الدفاع والأمن

The Black Sea is a very important region for NATO, and has not received the attention it deserves; a separate focused NATO strategy and support for countries in the Black Sea would send a message that the Alliance takes the region seriously.

His administration may end up besting its predecessors’ records in bringing partners together in the Persian Gulf.

With its clash with Syrian forces on Feb. 3, Turkey is being forced to realize that it has very limited leverage over its foreign policy priorities.

If Turkish efforts to stop the regime’s advance on Saraqeb fail, the humanitarian crisis will escalate uncontrollably.

The escalating tensions between Turkey and Russia over Idlib did not come as a surprise to many outside the Turkish capital.

While proclamations of ISIS’s defeat were certainly premature, international policy and attention on countering terrorism in Syria has since declined — as if to suggest that the job is done. In fact, as 2020 sets in, the world seems to be getting counter-terrorism all wrong in Syria, in three interlinked ways.

Iran and the U.S. were on a collision course as soon as President Donald Trump arrived at the White House in January 2017.

Absent international pressure, the Iran-backed Houthis have no reason to stop expanding

The 2018 National Defense Strategy shapes the way the U.S. military competes with state and non-state adversaries. It specifically calls for improvements in partner force operations (PFO) — especially counter-terrorism (CT) — so that regional partners can keep up CT pressure while America’s special operators shift focus to help the nation gain and maintain an advantage over the near-peer competitors of Russia and China.

Over the past several weeks geopolitical experts have been talking a lot about what the surprise U.S. drone attack on Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the IRGC – Quds Force, on Jan. 3 means for the Middle East and relations between the major powers. What has received considerably less attention, however, is what Soleimani’s killing means for the South Caucasus, a region whose small size belies its strategic importance.

As neighboring regions, the South Caucasus and the Middle East are inextricably intertwined — so much so that the former is sometimes even considered part of the Greater Middle East. While geographical proximity is the strongest driver of interconnectivity between the two regions, geopolitics, business ties, and energy interests also link countries from the South Caucasus and the Middle East and form the basis for important bilateral and regional relationships.

In the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force, on Jan. 3, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned the U.S. of Iran’s “harsh revenge.” There has been much speculation around the timing, location, and the type (or form) of Iran’s promised revenge. Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou takes a closer look at the impact of the widely discussed strategy of blocking the Strait of Hormuz.

On Jan. 5, shortly after Qassem Soleimani was assassinated in Iraq by an American drone strike, Tehran announced that it would no longer remain committed to the enrichment restrictions laid out under the 2015 nuclear deal. Even though European diplomats have rushed to assuage Iranian concerns about the possible resumption of international sanctions, Tehran perceives this as an extension of the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign and is very unlikely to back down or substantially change its defiant behavior — domestically promoted as a counterpolicy of “maximum resistance” — even if punitive UNSC resolutions against it are reinstated. 

The U.S. assassination of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani came as a seismic shock to the Middle East, not least to the embattled political system in Damascus that has reaped the benefits of Iran’s military involvement across the region. While his death will be a severe blow, it will not necessarily translate into a decline in Iran’s influence or military presence in Syria. Soleimani’s army of militias and supporters will outlast him, possibly by decades. 

Although Moscow continues to reap the benefits of its Syrian campaign, it is increasingly faced with diminishing returns. Despite its greater geopolitical involvement in the country, the Kremlin has so far failed to extract major economic dividends and may soon face increased competition from Tehran. With Syria’s future clouded in uncertainty and the unresolved issue of the Idlib region hanging like the sword of Damocles over any potential political settlement, Russia is now trying to bring the Libyan conflict into the equation as well.