The civil war in Yemen is well into its eighth year with no end in sight. It is imperative that the United Nations, with the United States and other key powers in support, do more to end the suffering and begin the long process of rebuilding and reconstructing Yemen. But that work cannot begin until there is a common understanding of what the obstacles are to achieving a peaceful resolution. In particular, what tools can and should the United States use to pressure the Houthis and overcome their resistance to negotiations?
Thanks to Iran, Israel emerges stronger as the US shifts its focus away from the Middle East
The U.S. is disengaging from the Middle East as it shifts its focus elsewhere, a move widely perceived within the region as a sign of a coming American departure. Many in Israel were concerned that this would strengthen Iran and its influence in the region. Instead, it is Israel that has emerged stronger.
Saudi Arabia’s natural gas aspirations: The domestic outlook
With the recent announcement of the Jafurah Field, a massive unconventional, non-associated gas play, Saudi Arabia is looking to enter the global gas sector. The field’s estimated reserves, while substantial, are insufficient to meet current domestic needs and, in the future, displace dirty heavy fuel oil used in power generation and satisfy international export goals. The kingdom thus faces difficult decisions regarding the allocation of the Jafurah gas — to either domestic or international markets — and both options have significant challenges.
The Arab Gulf states appear to be following a common template in responding to the global transition toward an energy system in which renewables play an increasingly central role. They are publicizing renewable energy targets, decarbonizing upstream and downstream oil and gas operations, commissioning renewable energy projects, and improving energy efficiency, among other strategies. A closer look, however, reveals differences in how they have deployed solar and wind power capacity.
Qatar is no short-term savior, but it may still play a role in strengthening EU energy security
The U.S. request for Qatari assistance in ensuring the EU’s energy security in case of a Russian supply disruption should be perceived as a political gesture of support addressed to Western allies and a warning to Russia. In reality, however, the American request is just one factor in Qatar’s calculations as it considers increasing its energy exports to Europe, and Doha’s final decision will be determined by an intricate combination of long-term economic and political considerations. In this equation political reasons may not be dominant and economic drivers will not always be in the West’s favor.
أمير قطر الشيخ تميم يصبح أول زعيم خليجي يزور البيت الأبيض في عهد بايدن
عندما يزور أمير قطر الشيخ تميم بن حمد آل ثاني الرئيس جو بايدن في 31 يناير/كانون الثاني، وعلى عكس العديد من القادة الآخرين الذين تلقوا دعوات إلى المكتب البيضاوي، هناك جدول أعمال جاد وحافل بالقضايا العالمية المُلحِّة للمناقشة بين الزعيمين. فعلى المدى القريب والعاجل، سيُطلب من الشيخ تميم التزام قطر بمساندة الجهود المبذولة لمعالجة احتمال انقطاع إمدادات الطاقة الروسية إلى أوروبا الغربية، وخاصة ألمانيا، في حالة إذا واصل الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين التهديدات بمهاجمة أوكرانيا.
For Gulf producers, decarbonization does not mean zero oil production
Gulf oil producers do not envisage a post-2050 world devoid of hydrocarbons, even though two of the region’s biggest producers, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and 2060, respectively. Reconciling their future environmental commitments with their current reliance on hydrocarbons is going to be an arduous and expensive journey that starts with decarbonizing their oil and gas production to reduce their carbon footprint and increasing their domestic green energy production. With demand for oil and gas forecast to continue post-2050 — albeit at lower levels than now — their net-zero target does not equate to zero oil and gas production. Instead, their transition will differ from that of other countries and will happen at a different pace.
The UAE paves way for Syria’s return to the Arab fold, but plenty of hurdles remain
The UAE has made bold strides to normalize relations with embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, opening itself up to criticism as many countries remain reluctant to reconcile with Damascus. Despite this measured reintegration of Assad into the Arab fold, many serious complications and challenges lie ahead. The most important of these is the lack of support from a hesitant Saudi Arabia, which would impede the crucial next step of Syria’s restoration to full membership in the Arab League before its upcoming summit.
What these attacks and many others in the region have in common is Iran’s irrefutable involvement. They may have different local contexts and their perpetrators, all loyal to Iran, may have different motivations, but every single one of those attacks was possible only because Iran provided either the weapons or the know-how to assemble and use them.
How involved was Iran in the Houthi attack on the UAE?
Three days have passed since the Houthi attack on the UAE, yet there’s still a lot we don’t know about what really happened. Here’s what we do know: The Houthis officially stated that they were the ones who struck Abu Dhabi, and unlike in September 2019 when they made the same claim, this time they might not be lying. Yet this is not enough to help us answer what in my opinion is the ultimate question: to what extent were the Iranians involved in this attack?
يوم 17 يناير/كانون الثاني، نفذ الحوثيون هجومًا آخر استهدف منشأة نفطية إماراتية في أبوظبي، ما أدى إلى مقتل ثلاثة وافدين، وإلحاق أضرار بالبنية التحتية. ظاهريًا، يبدو أنهم يذكَّرون الإماراتيين بمدى ضعفهم وإمكانية الإضرار بهم إذا استمرت الهجمات ضد مصالح الحوثيين في اليمن. وبحسب ما ورد، كانت وسائل الهجوم عبارة عن طائرات مسيرة، وهي أداة بسيطة غير متماثلة متاحة للكثيرين واستخدمها الحوثيون على نطاق واسع في جميع أنحاء المنطقة. لسوء الحظ فإن القصة هنا قد أصبحت مألوفة للغاية وتتطلب استجابة متسقة الآن. ففي نهاية المطاف، من المرجح أن يتم نسخ وتكرار ما أصبح روتينيًا في الخليج في مواقع أخرى.
As the Houthis expand their regional aggression, will the US double down on a failing strategy?
While a negotiated agreement by the parties to deescalate militarily and return to the negotiating table would be the preferred outcome, there’s little or no reason to believe that the Houthis, who have responded to their losses in Shabwa by escalating their attacks, are yet interested in talking. Rather, by issuing pleas for de-escalation, the international community risks sending the Houthis yet another message that their intransigence, which is the root cause of the humanitarian crisis afflicting Yemenis, will be rewarded by new pressure on the Saudi-led coalition to limit its response to Houthi aggression. In this regard, the Biden administration, with its international partners, risks repeating the failed strategy of 2021.
