تركيا

That some in Washington think another about-turn in policy allowing us to stay in negligible numbers, in a smaller piece of territory, would somehow enable us to sustain an anti-ISIS campaign and control Syria’s oil fields is nothing short of a fantasy.

To make his case for an expansive safe zone in northern Syria stretching to Iraqi border, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi. Putin might accept a limited Turkish presence in the area for now, but he is unlikely to agree to Turkey’s current plans.

Both Mr. Trump and Mr. Erdogan, each under mounting pressure at home, are trying to solve domestic challenges with a tragedy that will have long-term and unpredictable effects — none of them beneficial for the United States and any friends that remain.

While the Turkish military offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria might, once again, bring Moscow and Tehran together tactically in support of Assad’s rule and Syrian sovereignty, the two powers have fundamentally different visions for the war-ravaged country’s future.

Turkey’s cross-border incursion into northeastern Syria has stirred up a hornet’s nest of instability and threats. If left unchecked, this latest “war within a war” will have deeply destabilizing consequences for many years.

In one fell swoop, the U.S. has found itself evacuating a third of the country; breaking away from a 100,000-strong partner we trained and equipped; and watching it surrender to the regime that we have stood against from day one. In the chaos that has ensued, ISIS prisoners have been let loose, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced, and a once relatively stable northeastern Syria has been thrown into a potentially intractable pit of ethnic, sectarian, and political conflict. The consequences of America’s self-destruction in Syria will be felt for many, many years to come.

The biggest losers from President Trump’s arbitrary decision to allow Turkish forces to enter Syria may end up being pro-revolution Syrians and civilians living in Idlib.

On August 5, 2019 Turkey’s Foreign Ministry launched the Asia Anew initiative, whose declared aim is to give greater weight to cooperation with Asian countries in four substantive areas. This article shows that, although few details have emerged regarding how Ankara intends to implement this initiative, there is nonetheless sufficient reason to question whether it is viable or sustainable.

In a stunning announcement on Sunday, the Trump administration gave the nod to a Turkish military incursion into northeastern Syria, an operation that would entail clashes with Washington’s Kurdish allies in the area. The U.S. military, which has around 1,000 troops in Syria, would not “support or be involved in the operation.” But the White House said it would pull back U.S. forces stationed near the Syrian-Turkish border to clear the way for Ankara’s troops.

The Turkish offensive against Syrian Kurdish forces could result in a military success, but it will also seriously damage Turkey’s image in Europe and elsewhere.

Washington has a hard long-term choice when it comes to Syria. The best chance for an optimal solution through a negotiated political deal was lost years ago. The U.S. now must choose a policy which will yield only a “least-bad” result.

MEI Senior Fellow W. Robert Pearson and Non-resident Scholar Elizabeth Dent join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the Turkish incursion into northeastern Syria following the sudden withdrawal of US troops from the Turkish-Syrian border earlier this week.

On Sept. 16, the presidents of Russia, Iran, and Turkey met in Ankara to discuss the resolution of the Syrian civil war. In all three countries, the Ankara summit was hailed as a major success, as negotiations on the formation of a Syrian constitutional committee concluded and progress was made toward resolving other outstanding challenges, such as the future of northeastern Syria and the ongoing struggle for Idlib.

A question as to the value of a U.S.-Egypt Free Trade Agreement (FTA) misses the point. The question should not be whether an FTA would be in the interest of both parties since there is abundant evidence that it would. The question is what kind of FTA would best suit the needs, both short and long term, of the two parties: shallow integration or deep integration? This report argues that notwithstanding several hurdles, it is in the interest of both countries to move swiftly and decisively toward a deep FTA.

A unilateral Turkish military operation will worsen the already toxic mood vis-à-vis Erdogan on the Hill and might prompt a new round of sanctions at a time when Trump was trying to convince the Congress to hold off on punishing Turkey.