Special Briefing: The policy and geopolitical implications of the OPEC+ oil production cuts
تحليل إقليمي متخصص من قبل باحثي ومساهمي معهد الشرق الأوسط.
تحليل إقليمي متخصص من قبل باحثي ومساهمي معهد الشرق الأوسط.
تحليل إقليمي متخصص من قبل باحثي ومساهمي معهد الشرق الأوسط.
Since being named crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman has launched a series of far-reaching socio-economic reforms known as Vision 2030 and introduced a new form of nationalist identity — “Neo-Saudism.” Taken together, some see these changes ushering in what essentially amounts to a fourth Saudi state.
Strains in the U.S.-Saudi relationship do not paint a full picture of the Oct. 5 decision.
Drawing comparisons to the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, the Red Sands Integrated Experimentation Center will increase US-Saudi cooperation to counter two of the greatest threats emanating from Iran and its proxies — drone and missile attacks.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
As welcome as recent moves toward Iranian-Gulf détente have been, extensive obstacles continue to stand in the way of a real and sustained relaxation of tensions, cause by what international relations scholars call the “security dilemma.”
The Saudi-Iran dialogue continues, but has produced little progress. As James Jeffrey of the Wilson Center and Bilal Saab of the Middle East Institute argue, part of the reason is that the two powers have fundamentally different objectives for the negotiations and that the power imbalance in Iran’s favor is profound. They suggest ways that Saudi Arabia might improve its bargaining power and argue that the United States can help strengthen Riyadh’s position.
Under current, highly unpredictable market conditions, it is unreasonable for OPEC to make sharp movements to saturate the oil market or withdraw a significant number of barrels from it to meet divergent Western interests of lowering prices and punishing Russia.
Technology represents one potentially fruitful area where the I2U2 member states — Israel, India, the U.S. and the UAE — could cooperate together, expand their format to include more countries, deliver tangible results, and avoid agitating other global and regional powers.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
Two years after the signing of the Abraham Accords, progress in developing relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors has achieved mixed results, opening up some greater cooperation in the security sphere but failing to change Arab publics’ minds due to the lack of movement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
شهدت مدينة الحسكة شمال شرق سوريا يوم 22 أغسطس الحالي توزيعا لمنشورات وملصقات مناهضة للنفوذ الإيراني في المدينة، حيث ظهرت الملصقات في عدة مناطق حساسة وسط المدينة في المنطقة المعروفة بـ “المربع الأمني” التي تخضع لسيطرة جيش النظام السوري وميليشيات الدفاع الوطني التي أصبحت تخضع لنفوذ إيران.
On Aug. 22, the northeastern Syrian city of al-Hasakah was inundated with leaflets condemning creeping Iranian influence in the area. The printed messages were plastered around several highly sensitive locations in the city center, including the local branch of the Ba’ath Party, the neighborhoods of al-Matar and al-Mahatah, as well as near the Great Mosque and market streets.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine renewed focus on Moscow’s earlier military intervention in Syria, which often became framed as a “testing ground” for the weapons and tactics it now employs against Ukrainian cities. But crucially, the Russian forces backing Assad’s embattled regime also understood the importance of rebuilding the broken Syrian security forces into more effective fighting units.