The Abraham Accords have represented a remarkable shift in U.S. Middle East policy. They reframed Arab-Israeli normalization as a result of shared interests – within the Middle East and directly with the US, rather than as a byproduct of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Signed in September 2020, on the last leg of the first Trump administration, the Accords brokered by Washington normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, followed by framework agreements with Morocco and Sudan. From the American perspective, the Accords were intended to break decades of diplomatic stagnation in the Middle East in order to establish a regional framework aligned with American strategic objectives.
بعد استيلاء قوات الدعم السريع على مدينة الفاشر، عاصمة ولاية شمال دارفور وآخر معاقل الجيش السوداني، استقطب الصراع في السودان الاهتمام الدولي مرة أخرى. هذا التطور هو الأحدث في الحرب الأهلية المدمرة التي استمرت لأكثر من عامين. تتناول جيهان هنري من "ميدل إيست آي" أصول الصراع، والوضع الإنساني على الأرض، وما يجب أن يحدث في المستقبل.
Water and Power: Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia at Odds Over Africa’s Largest Dam
In this episode of Middle East Focus, hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Senior Fellow Mirette F. Mabrouk to unpack the growing tensions over the recently inaugurated Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile.
How has the Ukraine war affected Russia's ties with Libya and Sudan?
Official reactions in Africa to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have varied dramatically from country to country. While stopping short of implementing sanctions, most African countries condemned Russia’s invasion in a March 2 U.N. General Assembly vote. A sizeable minority, however, abstained or subtly displayed solidarity with Moscow. Such polarization can be seen in the differing postures of Libya and Sudan.
Mirette Mabrouk, Joey Shea, and guest host Eliza Campbell discuss current political disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), cyber diplomacy, and the effects of climate change on the Horn of Africa.
Sudan-Russia relations after the October coup: The view from Moscow
Since late October, Sudan has been mired in a state of intense political turmoil. On Oct. 25, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized power in a coup d’état, placed civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok under house arrest, and declared a state of emergency. In response to intense international pressure, Burhan and Hamdok signed a 14-point deal on Nov. 21, which reinstated Hamdok as prime minister and resulted in the release of political prisoners. While this agreement thwarted Sudan’s descent into a military dictatorship, mass protests persist and the opposition Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) have rejected the deal.
جنرالات السودان يتراجعون قليلًا لكن الأزمة لم تنته
منذ تولي الجنرالات السلطة الكاملة في السودان في 25 أكتوبر/تشرين الأول، ضغطت الولايات المتحدة والعديد من الجهات الفاعلة الأخرى على الجيش لإعادة رئيس الوزراء عبد الله حمدوك ووزرائه المدنيين إلى السلطة قبل استئناف المساعدة ومناقشات الإعفاء من الديون. لقد أحجم المجتمع الدولي عن تقديم 4 مليارات دولار من المساعدات الإنمائية وأوقف المناقشات بشأن ما يصل إلى 50 مليار دولار لتخفيف الديون.
Despite great diplomatic efforts, progress on reaching a comprehensive agreement between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has remained elusive. While these states have long resorted to legal and political means to protect their share of the Nile, the battle over the dam is increasingly playing out in the global theater of public opinion: social media.
Since late June, Russia has expanded its diplomatic involvement in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. While Russia has offered technical assistance to the GERD’s conflicting parties, it has refrained from inserting itself into the Nile dam dispute as a mediator and instead balanced the views of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia in multilateral fora. Russia’s balancing strategy has been positively received in Sudan and Ethiopia but has created latent frictions with Egypt. Russia has persisted with this non-interference policy, as it has largely prevented a spillover of tensions over the GERD to other areas of cooperation with Egypt and believes that its position will help consolidate its partnership with Ethiopia.
Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan are caught in a dangerous deadlock over the Nile River and despite what the international community seems to think, the risk of military confrontation among the three nations is not at all far-fetched. Addis Ababa began the second phase of filling the reservoir behind its giant Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in early May without an agreement with the riparian nations — Egypt and Sudan. However, much has changed over the past year and the second filling has played out rather differently from the first last July. In the intervening months Egypt has ramped up its diplomatic outreach and emerged as an influential player in the Nile Basin, the Horn of Africa, and East and Central Africa. Cairo succeeded in forging strategic alignment with Khartoum to exert diplomatic pressure on Addis Ababa, forming webs of alliances with different regional powers across East and Central Africa and the Horn of Africa to project power and influence, and exerting geopolitical forward pressure on Ethiopia in parallel with the diplomatic track to solve the GERD dispute.
Russia’s foreign policy in areas of the Arab world and Africa where the Soviets once wielded significant influence decades ago has become increasingly assertive in recent years. One such area is Sudan, a pro-Soviet country from 1969, when Gaafar Nimeiri took power, until the communist-backed coup of 1971.
The recent round of fighting between Israel and Hamas, and especially the events that preceded it in Jerusalem, were the first significant test of the Arab-Israeli normalization agreements signed in 2020. Saved by Hamas’ intervention, the four normalizing Arab governments were nevertheless forced to address the consequences of their agreement in the face of popular discontent with the situation at home as well as criticism from other Arab and Muslim states over their relative silence. How they respond to the evolving Israeli-Palestinian tension going forward will be critical not only in regard to their own relations with Israel but also in terms of the future path of Arab-Israeli normalization.
