اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.
The Ukraine grain export deal, which Turkey helped mediate over the summer, was saved last week to much fanfare; but the central unaddressed issue remains lifting Russia’s illegal blockade of Ukrainian ports, so Ukraine can freely trade with the world.
The 22nd Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in the Uzbekistani city of Samarkand this past September turned out to be a boon for Iran’s regional policy. Not only was the Islamic Republic extended a roadmap to join the grouping, but the meeting also offered a convenient opportunity to revive and strengthen ties with Uzbekistan.
The Biden Administration’s National Security Strategy has drawn some criticism for its relatively late release, but what of its actual substance? Today, Alistair Taylor talks with four experts, each with unique insights into the context and strategy of this document with regards to the Middle East, North Africa, and American foreign policy at large.
Ashton B. Carter, the 25th U.S. Secretary of Defense, who served under former President Barack Obama, passed away on October 24, 2022. MEI’s scholars react to the news and remember his rich legacy.
Following the AKP’s rise in 2002, civil-military relations in Turkey began to change significantly. The military’s tutelage over Turkish politics was gradually replaced with the AKP’s control over the Turkish Armed Forces. The July 2016 coup attempt put an end to the military’s prestige and popularity and ushered in a new era, with Erdoğan and his AKP asserting full civilian control over the military. This paper explores the factors that paved the way for the new civil-military relations between 2002 and 2016, reviews how the 2016 coup attempt became an opportunity for the AKP to further eliminate all opposition, and analyzes the impact of the upcoming 2023 elections and the opposition’s stance on civil-military relations.
As protesters’ slogans and chants have made clear, the current protests are definitely not about the economy, but about opposition to the regime more broadly and its political and social oppression. Yet Iran’s economic problems have created an atmosphere that encouraged and fueled protesters’ anger and have done nothing to help the regime.
تحليل إقليمي متخصص من قبل باحثي ومساهمي معهد الشرق الأوسط.
Strains in the U.S.-Saudi relationship do not paint a full picture of the Oct. 5 decision.
Drawing comparisons to the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, the Red Sands Integrated Experimentation Center will increase US-Saudi cooperation to counter two of the greatest threats emanating from Iran and its proxies — drone and missile attacks.
As welcome as recent moves toward Iranian-Gulf détente have been, extensive obstacles continue to stand in the way of a real and sustained relaxation of tensions, cause by what international relations scholars call the “security dilemma.”
The Saudi-Iran dialogue continues, but has produced little progress. As James Jeffrey of the Wilson Center and Bilal Saab of the Middle East Institute argue, part of the reason is that the two powers have fundamentally different objectives for the negotiations and that the power imbalance in Iran’s favor is profound. They suggest ways that Saudi Arabia might improve its bargaining power and argue that the United States can help strengthen Riyadh’s position.
Since seizing the capital of Sana’a in September 2014, the Houthis have been transforming the portions of Yemen under their control in line with a radical political and religious ideology. The Houthis’ war is complicated and may not be resolved quickly. But for now, the main obstacles to peace are ones that only Yemenis can resolve, which are rooted in rival concerns over the distribution of political power and equitable delivery of public services.
Under current, highly unpredictable market conditions, it is unreasonable for OPEC to make sharp movements to saturate the oil market or withdraw a significant number of barrels from it to meet divergent Western interests of lowering prices and punishing Russia.
U.S. Central Command is quietly making a historic transition from a wartime command center to something like a hub for cajoling the region’s partners large and small toward stouter collective defense. But since CENTCOM’s new commander has vastly fewer resources for his tough new mission, defense and national security leaders in Washington need to back him up with a larger measure of policy coherence.