المشرق العربي

As Israel faces a relentless, unprecedentedly severe political crisis at home, in the regional theater Iran has amplified its anti-Israeli activities, undermining the efforts Israel undertook during 2020-22 to build up a common security front with neighboring Arab states against Tehran as well as to intensify various military operations against Iranian interests.

اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.

When Netanyahu takes the stage in this year’s UNGA, much fewer Israelis will see him as their country’s diplomatic savior. Rather, he will be met with unprecedented demonstrations in the streets of New York, showcasing once again the extent to which Israelis are concerned about the damage the current far-right government is causing to their country’s democracy and standing in the world.

As the humanitarian, political, and economic challenges in Syria are occurring simultaneously with increasingly hot and dry summers, conflict- and climate-related factors have compounded, resulting in the emergence of a so-called “triple water crisis.”

Since Turkey’s presidential election in May, western analysts have held out hope that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will moderate his strongman style of rule. Feeding their optimism are several steps Erdoğan has taken, including appointing market-friendly technocrats to his economic team, replacing the hardline interior minister, dialling down anti-western rhetoric and voicing support for Sweden’s Nato membership. All these moves, however, are aimed at strengthening Erdoğan’s one-man rule, and the west is helping him. 

When the Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi, visits New York for the opening of the UNGA this week, he will try to project a sense of confidence and argue that the Iranian regime is purportedly committed to building ties with its neighborhood by promoting and referring to its membership in various regional dialogue forums. Yet their existence has historically not moderated Iranian behavior.

مع احتفال الموقعين الأصليين على اتفاقيات أبراهام — إسرائيل والإمارات العربية المتحدة والبحرين — بالذكرى السنوية الثالثة لاتفاقهم المبرم في سبتمبر 2020، هناك أساس كافٍ لتقييم ما إذا كانت اتفاقيات أبراهام حقيقية أم مجرد ضجة إعلامية أم شيء بين بين. وكما كان الحال قبل عام، لا تزال النتائج حتى الآن مختلطة.

On Sept. 8, the Kurdish-led SDF, a key U.S. ally, announced the end of its “Operation Security Enhancement” in Deir ez-Zor in northeast Syria. While framed as an operation targeting ISIS sleeper cells and criminals, it aimed at quashing an armed uprising led by Arab tribesmen, particularly members of the Akidat tribe. While multiple factors may have contributed to fueling the uprising, the importance of the region’s longstanding grievances cannot be overstated.

Thirty years on since its historic signing, the Oslo Accords framework continues to define virtually all aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations as well as America’s and the broader international community’s approach to the peace process. Yet Oslo’s extraordinary longevity stands not as a testament to its utility but to its unmitigated and ongoing failure.

المحتويات:

On Sept. 8, the Syrian Democratic Forces were able to enter the villages and towns of Deir ez-Zor’s eastern countryside, stretching from al-Tayyanah to al-Baghouz, regaining control of all of the areas that had witnessed an uprising against their forces beginning on Aug. 27. But what sparked the fighting in the first place, how did things play out, and what might it mean for the region going forward?

تمكنت قوات سوريا الديمقراطية في الثامن من أيلول/سبتمبر، من الدخول إلى قرى وبلدات ريف ديرالزور الشرقي الممتد من بلدة الطيانة حتى الباغوز، بذلك أعادة السيطرة على جميع المناطق التي شهدت حالة تمرد ضد قواتها، التي بدأت في السابع والعشرين من شهر آب/ أغسطس الماضي.

Russia’s malign behavior in the Black Sea includes piracy, plunder, petroleum price cap violations, and actions to prevent the free transit of foreign commercial and naval vessels. Its largely unchallenged position in the Black Sea also helps Russia maintain access to foreign-made products and components, circumventing sanctions. The West and the broader international community have yet to act to decisively rein in these flagrant violations of international laws and norms.

The normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel is looking increasingly likely, even if it does not take place in the immediate future. For Israel, normalizing relations with as many Arab states as possible — especially if it does not have to give up much in exchange — has always been a strategic goal. For the new Saudi Arabia, those ambitious goals strongly suggest opening up to the Israeli economy.