Research & Commentary Results

Faced with the Trump and Netanyahu governments’ persistent dismissal of the Palestinians and their rights, the PA has spent the better part of the last three years threatening to terminate all relations with Israel, and even to withdraw the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) recognition of Israel. The deteriorating situation culminated in Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ May 2020 declaration that the Palestinian leadership was absolved “of all the agreements and understandings with the American and Israeli governments.” Notwithstanding previous similar warnings from Abbas in recent years, the announcement prompted speculation among Palestinian political parties, Palestinians at home and in the diaspora, scholars, activists, and journalists over the future of Palestinian politics in the post-Oslo era.

It’s difficult to look at the Middle East and consider its future optimistically. Much of the analysis of the region centers on crisis and collapse. There is plenty of both, fueled by wars and civil conflicts, poverty, extremism, and more. Given the human toll, focusing on all this is natural. It is also necessary if solutions to deeply rooted problems are ever to be developed, leading to a better future.A related risk is becoming blinded to “weak signals” — early indicators of what could become features of potential alternative futures. Weak signals are developments that are emerging outside the dominant norms and trends of today. In the Middle East, probably the most dominant norm is the inability of governments throughout the region to provide security and prosperity for their citizens. The COVID-19 pandemic is making this even more apparent, and markedly worse. It is not just the obvious failed states — as Steven Cook recently observed, “sometimes state failure is a more chronic condition.” But in the midst of this — and fueled by it — there is evidence of activities at the local level to create what is missing. Could these be signals of a future different than the one it is so easy to expect for the region?

This new white paper distills the findings of the Middle East Institute panel “State of Play for Middle East Cybersecurity Leaders,” a discussion held in September 2020 about the unique threats, best practices, and corporate landscape in the Middle East and North Africa region.

The (UAE is laying the groundwork for regional supremacy in AI. By fostering a web of novel institutions and partnerships, the Gulf state aims to augment its capacity to execute lofty AI policy initiatives. Further signaling its resolve, Abu Dhabi is lavishing the nascent sector with a host of incentives: financial privileges, office space, and even health care coverage. The embrace of AI comes as the UAE is cultivating emerging technologies as a means of boosting and diversifying its rentier economy, as well as signaling its innovation capacity and viability as a global trade powerhouse.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China seeks to play a larger role in the Black Sea region. China has been wooing littoral states in hopes of securing new markets for its goods and investing in infrastructure projects. But some worry that there is more to Chinese actions in the region than meets the eye. The worry is that China will increase its political and diplomatic clout in a region that is considered vital for Russian interests and create tension between Moscow and Washington. Despite the uneasiness in the West about China’s increasing presence in the Black Sea, there is not enough focus on the issue in the scholarly debates in Western capitals. The MEI’s Frontier Europe Initiative aims to contribute to the debate on the role of China in the Black Sea. We hope the articles in this report will help to address several important unaddressed questions.

Tech platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Google have come to play a central role in questions of free speech, governance, and human rights in the Middle East. In particular, the question of content moderation — how platforms create and enforce policies which determine what kinds of user-generated content are and are not permissible on their services — has become a focal point of these discussions.

What does a Biden presidency mean for the economy of Iran? The short answer is: not much. While the Iranian public considers his election good news for the country, these sentiments are fleeting and will soon fade. The reason is simple: Even if Joe Biden decides to reengage with Iran or reenter the 2015 nuclear deal on his first day in office, a Biden presidency will not change many crippling realities for the Iranian economy.

Iraq’s economic and fiscal crises, which came to the forefront this year following the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, were bound to happen at some point. What corona and the ensuing drop in oil prices and declining demand for oil did is accelerate the timing, according to the recently released Iraqi government white paper, a report of the Emergency Cell for Financial Reform. What the paper doesn’t predict is that in the next 6-12 months, and possibly beyond, we could see a worsening of the crisis with both current and future governments trying to adjust oil production and revenues in an effort to contain public discontent.

Algeria is at a critical stage in its energy sector development. The nation has both the potential and the incentive to maximize its natural resources and become a renewable energy leader. In addition to its status as the second-most-populous country in North Africa, Algeria is noteworthy for its relative size, wealth, location, gas reserves, renewable energy potential, and greenhouse gas emissions. Recent oil and gas price volatility and increasing domestic electricity demand provide impetus for Algeria to prioritize clean energy investment.

On June 17, 2020, the U.S. State Department’s special envoy to Syria, Joel Rayburn, announced the beginning of the “summer of Caesar,” promising a wave of sanctions designations under the newly activated Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. Summer has come and gone, but there’s little to show for it.

The Caesar Civilian Protection Act sanctions on Syria, which were signed into law by U.S. President Donald Trump in December and took effect on June 17, have polarized the international community. Most European countries have supported the Caesar Act’s use of sanctions to punish Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for war crimes, but Russia and China have stridently criticized the legislation.

Landlocked Afghanistan has begun using the Chinese-operated Pakistani port of Gwadar for transit trade — a development Pakistani officials see as marking the start of Gwadar’s role as a gateway port through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Pakistan’s hope to develop the Arabian Sea port into a gateway for Afghanistan, Central Asia, and China’s Xinjiang region has been a long-standing one — and it is misguided. Islamabad should instead focus on local drivers to build the port and use it as a vehicle to develop the impoverished, but resource-rich region of southern Balochistan.

Egypt is not alone in having been knocked into a pit by the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, but it will have to dig itself out on its own. However, if Egypt is going to do so, it needs to rethink its approach to development, starting with looking for the silver lining to the pandemic. Is it possible to address existing issues that have been brought home by the exceptional circumstances? In this report, contributors dissect the weaknesses that make Egypt particularly vulnerable to external threats and examine ways in which to address these vulnerabilities and shore up the economy and the business and developmental environment.

With its successful turnaround, strategic location, and extensive infrastructure, Egypt is repositioning itself as a regional energy hub for not only Europe and the Middle East, but also for Africa. It is useful to reflect on the successful transformation of Egypt’s energy sector while also evaluating where the sector stands today and how it will react to the twin challenges of the COVID-19 global pandemic and the oil price shock.

Over the past decade, Iran has made a concerted push to expand its cyber capabilities, an effort in which the IRGC has played a central role. Given the IRGC’s expansive and growing power, scholars, analysts, and many Iran watchers have long thought that at some point it could take over control in Iran, replacing the theocratic government with a military one. As Iran approaches an inflection point over the issue of succession after Ayatollah Khamenei, that day could be coming soon, and the IRGC is well placed to bring about such a transition given the hybrid mix of physical and cyber capabilities that it has developed and perfected over recent decades.