbollah’s regional adventurism is most pronounced in its expeditionary forces deployed in Syria and elsewhere in the region, but no less important are the group’s advanced training regimen for other Shi’a militias aligned with Iran, its expansive illicit financing activities across the region, and its procurement, intelligence, cyber, and disinformation activities. Together, these underscore the scale and scope of the group’s all-in approach to transforming from one of several Lebanese militias into a regional player acting at Iran’s behest.

منذ بداية الانتفاضة السورية مايو 2011 وحتى صيف العام 2015، فشلت الميليشيات الإيرانية إلى جانب الجيش السوري والميليشيات المحلية في إعادة السيطرة على البلاد، على الرغم من العدد الهائل لمجموع هذه القوات أمام المتمردين الذين كانت حركتهم فوضوية في مقابل أجهزة أمنية وقوات منظمة، حيث سيطرت هذه القوات المتمردة على النظام السوري مساحات واسعة من سوريا.

The Russian military intervention in Syria in late 2015 brought about a clear change in the balance of power in the military, political, and psychological spheres. The Russian military, especially its air force, dramatically tipped the scales in the conflict between the armed opposition, the regime, and the Iranian militias. Moscow’s intervention was also accompanied by a project to regain control over the security and military situation in Syria, but this effort proved far less successful.