Wars don’t just end. They get interpreted, reinterpreted, and turned into strategic doctrine. That is what happened after the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, a conflict that saw the United States back Tehran’s Iraqi adversaries. The war taught Tehran three lessons it never unlearned: that Washington wants the Islamic Republic gone, that Iran stands essentially alone in the world, and that it cannot survive a direct, overt fight with the U.S. and Israel.
Within 48 hours this week, Iran filled six of the most important posts in its battered military and security establishment. Read together with the biographies and mandates behind them, the appointments show how Tehran is drawing lessons from successive wars and preparing for a prolonged period of insecurity, without proving it has abandoned negotiation.
In an August 9 interview with Axios, when asked about the endless swings of the Iran standoff, he shrugged it off as familiar territory. “It’ll work out in the end. It always does. It’s like a chess game.”
Since 1967, Israeli settlements in the West Bank have been a contested feature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The ultimate disposition of the settlements and ongoing activity related to their growth have repeatedly defied agreement in negotiations over a resolution to the conflict.
The Houthis are a political-military faction and Zaydi religious movement founded in northwestern Yemen in the 1980s. A key member of Iran’s Axis of Resistance with links to other militant organizations in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, the group has continued to pose a threat to Western interests on a global scale.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a proposed multinational infrastructure initiative aimed at upgrading connectivity between the three regions through integrated trade, energy, and digital networks. Announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, IMEC is envisioned partially as a counterweight to China’s international infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative.
After a decade of post-Arab Spring isolation, Turkey’s leaders have recognized that their ambition to position the country as an agenda-setter on the world stage requires active engagement in all directions. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s consolidation of executive authority has centralized foreign policy decision-making and tied it to his domestic political priorities, transforming the country’s revisionist approach to one shaped primarily by personal and pragmatic interests.
المدونات الصوتية
التركيز على الشرق الأوسط
البودكاست الأسبوعي الرائد لمعهد الشرق الأوسط حول السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية والقضايا السياسية والاجتماعية المعاصرة في الشرق الأوسط.
Kayhan, a leading newspaper that represents the most hardline of voices inside the Iranian regime, has been raising doubts about Turkish intentions in the Syrian conflict. The reservations the paper expressed come shortly after the late December 2016 Turkish-Russian-Iranian ceasefire deal aimed to kick-start the political process to find a solution to the six-year Syrian war.
The representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader on Hajj [pilgrimage] affairs has announced that Tehran will shortly dispatch a delegation to Saudi Arabia. This latest development has come about following Iran’s decision not send any pilgrims to Saudi Arabia in 2016. Riyadh had earlier sent an invitation to Iran for talks to be held to resolve differences that exist in this context.
In a meeting with a high-level delegation visiting Tehran on January 11, Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani called terrorism a common enemy of Afghanistan and Iran and pledged his country’s all-out support to Afghanistan’s stability.
Burden or Boon? Turkey’s Tactical Treatment of the Syrian Refugee Crisis
Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) approaches the question of refugees much differently than its European counterparts. The latter’s pushing back against burden-sharing measures has led to what can be described as burden-shifting. In contrast, the AKP’s view of Syrian refugees in Turkey is that they are more of a boon than a burden. This essay explores the thinking and the tactics behind Turkey’s approach to dealing with the Syrian refugees challenge.
The death of Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani on January 8 marks a major turning point for Iran. For nearly 40 years, his undisguised hunger for power combined with his knack for deal making had made him the most proven kingmaker of the Islamic Republic.
Saudi Interest in the Red Sea Islands of Tiran and Sanafir Grows as Its Security Interests Expand
Notwithstanding Egypt’s political and judicial contretemps, the Egyptian parliament is expected to vote soon in favor of the return of Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia. The decision, after months of controversy in Egypt, will fulfill the April 2016 agreement reached between Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al Sisi and Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud that formally acknowledged Saudi sovereignty over the two small islands and provided for their return to Riyadh’s control.
The current Syrian ceasefire effort of Russia and Turkey is a Russian attempt to impose a final political defeat on the rebels and a Turkish attempt to focus on eliminating the Kurds in Syria militarily and politically. Turkey is also intensely lobbying the new U.S. administration for help. The ceasefire deal rests on the barbarism of Russia and the Assad regime and the feckless response of the West. This is the peace Rome imposed on the prostrate Carthage. The unanimous UNSC vote endorsing the Russian/Turkish proposal enshrines one side’s brutality and the other’s moral vacuum.
During the January 10 mass rallies of the funeral of former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, crowds in Tehran repeatedly chanted “Death to Russia” and “Russian Embassy is the den of spies.” Those chanting are supporters of the popular political opposition, which continue to be repressed by the security services.
Iran’s Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimani attended the funeral of Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and praised the former Iranian president’s anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments and positions.
The generals of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) have been busy mourning the death of Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. That is at least the public show they have put on. Since his death, several top IRGC commanders have hailed Rafsanjani as a pillar of the Islamic Republic and a hero in the so-called struggle against Western powers. Such public show of grief, however, is hardly convincing. In recent weeks prior to his death, IRGC-run media and personalities had unleashed a barrage of new attacks against Rafsanjani.
Iran Continues Efforts to Subvert Saudi Arabia from within
In fresh evidence that the government of Iran continues its efforts to undermine Saudi stability and security from within, a Saudi court has convicted a Saudi businessman of plotting with the government of Iran to instigate sectarian strife and threaten Saudi social stability, according to a report in al-Sharq al-Awsat.
Iran’s Oil Ministry has announced that two new energy contracts have been signed with Iraq. In particular, Tehran is looking to export natural gas to Iraq. Energy is only part of the equation.
Rafsanjani’s Funeral Turns into Anti-Regime Protest
Today’s funeral for an influential Iranian leader turned into a protest rally against the regime. It was reminiscent of the demonstrations by the so-called Green Movement that rocked Iran after the country’s controversial 2009 presidential elections.
January 5, 2017 – Eric Trager, Esther K. Wagner Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, joins host Paul Salem to discuss his new book, “Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days.”
تُعد المجلة الرئيسية لمعهد الشرق الأوسط أقدم مطبوعة محكّمة مكرّسة لدراسة الشرق الأوسط الحديث، وتغطي المجلة الرئيسية في المعهد السياسة والمجتمع والثقافة في المنطقة.
