سوريا

As the humanitarian, political, and economic challenges in Syria are occurring simultaneously with increasingly hot and dry summers, conflict- and climate-related factors have compounded, resulting in the emergence of a so-called “triple water crisis.”

On Sept. 8, the Kurdish-led SDF, a key U.S. ally, announced the end of its “Operation Security Enhancement” in Deir ez-Zor in northeast Syria. While framed as an operation targeting ISIS sleeper cells and criminals, it aimed at quashing an armed uprising led by Arab tribesmen, particularly members of the Akidat tribe. While multiple factors may have contributed to fueling the uprising, the importance of the region’s longstanding grievances cannot be overstated.

المحتويات:

On Sept. 8, the Syrian Democratic Forces were able to enter the villages and towns of Deir ez-Zor’s eastern countryside, stretching from al-Tayyanah to al-Baghouz, regaining control of all of the areas that had witnessed an uprising against their forces beginning on Aug. 27. But what sparked the fighting in the first place, how did things play out, and what might it mean for the region going forward?

تمكنت قوات سوريا الديمقراطية في الثامن من أيلول/سبتمبر، من الدخول إلى قرى وبلدات ريف ديرالزور الشرقي الممتد من بلدة الطيانة حتى الباغوز، بذلك أعادة السيطرة على جميع المناطق التي شهدت حالة تمرد ضد قواتها، التي بدأت في السابع والعشرين من شهر آب/ أغسطس الماضي.

Years of simmering tensions between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and local populations in northeast Syria have exploded this week into still-expanding battles across much of Deir ez-Zor. Conflict resolution requires the international coalition to engage with the Kurdish administration on deep political and administrative reforms. However, the violence in Deir ez-Zor may demand a more creative and locally driven approach to the northeast to foster a more resilient governance and security structure.

نظرًا لوجود مجموعة فاغنر العسكرية الراسخ في سوريا وليبيا والسودان، فإن القضاء على قيادتها العليا سيكون له تداعيات خطيرة على نفوذ روسيا في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا. من غير المرجح أن يغادر المتعاقدون العسكريون التابعون لفاغنر، لأنهم يحرسون منشآت نفطية وتعدينية ذات قيمة استراتيجية؛ ولكن من المرجح أن يتم دمجهم بسرعة في القوات المسلحة الروسية النظامية.

The SDF has always been a diverse coalition of localized actors. Over the past eight years, it has managed to contain these persistent frictions, but that may now be coming to an end. In the past three days, at least 50 people have been killed in fighting between Arab tribal fighters and the SDF in the region where Syria’s Khabur and Euphrates rivers meet. The catalyst for this fighting occurred late on Aug. 27, when Ahmed al-Khubayl, the leader of the SDF’s Deir ez-Zor Military Council, was lured north to Hasakah for a purported meeting, only to be arrested alongside his brother and four other commanders.

اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.

There are currently over 5.34 million Syrian refugees dispersed in camps, collective shelters, and poor neighborhoods across Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt. Many make desperate attempts to find refuge in Europe. Instead of adopting repressive measures and discriminating against these individuals, the U.S. and European countries should work with regional partners and non-governmental organizations to limit the danger to refugees and IDPs.

Syria’s dramatic readmission into the Arab League in May was perceived as a turning point for the country’s fortunes. Although Damascus may have come in from the cold diplomatically, there has been little change on the economic front, where the situation remains dire. Since the start of May, the Syrian pound has lost over 70% of its value and shows no sign of stabilizing.

اقرأ تقرير MEI الأسبوعي الذي يتضمن تحليلات الخبراء للتطورات الإقليمية الرئيسية للأسبوع المقبل.

Recently, a notable trend has emerged among Alawites in Syria’s Assad regime-held areas, including those from powerful families. Writers, journalists, and rank-and-file Alawites have taken to social media platforms to express their deep frustration with the regime’s economic policies and the centralized nature of the dictatorship under President Bashar al-Assad, as well as his wife Asma al-Assad’s outsized influence and corruption linked to her secretive “economic council.”

Three months ago, Saudi Arabia kick-started a concerted regional effort to reengage and normalize Syria’s regime within the Middle East and, Riyadh hoped, farther afield. On April 18, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian capital of Damascus. Just one month later, on May 19, the Arab League embraced one of the world’s most notorious war criminals for the first time since 2011.

As the clock ticks down on the repatriation of IS foreign fighters from Syria, a recent development has added a new sense of urgency to the situation. On June 11, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), announced its intention to prosecute 2,000 IS foreign fighters. How-ever, the lack of international recognition for the AANES and its courts renders these trials illegiti-mate, further complicating future international legal efforts to prosecute these combatants.