ISIS appears to have collapsed in Syria in the wake of the SDF’s military defeat and subsequent integration, followed by the withdrawal of US troops. To the extent that the US prioritizes the group’s enduring defeat in the country, a relationship centered in Damascus is the best way to achieve it.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a proposed multinational infrastructure initiative aimed at upgrading connectivity between the three regions through integrated trade, energy, and digital networks. Announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, IMEC is envisioned partially as a counterweight to China’s international infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative.
It's Now or Never: Lebanon Policy Conference Key Takeaways
Over the course of two weeks in May and June, the Middle East Institute hosted its inaugural Lebanon policy conference in collaboration with the American Task Force on Lebanon (ATFL) and LIFE. This series of events brought together leading diplomats, policymakers, economists, development practitioners, and think tank professionals from the U.S., Europe, the Middle East, and Lebanon to discuss the urgency and viable paths forward for the country’s political, financial, and humanitarian crises.
تضغط الدول الغربية وبعض دول الخليج وتركيا وبدرجة أقل حتى واحدة من مؤيديه الرئيسيين، روسيا، على رئيس الدولة السوري بشار الأسد ليكون أكثر مرونة بشأن قبول تسوية سياسية للصراع السوري. لكن الأسد رفض التزحزح شبرًا واحدًا.
في الوقت الحالي، تريد معظم الدول المعارضة للنظام السوري من الأسد قبول قرار الأمم المتحدة رقم 2254، الصادر في عام 2015، والذي يدعو، من بين أمور أخرى، إلى انتخابات نزيهة ودستور وحكم ذي مصداقية يتسم بالشمول واللاطائفية.
لفهم سبب عدم تراجع الأسد، عليك أن تفكر في الخيارات التي يواجهها.
Western countries, some Gulf states, Turkey, and to a far lesser extent even one of his own key backers, Russia, have been pressuring Syrian head of state Bashar al-Assad to be more flexible about accepting a political settlement to the Syrian conflict. But Assad has refused to budge an inch.
The nascent Israeli government: The thread that binds?
There is only one thread holding together the unprecedentedly disparate parties that will establish and support the nascent Israeli government announced on the night of June 2, an hour before the midnight deadline. That thread is, of course, a shared loathing for Benjamin Netanyahu. Whether that thread will even get the new government past its first hurdle, which is a vote of confidence in the Knesset, much less to its theoretical four years, is an open question. Until recently no one could have imagined such a political monstrosity might be conceived, let alone gestated, but there’s a decent chance this government will get off the ground.
The policy consequences of Arab state normalization with the Assad regime
The recent push by a number of Arab states to normalize relations with the Assad regime is based on the false premise that the war is over and it is necessary to restore ties to lobby Damascus to change its relationship with Iran. Other regional dynamics are also a factor: The UAE, for example, sees it as a necessary balance against what it perceives as adversarial actions by Turkey with the Syrian jihadist group HTS in Idlib. Yet these rationales for rehabilitating the Assad regime are completely fallacious. The downsides and policy consequences will not only affect Arab states, but will also harm American interests, making it difficult for the U.S. to fully pivot to address the rising threat from China.
Jordan emerges from Gaza-Israel showdown with little political clout
In the final leg of his recent Middle Eastern tour, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stopped in Amman for half a day to meet King Abdullah. Blinken’s main objective was to support the shaky cease-fire reached between Palestinian factions in Gaza and Israel after an 11-day military showdown. Speaking at a press conference on May 26, Blinken said that “the leadership of His Majesty King Abdullah was crucial, as it always has been in different issues, his role was essential in reaching a cease-fire in Gaza.” Jordanians were less confident of their government’s role in ending what most saw as “Israeli aggression against Gaza,” however. Even before the recent military clash Jordanian pundits, some known for their close ties to the government, were critical of the lukewarm official response to the Israeli provocations of Palestinians at Al-Aqsa Mosque and in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem.
مجلس حقوق الإنسان التابع للأمم المتحدة يوافق على لجنة غزة لتقصي الحقائق
“إن استعداد مجلس حقوق الإنسان لإنشاء لجنة دائمة ذات تفويض شامل يشير إلى مدى التغيير في التصورات الدولية للصراع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني في السنوات القليلة الماضية”.
