Research & Commentary Results

There has been a largely overlooked yet significant trend in entrepreneurship in Egypt, the Arab world’s most populous country. Much of this has been concentrated in the country’s two main economic centers, Cairo and Alexandria, but there are also signs of a broader and more inclusive trend. Despite this boom, few start-ups seem to have left much of a mark beyond the early development stages. A lack of access to finance has long been recognized as a key obstacle, yet the approaches taken by the government and international development lenders have proven largely ineffective. If this, along with other obstacles, can be addressed, the country’s nascent start-up scene could become a catalyst for economic development.

The main takeaway from the Saudi Aramco IPO in December 2019 is that the Saudi leadership is willing to fully support private investors. 

Egypt’s burgeoning population is one of the biggest threats to its future.

The eastern Mediterranean has become an increasingly important focus for Turkey’s foreign and security policy, but the interlocking of new issues like energy politics and sovereignty rights with old problems like Cyprus has created significant challenges for Ankara.

Over the past 14 months, there have been moments when it seemed like progress was being made toward de-escalation in Yemen, but there have also been significant setbacks as well. Peace efforts thus far have been largely fragmented and frail, and two primary lessons from the past failures have become clear.

The green movement has been slow to catch on in Egypt, but the January announcement by the Egyptian government that it is finalizing plans to launch the country’s first green bonds could provide the financial incentives to further promote sustainable development. “Sustainability” is one of the fastest growing sectors globally, estimated to reach as much as $12 trillion annually by 2030.

As Egypt’s presidency of the AU comes to an end, it will have to maintain its focus on Africa to prove that it was not a one-time effort.

Since the death of its founder Ali Abdullah Saleh on Dec. 4, 2017, the General People’s Congress (GPC) — Yemen’s dominant political party for the past four decades — has faced a test in attempting to reunify its divided wings in Riyadh, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Sanaa amid a shifting strategic landscape. The GPC’s factions have competed over the party leadership, failed to elect a transitional leader, and exchanged accusations following the Saudi-brokered meeting in Jeddah in July 2019. Nevertheless, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh’s attempts to revive Saleh’s damaged old political vehicle continue, both politically and militarily.

Absent international pressure, the Iran-backed Houthis have no reason to stop expanding

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait (“Gate of Tears” in Arabic) forms a vital strategic link in the maritime trade route between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. On one side of the narrow strait lies the Arabian Peninsula. On the other is the Horn of Africa, a fragile region that has been plagued for decades by high levels of violence and instability within and across borders, and which in recent years has served as a launching pad for terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, and smuggling operations.

Egypt has realized a significant number of changes in healthcare, education, and economic reform policy over the past decade. It is also increasingly looking toward policy for development that emphasizes cohesive problem solving, in line with its Vision 2030 strategy, which highlights the need for positive knock-on effects from investments in human development

As neighboring regions, the South Caucasus and the Middle East are inextricably intertwined — so much so that the former is sometimes even considered part of the Greater Middle East. While geographical proximity is the strongest driver of interconnectivity between the two regions, geopolitics, business ties, and energy interests also link countries from the South Caucasus and the Middle East and form the basis for important bilateral and regional relationships.

In the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force, on Jan. 3, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned the U.S. of Iran’s “harsh revenge.” There has been much speculation around the timing, location, and the type (or form) of Iran’s promised revenge. Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou takes a closer look at the impact of the widely discussed strategy of blocking the Strait of Hormuz.

Just over a year ago, the international community rejoiced in the revival of the UN-led Yemen peace process with the conclusion of the Stockholm Agreement between the Yemeni government and the Houthi insurgency (Ansar Allah), brokered by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Although the deal marked the first political breakthrough in the peace process since the collapse of Geneva and Kuwait talks under Griffith’s predecessor, the ensuing hurdles in implementation meant that hopes for its success were short-lived. In evaluating the progress on the agreement’s three key components — covering prisoner exchange, Hodeida, and Taiz — it quickly becomes clear that the truism that implementing peace agreements is far more important, and difficult, than concluding them still rings true.

The latest talks in Washington brought about some concrete, and cautiously welcome, results.