The Americans Are Gone. Will Iraq’s Militias Disarm?
On September 30, the US completed its military withdrawal from Iraq, ending a 12-year-long mission to combat ISIS that began in 2014. The date was also meant to be the deadline for disarming the largely Iranian-backed militias known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), but Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has now pushed that cutoff back to June 30, 2027. MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow Amb. (ret.) Robert S. Ford joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to discuss what the US military withdrawal means for Iraqi security and the nature of the bilateral relationship going forward. They also speak about what it will take for Baghdad to bring the PMF militias to heel, and how Iraq may navigate the post-Iran war era.
Proponents of the war with Iran have taken recent increases in crude-oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz as proof that the US strategy is finally working. President Trump is so confident in this that he recently rejected a seven-day plan, set forward by Iran’s foreign ministry, to end the war and open the strait. The United States is “winning tremendously,” Trump boasted.
The Mecca Joint Défense Agreement: A New Geometry of Middle Eastern Power?
On August 7, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Défense Agreement, a collective-defense pact widely compared to NATO’s Article 5. This essay argues that the comparison is misleading. Mecca borrows NATO’s language of solidarity without yet possessing NATO’s institutional machinery, and the Houthi offensive against Saudi Arabia in September 2026 provided an early and revealing test of what the agreement actually means in practice. Neither Pakistan nor Turkey automatically entered the fight on Saudi Arabia’s behalf, and Washington, despite an initial reluctance to strike directly, remained indispensable through intelligence support and a major proposed F-35 sale. Drawing on realist alliance theory — Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, Glenn Snyder, and Steven David — and on the precedent of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the essay contends that the Middle East is not dividing into rival blocs but moving from hierarchy toward a looser, overlapping geometry of hedged partnerships, in which American exclusivity is eroding considerably faster than American primacy.
Fearing war fatigue in Ukraine or an escalation of tensions with the potential to spill over beyond region, the West is keen to act. But what can the EU and NATO do to help resolve the war in Ukraine?
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a watershed moment on so many levels for so many countries. Existing political, economic, energy, and transportation channels are being affected across western Eurasia. Countries are maneuvering to minimize the war’s detrimental impact while new trade synergies are being formed at a rapid pace. Most recently, Germany and Qatar signed a long-term energy partnership for the delivery of Qatari natural gas as the Germans look to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. Qatar’s reserves are located in the world’s largest gas field, which it shares with its northern neighbor, Iran.
Sanctions won’t move Putin — we must bolster Ukraine’s air defenses
Attempts at deterrence by sanctions have failed. The question now is: Does the West expect sanctions to change Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actions? We think not — and the world should have given up years ago on expecting them to dissuade him.
Connecting Beijing’s global infrastructure: The PEACE Cable in the Middle East and North Africa
One of the most ambitious elements of China’s Digital Silk Road is the Pakistan & East Africa Connecting Europe (PEACE) fiber-optic cable. China has long expressed its ambition to connect the greater Middle East, Africa, and Europe with Chinese fiber optics in order to expand its presence in the region, and Beijing now boasts strategic infrastructure assets in geopolitical hotspots, such as the Pakistani port of Gwadar.
While there are similarities between Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine today, we argue that overstating them leads to a deeper misunderstanding of both conflicts and leaves out significant differences that need to be addressed.
Russia doesn't see Israel as a preferred strategic partner over Iran
Iranian observers argue that Russia is willing to sacrifice Iranian interests when expedient, and some might even think that Russia is pivoting toward Israel in its Middle East policy. Nonetheless, the big picture of Russo-Iranian relations over the last decade reveals security cooperation between Tehran and Moscow that stands on a strong and reliable foundation, with both countries benefitting.
Is the Middle East next on Putin’s agenda? What the US can do to prepare
Conventional wisdom has it that the conflict in Ukraine will lead the U.S. to bolster its military presence along NATO’s boundary in Eastern Europe, with a concomitant downscaling in the Middle East. While presenting a robust front in support of NATO is of course critical, it would be a mistake to do so at the expense of the U.S. military presence in the Middle East at a time when it appears likely that Russian President Vladimir Putin has chosen the region as the venue for the next moves in his campaign to marginalize the U.S.
ليس شرقًا ولا غربًا: حسابات تركيا في أزمة أوكرانيا
تحمل الأزمة في أوكرانيا، من وجهة نظر أنقرة، مخاطر كبيرة، لكنها تنطوي أيضًا على بعض الفرص. إنها ليست أزمة من صنعهم، ولا أزمة رحبوا بها. ومع ذلك، من الواضح أن أنقرة جهَّزت مخططًا أساسيًا لتجاوز العاصفة. من وجهة نظر صانعي السياسة في واشنطن، من المرجح أن تجلب استراتيجيتهم إحباطًا أكثر من تطمينًا.
وفي نفس الوقت، فإن الفهم الأفضل لكيف تأمل تركيا أن تتجاوز الأزمة الأوكرانية يمكن أن يساعد في توضيح بعض النقاشات الجارية داخل واشنطن حول كيفية تصور السياسة الخارجية الجديدة لأنقرة ومكانها داخل حلف الناتو.
Neither East nor West: Turkey’s calculations in the Ukraine crisis
The crisis in Ukraine, from the perspective of Ankara, carries significant risks, but also some opportunity. It is neither a crisis of their own making, nor one that they welcomed; nevertheless, Ankara has clearly developed a basic blueprint for weathering the storm. From the perspective of Washington policymakers, their strategy is likely to hold more frustration than reassurance.
حتى كتابة هذه السطور، ليس من الواضح ما هو النهج الذي ستتخذه روسيا في أوكرانيا: الضغط، أو التقسيم، أو البلع. يمكن للرئيس فلاديمير بوتين أن يواصل ويُصعّد من سياسة الضغط الشديد على أوكرانيا، دون غزو كبير، الأمر الذي يمكن أن يجعل أوكرانيا تخضع وتستسلم، ويفرض تغييرًا في سياسات كييف أو مساراتها، ويضمن هدف بوتين المتمثل في مواءمة أوكرانيا مع روسيا. أو يمكنه أن يواصل ما بدأه في دونباس وشبه جزيرة القرم وأن يستولى ببساطة على قطعة أخرى من أوكرانيا، مما يزيد الضغط على كل من كييف والغرب. الاحتمال الثالث الواضح هو غزو شامل لابتلاع البلد كله.
Fragile promise: The prospects for Turkish-Armenian normalization
Now, after decades of animosity, Turkey and Armenia are taking steps to normalize ties, and the prospects for restoring relations and reopening the border have never been brighter.
