اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is at its core an ideological army, not a national one, and its notorious enmity toward Israel is an aberration in Iranian history. But many Israelis to this day think Iran could be a natural partner as long as the country gave up its pursuit of ideologically driven regional dominance, disavow calls for the destruction of Israel, and were instead to again allow the regular army, the Artesh, to pursue Iranian national interests.
One of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s special envoys keeps visiting Iran. Igor Levitin, Putin’s advisor, has visited Tehran twice in 2023, totaling five visits in the last six months. During his latest visit, Levitin met with top Iranian figures, including Mohammad Mokhber, first vice president and top economic coordinator, and Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
تركزت جميع النزاعات التاريخية والحديثة في الشرق الأوسط حول الاعتبارات الإقليمية الكلاسيكية المتعلقة بفقدان الأراضي أو استعادتها. وللخروج من هذه الدوامة، كان من الضروري الابتعاد عن أحد الأسباب الجذرية الرئيسية للنزاع: الجغرافيا. وقد تكون التغيرات الحالية في المنطقة، التي تتميز بتوجه كبير نحو تخفيف حدة التوتر واستعداد متزايد للانفصال بشكل دوري عن الحلفاء التقليديين، مؤشرات على حدوث تحول جذري عميق نحو "السياسة الكمومية".
When Saudi Arabia suddenly announced in early April that it would reduce its oil production by 500,000 bpd, followed shortly thereafter by several other OPEC+ members, bringing the total cut to 1.1 million bpd, Japan was greatly concerned. In spite of Japan’s serious efforts to work toward a carbon-neutral society, the country is still heavily dependent on oil, the overwhelming majority of which comes from the Persian Gulf.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
في الشرق الأوسط، تسعى دول الخليج - من خلال العمل المشترك أو بشكل فردي - إلى تحقيق إنجازات علمية وتجارية جديدة في مختلف مجالات صناعة الفضاء. وترتبط هذه الطموحات بآثار جيوسياسية كبيرة، حيث يتفاوض عدد متزايد من الدول الفضائية حول قطاع حساس وذو قوة متزايدة.
President Theodore Roosevelt said, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.”1 Roosevelt used the image of the big stick to popularize his philosophy, but he offered a subtler interpretation in other venues. It represented a quiet threat that would only rarely need to be used if accompanied by steady diplomacy.
In recent years, Iraq has become one of the leading destinations for Chinese investments in the Middle East and a crucial link in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. To capitalize on its geostrategic location and central position within the Chinese BRI, Iraq is seeking to develop a sprawling new 54-square-kilometer port project, known as al-Faw Grand Port, which will reduce the country’s reliance on Arab Gulf ports and overland transit from Iran and Turkey. The project also underscores Iraq’s growing economic rivalry with neighboring Iran, as both countries seek to carve out a similar niche in handling regional transit traffic.
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
After an intense round of secret negotiations between Iranian and Saudi representatives, facilitated by Chinese mediation, Tehran and Riyadh announced in mid-March that they would resume diplomatic relations. It is unclear if the Saudi-Iranian détente will last, but at least for now, China’s role in resolving this diplomatic stalemate seems to indicate the beginning of a multi-faceted de-Westernization process in the region.
The conclusion of the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian détente on March 10, which aims to thaw long-standing enmity and manage competition between the two regional arch rivals, has multi-layered implications for Yemen.
Relations between Tehran and Baku have long had their ups and downs, but a recent series of events in late March have once again brought tensions to a boil. However, despite the mutual threat perceptions, the recurring tensions between the two countries have not gotten out of control and led to military conflict. In fact, over the past three decades, relations between Tehran and Baku have consistently followed a cycle of escalating and de-escalating tensions.
More than a year on from the beginning of the Ukraine war in February 2022, there is no more business as usual for Russia-Iran relations. While bilateral ties are still characterized by an intense focus on security and defense, the two sides are opening multiple new areas of cooperation as well. But what has motivated Moscow and Tehran to invest in strengthening their bilateral relations given all the potential risks and costs? Could conflicts of interest and competition put a crack in this burgeoning relationship? And what can the West do about it?
اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.