Look to the people of the region first, then the evolving competition among regional states and global powers, for signs on what to expect.
On Jan. 17, the Houthis perpetrated another attack, targeting an Emirati oil facility in Abu Dhabi, killing three international citizens, and damaging infrastructure. The story here is unfortunately all too familiar and begs a coherent response now. After all, what is becoming routine in the Gulf will likely be copied and repeated in other locations.
Morocco’s phosphorus fertilizer industry, with its massive production capacity and international reach, has transformed the kingdom into a gatekeeper of global food supply chains. Morocco’s centrality to global food security rests with the fact that all food crops, indeed all plant life, require the element phosphorus to grow and Morocco possesses over 70% of the world’s phosphate rock reserves, from which the phosphorus used in fertilizers is derived. By becoming one of the world’s leading fertilizer exporters, instead of continuing to just export the raw material, Morocco has enriched its economy and elevated its international standing. In Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the kingdom’s combination of joint venture partnerships in local fertilizer production and deft direct outreach to farmers has resulted in a remarkable boost in African agricultural yields and the notable expansion of Morocco’s soft power influence across the continent.
While some of Saied’s rhetoric as well as his symbolic and legislative decisions may appear to some as revolutionary, the post-July 25 political system has thus far maintained continuity from both the pre- and post-revolutionary way in which the state governs: a top-down, policing approach with deference to — and reinforcement of — existing socio-economic hierarchies. In presiding over and perpetuating this system, whether with verve or reluctantly, Saied has become an ordinary politician, following in the footsteps of many others who have held positions of power.
In a volatile international environment, unpredictability reigns. Perhaps nowhere is this more true than in the Sahel, where myriad existing security challenges have only been exacerbated by the devastating impact of COVID-19. Despite significant stabilization efforts, the situation is growing increasingly complex and various interrelated vulnerabilities weigh heavily on the region’s security agenda, including the pandemic, terrorist threats, chronic economic instability, climate change, skyrocketing demographics, and weak governance systems, as well as unprecedented food insecurity and extreme poverty.
إن استراتيجية المملكة العربية السعودية لزيادة محفظتها من الأصول النظيفة والمتجددة قد تم تعزيزها في عام 2021، حيث شهدت المملكة العديد من عمليات تمويل المشاريع في قطاع الطاقة الشمسية وأطلقت صندوق البنية التحتية الوطني لتنويع اقتصادها.
بعد شهرين في السلطة، أعطت الحكومة المغربية الجديدة إشارات إلى أنها تريد إعطاء الأولوية للتنمية الاجتماعية والتعافي من الآثار المطولة لكوفيد 19 على البلاد. ومع ذلك، فإن استقرار الاقتصاد الكلي، والموارد المالية المحدودة، وزيادة الإنفاق الدفاعي تحد من مدى قدرة الدولة على متابعة وتمويل خطط التنمية الاجتماعية التي تشتد الحاجة إليها.
Saudi Arabia’s leviathan sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), has recently sold a 5% stake in the Saudi Telecom Company (STC). The firm is the largest and most profitable in the regional telecoms sector. The 3.2B USD sale, completed in early Dec. 2021, is yet another step in Riyadh’s privatization drive as part of its Vision 2030 agenda, and highlights the growing role of the Kingdom’s domestic financial sector.
Saudi Arabia’s strategy to push through its portfolio of clean and renewables assets was further strengthened in 2021 as the kingdom witnessed several project financings in the solar sector and launched the National Infrastructure Fund (NIF) to diversify its economy.
For the MENA region, groundwater is a hidden but significant problem, as many countries extract more than is being recharged and most lack solid legal frameworks and national water policy regulations to determine use. As a result, there are questions and concerns about the current status of groundwater aquifers, especially with the increasing impact of climate change, as well as the type of sustainable alternative solutions that could assist in conserving them. Libya is no exception to this broader regional trend, and the country suffers from growing water scarcity.
Since late October, Sudan has been mired in a state of intense political turmoil. On Oct. 25, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized power in a coup d’état, placed civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok under house arrest, and declared a state of emergency. In response to intense international pressure, Burhan and Hamdok signed a 14-point deal on Nov. 21, which reinstated Hamdok as prime minister and resulted in the release of political prisoners. While this agreement thwarted Sudan’s descent into a military dictatorship, mass protests persist and the opposition Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) have rejected the deal.
On Nov. 22, the Dubai Expo hosted an event where the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, and Israel signed a cooperation agreement that would broker an exchange of renewable energy and water between Jordan and Israel. The signing of the agreement between the respective minsters of the three countries took place in the presence of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and U.S. Climate Envoy John Kerry, who played a role in getting the deal done.
The local and regional elections that took place in Algeria on Nov. 27 are the last in a series after the fall of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in April 2019. They were preceded by a presidential election that elevated Abdelmadjid Tebboune in December 2019, a referendum on the revision of the constitution in November 2020, and legislative elections in June 2021. Once again, Algerian observers can’t help but ask about the meaning of these repetitive flawed elections. Analyzing elections held in an authoritarian context for what they should be, namely a bridge toward a democratic transition, is indeed fruitless. By analyzing the purpose they serve for the actors themselves, however, we can understand why they still occur despite their lack of credibility and how their illegitimacy shapes current Algerian politics.
After two months in power, Morocco’s new government has indicated that it wants to prioritize social development and post-pandemic recovery as the country reels from the prolonged impact of COVID-19. However, macro-economic stabilization, constrained financial resources, and increasing defense spending are limiting the extent to which the state can effectively pursue and finance much-needed social development plans.
