Maysam Behravesh

The Islamic Republic’s unconventional alliance network reaches far and wide, and its workings have only intensified since the killing of Gen. Qassem Soleimani in early January 2020. The systematic effort to consolidate these alliances, indicated by the swift appointment of Gen. Esmail Qaani and his new deputy Gen. Mohammad Hosseinzadeh Hejazi to lead the Quds Force, is about much more than just retaliation and revenge against the United States. It is also, and perhaps more importantly, a calibrated response to the Trump administration’s reckless and escalatory changes to the established “rules of engagement” between Washington and Tehran.

On Jan. 5, shortly after Qassem Soleimani was assassinated in Iraq by an American drone strike, Tehran announced that it would no longer remain committed to the enrichment restrictions laid out under the 2015 nuclear deal. Even though European diplomats have rushed to assuage Iranian concerns about the possible resumption of international sanctions, Tehran perceives this as an extension of the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign and is very unlikely to back down or substantially change its defiant behavior — domestically promoted as a counterpolicy of “maximum resistance” — even if punitive UNSC resolutions against it are reinstated. 

Fears of a large-scale war in the Middle East remain heightened as the U.S. continues ratcheting up sanctions against Iran while Tehran takes measures to scale back its restrictive commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The latest sign of Iranian retaliation against the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear accord was its decision, confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Nov. 11, to begin refining uranium at its Fordow underground enrichment facility.

While the Turkish military offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria might, once again, bring Moscow and Tehran together tactically in support of Assad’s rule and Syrian sovereignty, the two powers have fundamentally different visions for the war-ravaged country’s future.

The unprecedented attack on critical Saudi oil infrastructure in Abqaiq and Khurais on Sept. 14 came just days after U.S. President Donald Trump’s dismissal of hawkish National Security Advisor John Bolton had opened a narrow window of diplomacy for Iran-U.S. negotiations to deescalate spiraling tensions.

As the Islamic Republic shifts to a more muscular foreign policy in the face of mounting external pressure, its defense and security apparatus is also undergoing key changes. This includes a reshuffling within the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the creation of a separate “air defense force” within the regular Army. Much less publicized, however, are reports of high-profile removals and replacements within the IRGC and more broadly, the armed forces, as part of a systematic effort to enhance their operational efficacy at a time of growing internal and external threats.

Having earlier threatened Iran with “obliteration” in the event of war, U.S. President Donald Trump warned on July 2 that the Islamic Republic was “playing with fire” after it breached the 300-kg cap on the stockpile of low-enriched uranium set by the nuclear deal. Yet, despite reportedly engaging in suspected “sabotage attacks” on a number of oil tankers, Iran is very unlikely to initiate a direct conflict with the U.S., but the scale and scope of its response to potential U.S. military action is not clear. Will it resort to overwhelming strategic force in the hope of dissuading the “aggressor” from further escalation, thus risking a major confrontation, or respond surgically to potential U.S. “tactical” strikes?