Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
The painful reality is that Washington’s hastily cobbled together ethno-sectarian political system for post-2003 Iraq ended up doing the opposite of what it intended. The regional domino effect was also the opposite of what the U.S. had hoped for, as Iraq became a cautionary tale that regimes could use to undermine the democratic desires of their own populations.
As part of a continued collaboration with the Middle East Peace and Security Forum held in Iraqi Kurdistan at the American University of Kurdistan, the Middle East Institute and the Iraq Policy Group held a workshop on Nov.15, 2022 focusing on challenges of economic diversification, energy transition, and impacts on labor markets in Iraq and the Gulf region. This report provides the insights and analyses of a select group of participants from the workshop.
Despite Iraq’s systemic and ongoing domestic instability, division, and foreign interference, there are fragile but hopeful signs of de-confliction and de-escalation. These include important efforts that a number of international actors as well as the government in Bagdad itself have been making to turn Iraq into a platform for regional engagement.
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Bafel Talabani is a frequent visitor to Baghdad, traveling to Iraq’s capital an estimated 35 times since the beginning of 2022 or more than once every two weeks on average. It is indicative of a deliberate strategy by the PUK to increase its activity within Iraq’s federal system, making it a priority, rather than merely an afterthought, to political affairs in the Kurdistan Region.
The next few decades will be crucial for Iraq and the KRG as global changes reshape the energy sector. The push for sustainable development, the Paris Agreement climate goals, and associated efforts in areas like renewable energy, climate change, and environmental protection will bring about a transition across the sector, affecting everything from employment and working patterns to governance.
The Gulf Arab states, while major oil and gas producers, can play a significant role in supporting global efforts to achieve net-zero goals. They are not only endowed with great potential for renewable energy resources as well as some of the world’s lowest carbon content fuels, but also with, to varying extents, sizable financial resources. Yet, to unlock such huge potential, the Gulf Arab states will need to systematically identify and address the various challenges in their path to net zero.
The traditional 20th-century pillars of U.S.-Saudi bilateral relations are energy and security — a reflection of Cold War dynamics and the critical role that Saudi Arabia plays in the global economy as an energy superpower. Now, in 2023, Riyadh and Washington should think beyond energy to explore opportunities and address critical challenges in areas such as tech and cyber, which could ultimately cement their strategic relations for the 21st century.
Even as the Iran-backed Houthi rebels pursue back-channel talks with Saudi Arabia as Riyadh looks for a major de-escalation in the coming weeks, they have also been ratcheting up the pressure on the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government. The Houthis’ strikes on government-controlled critical infrastructure exhibit the same strategic use of Iranian-supported non-conventional warfare tactics seen in their previous cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Amid international efforts to resurrect the fragile peace in Yemen, the Iran-backed Houthi militia is imposing stringent conditions for their return to the negotiating table, demanding that state payments of civil servant salaries also go to their militia members and loyalists through direct deposits, which would bolster both their forces and their transnational allies. While the need to compensate Yemeni civil servants is undeniable, the Houthis’ self-serving demands threaten to undermine any progress toward a lasting peace.
The difficulty of quickly providing mechanized and armored equipment to Ukraine, training Ukraine to employ this equipment in combined arms operations, and ensuring Ukraine can maintain and sustain combat power should not be underestimated. As the examples of Turkey’s 2016 military operation in Syria and the U.S. operation in Fallujah in 2004 illustrate, dislodging Russia from its prepared defensive positions will be a daunting task for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The Middle East and North Africa is one of the epicenters for what the U.S. has termed “great power competition” especially between the U.S. and China, although Russia also figures into the assessment. There is particular sensitivity to China’s perceived economic inroads into the region as it has surged to become its largest economic partner. Based on Arab Barometer’s Wave 7 raw favorability numbers, China’s increased presence in the region appears to have paid dividends in terms of its popular standing, especially in North Africa.
Despite massive hydrocarbon reserves, Iraq struggles with chronic electricity shortages. There is a clear need to explore cleaner alternatives, such as renewable energy systems, yet the deployment and integration of these systems would be hindered by the same structural woes that have crippled the electricity sector, and which go far beyond generation issues.
A Saudi-Houthi agreement now looks increasingly likely, but it is highly doubtful that such a deal by itself will end the multi-layered war or build a sustainable peace.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.