After over a decade of division between rival factions in eastern and western Libya, the Trump administration has put forward a plan to unite the two sides through a power-sharing agreement. Hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow Jonathan M. Winer to unpack the details of this proposal and its potential consequences for the Libyan people. Winer, who served as United States Special Envoy for Libya, offers analysis of the plan’s viability, the response of various actors on the ground, and whether it can stabilize the country and help resolve its deep-seated challenges.
Libya’s Fragile Equilibrium: Succession Risk and Energy Stability
Libya’s stability has taken on renewed strategic importance as the impact of the US and Israeli war with Iran reverberates through global energy markets. Sustaining existing Libyan oil production depends on a governing arrangement capable of keeping ports open, pipelines flowing, and revenues distributed without triggering conflict.
The question facing international oil companies is not whether Libya has oil and gas to develop. It does. The question is whether the country’s current political, economic, and security conditions allow that potential to be converted into reliable returns — and whether near-term changes could alter that calculation.
Obama and the Maghreb in the Wake of the Arab Spring
This paper is part of an MEI scholar series, titled “Obama’s Legacy in the Middle East: Passing the Baton in 2017.” Click here to view the full project, or navigate using the table of contents to the right.
Excerpted from article first published on LobeLog.
Libya remains broken and violent. Secular forces made gains against Muslim extremists in Benghazi recently, but the advantage has shifted from side to side since early this year. And two rival governments vying for power amidst a near lawless country with open borders is an ideal setting for the outflow of everything from heightened concerns to munitions and fighters. Yet Libya keeps boiling away on the global back burner.
Several weeks ago an Islamist and jihadist alliance led by Ansar al-Sharia–a group with ties to Islamic State (formerly ISIS)–took control of Benghazi and declared an “Islamic Emirate.” A few days ago, an Islamist alliance took control of Tripoli’s main airport. These developments have come as a shock to the Egyptian government, which considers an Islamic state on Egypt’s 720-mile long western border an immediate threat to Egypt’s national security. This helps explain Egypt’s alleged role in recent airstrikes inside Libya coordinated with the United Arab Emirates.
Libya’s road to democracy is shaky at best. Security is deteriorating, with targeted killings, criminal attacks, and bombings on the rise and clashes between rival armed groups—some apparently with government legitimacy and others not—growing more frequent. While these negative trends put tremendous pressure on the transition, Libya’s political process, albeit fickle, manages to keep moving. The efforts at institution building in Libya present a nuanced landscape: for every step forward in one aspect, there are steps backward in others.
Challenges to State Building after the Fall of Qaddafi
The fall of the Qaddafi regime and the loss of the state monopoly on violence gave way to a duopoly of power in Libya whereby rudimentary “national” forces—under the control of the National Transitional Council (NTC) from March 2011 to August 2012—were established in competition with the non-state “Revolutionary Brigades,” which had borne the brunt of the military struggle against Qaddafi’s forces. Since then, the Revolutionary Brigades have increasingly sought to assert themselves in the political arena.
Libyan popular and political support for engaging the international community offers the United States and Western partners an opportunity to help stabilize a North African energy producer and encourage orderly political change. Conversely, a failure to act could have costly, long-term regional and international security consequences. Domestic political limitations to direct U.S. government engagement, along with other issues that compete for attention and resources, are constraints on a more active policy. Moreover, Libyans themselves would not tolerate a dominating U.S. role.
Bad Neighbor, Good Neighbor: Libya-Egypt Relations
In 2011, many observers predicted that relations between Libya and Egypt would become closer after both countries underwent similar revolutions followed by attempts at democratic transition. But three years later, the realization of this prediction appears unlikely. Political realities and ideological differences have led to a relationship that is contentious at best.
Libya on the Brink: Insecurity, Localism, and the State Not Back In
This essay is part of the Middle East-Asia Project (MAP) series on “’Civilianizing’ the State in the Middle East and Asia Pacific Regions.” The series explores the past and ongoing processes of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Asia-Pacific countries and examines the steps already taken and still needed in the MENA region. See More
All Retributive Justice, No Restorative Justice in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East
In the wake of the revolutionary fervor that has swept the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of 2011, retributive justice has taken precedence over restorative justice approaches as countries seek to address human rights violations.
Libya's Political Isolation Law: Politics and Justice or the Politics of Justice?
In May 2013, Libya’s General National Congress (GNC) overwhelmingly passed the Political Isolation Law (PIL). The PIL’s enactment represented a far-reaching attempt to prevent members of the regime of Muammar Qaddafi from holding public office during the country’s transition. But the decision also appeared to fit a precarious pattern of post-conflict accountability in Libya, which has been characterized by acts of vengeance and one-sided justice aimed at anyone associated with the defeated regime. The passage of the law also reflects the current state of political instability in Libya wherein decisions are politically motivated and often forced at the barrel of the gun rather than agreed upon through public consultation and democratic decision-making.
