Iran

It should come as no surprise that Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei is once again predicting America’s “political, civil and moral decline” in the wake of the U.S. elections. But the regime’s preemptive attacks on President-elect Biden as an “iron fist in a velvet glove” and its demands that his administration “compensate for past mistakes” mark a departure from the Islamic Republic’s more restrained approach to previous transitions — and portend a flurry of commentary coming out of Tehran over the next two months.

What does a Biden presidency mean for the economy of Iran? The short answer is: not much. While the Iranian public considers his election good news for the country, these sentiments are fleeting and will soon fade. The reason is simple: Even if Joe Biden decides to reengage with Iran or reenter the 2015 nuclear deal on his first day in office, a Biden presidency will not change many crippling realities for the Iranian economy.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Paul Salem, Alex Vatanka, Gonul Tol, Gerald Feierstein, Randa Slim, Khaled Elgindy, Charles Lister, Mirette F. Mabrouk, and Marvin G. Weinbaum.

At a rally in Florida, Donald Trump stated that Iran will be the first country to call to him after his reelection because the Iranians are “dying for a deal.” National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien added that “it is very difficult for Iran to refuse to negotiate” because “Iran cannot sustain economic pain much longer and… we don’t think they can hang in there for another four years.”

There is no doubt that the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign has had serious negative impacts on Iran’s economy and that the country is experiencing a crisis. But, if the past is any indication, the sanctions or economic pressure will not be the main drivers of Tehran’s decision-making if it decides to compromise with the United States. To imagine that a deal is in the offing due to Iran’s dire economic straits seems simplistic.  

While most experts believe that the recent normalization of ties between Israel and the UAE will not lead to a significant change in the regional balance of power, there are indications that it has the potential to bring about such a change in the long run.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Paul Salem, Michael Sexton, Alex Vatanka, and Gerald Feierstein.

As the U.S. prepares to head to the polls to choose its next president, Iran finds itself at a dead end. Hit hard by American sanctions and its own mismanagement of the economy, Tehran needs to negotiate with Washington to get out of its current economic crisis and shore up its waning popular legitimacy. With an eye to addressing these issues and mindful of the steady erosion of support for the government, President Hassan Rouhani has obtained permission from Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to negotiate with the U.S. While the news has not yet been made public, Rouhani has told Ayatollah Khamenei that he will begin talks to reach an agreement with the winner of the upcoming election — regardless of who it is — and the Iranian leader has given his initial consent.

Nazila Fathi, Nazee Moinian, and Alex Vatanka join host Alistair Taylor to discuss Iran, U.S. policy, and the potential impact of the upcoming presidential election.

The Islamic Republic of Iran recently announced that it is now welcoming the possibility of women’s leadership at the highest levels of government. Optimists are celebrating this development in the belief that it could reinvigorate weak voter turnout and lead to much-needed reforms in the country. But a more realistic analysis finds that this is little more than a cynical ploy. There is an overwhelming body of evidence that suggests not much has happened to truly advance women’s rights in the Islamic Republic in years.

Since Aug. 13, speculation has been rife that the Sultanate of Oman will soon follow the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) lead and formalize full-fledged ties with Israel. Yet, at least thus far, Muscat has refused to join the UAE, Bahrain, and now Sudan in normalizing relations with Tel Aviv. As a moderate Arab country, where tolerance is firmly embedded into the national ethos and the Ibadi sect of Islam, Oman appears to be maintaining a balanced position on the overall Arab trend toward normalizing relations with Israel. Muscat’s positive reaction to the Abraham Accords is not a major change in strategy and is more illustrative of Oman’s longstanding position on normalization.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could spill over to Iran’s Azeri minority, setting off a battle the government can’t contain.

With the latest polls suggesting a likely victory for the Democrats in the November U.S. presidential elections, a looming foreign policy crisis awaits a potential Biden administration: escalating tensions with Iran. While the Democrats’ “diplomacy first” approach has won praise across the Atlantic as the solution to deescalating tensions with Tehran, this Western-centric view ignores the changing reality on the ground in Iran. If Biden thinks he can return to the 2015 status quo, he may be in for a surprise.

Landlocked Afghanistan has begun using the Chinese-operated Pakistani port of Gwadar for transit trade — a development Pakistani officials see as marking the start of Gwadar’s role as a gateway port through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Pakistan’s hope to develop the Arabian Sea port into a gateway for Afghanistan, Central Asia, and China’s Xinjiang region has been a long-standing one — and it is misguided. Islamabad should instead focus on local drivers to build the port and use it as a vehicle to develop the impoverished, but resource-rich region of southern Balochistan.