On the economic front, there were ups and downs, as the overall rosier-looking economic picture came at the expense of many of Egypt’s citizens.
On Nov. 27 the GNA signed an MoU with Turkey seeking to create a shared maritime boundary in the Mediterranean Sea between southwestern Turkey and northeastern Libya. In an overt quid pro quo, this maritime agreement was signed along with a separate MoU to expand security and military cooperation. Thus, it seems clear that Turkey was only able to persuade the GNA to agree to the maritime deal in exchange for increased security support for the GNA-aligned forces fighting the self-styled LNA in Tripoli.
The U.S. and World Bank sponsored talks last week between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – the latest developments in a regional soap opera that’s been running since 2010, when Ethiopia first announced the construction of the dam.
The Nov. 1 seizure by Malta of two 2000-cubic-foot containers full of Libyan currency printed by the Russian state printer, Goznak, that was intended for delivery to Libya’s non-internationally recognized eastern government, highlights the continuing importance of the economic aspects of Libya’s ongoing civil war.
On Oct. 23-24, Russian President Vladimir Putin co-chaired the Russia-Africa Economic Forum in Sochi with his Egyptian counterpart Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi. At the conclusion of the summit, which brought 43 African heads of state to the Black Sea resort town, Sisi emphasized the importance of strengthening Egypt’s partnership with Russia, and Putin described Egypt as a “pillar for security and stability in the Middle East and Africa.”
Egypt and Ethiopia remain at odds over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Currently almost 70 percent complete, the giant upstream dam, which can hold the entire annual rainfall of the Nile, has the capacity to essentially turn the taps off on Egypt, depriving the country of the river water that supplies a mind-numbing 90 percent of its fresh water.
Reports of a secret war being waged by Hamas against Salafi-jihadist groups in the Gaza Strip are indicative of increasing challenges to the former’s security control within the enclave. Hamas’ current approach to violent Salafist cells in Gaza is equally demonstrative of an ongoing warming of relations between Cairo and Hamas, and one that has afforded Hamas international legitimacy and an ease in border restrictions.
A question as to the value of a U.S.-Egypt Free Trade Agreement (FTA) misses the point. The question should not be whether an FTA would be in the interest of both parties since there is abundant evidence that it would. The question is what kind of FTA would best suit the needs, both short and long term, of the two parties: shallow integration or deep integration? This report argues that notwithstanding several hurdles, it is in the interest of both countries to move swiftly and decisively toward a deep FTA.
The weekend of the 23rd saw small demonstrations in approximately five governorates that had the twitterverse in an uproar and rekindled mostly moribund international interest in democracy in Egypt.
The crux of today’s Libya problem in international foreign policy lies in an underappreciated UN misstep in the most important international treaty concerning Libya, the 2015 Skhirat Agreement, and the decision to vest sovereignty in the heads of independent and semi-independent sub-state institutions like the Central Bank of Libya. The negative implications of this decision must now be addressed and it is time to move onto something new, after Skhirat.
Largely overlooked in international policymaking toward Libya’s current conflict is the role of corruption as a key driver of violence, as opposed to merely its byproduct. The high-level debate on Libya at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in late September and the proposed follow-on international conference to be hosted by Germany in October or November are the perfect opportunities to correct this oversight.
In late July, Lt. Gen. Michael Anker Lollesgaard left Yemen after his six-month term as the second head of the UN Mission in support of the Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA) came to an end. Unlike his predecessor, Maj. Gen. Patrick Cammaert, who departed quietly, Lollesgaard was given a proper sendoff from Sana’a. A senior Houthi commander, Maj. Gen. Ali al-Musheki, even went so far as to describe Lollesgaard as “a conscientious military commander.”
Khalifa Hifter has managed to garner outside support by appealing to foreign states’ desire for a stable Libya, but this rogue former general and would-be authoritarian has proven a troublesome proxy. In supporting his ongoing offensive on Tripoli, foreign states are undermining their own narrative of authoritarian stability.
Water scarcity is a global concern that disproportionately affects the Middle East. Mirette Mabrouk, director of MEI’s Egypt program, joins host Alistair Taylor to discuss steps Egypt has taken to manage its own water resources, and what more needs to be done to mitigate the impact of climate change.
The article was first published by the Atlantic Council.