Rebalancing Russia’s Mediterranean strategy: From showing the flag to retreating to the gray zone
Either maintaining Russia’s military bases in Syria or finding an alternative outpost in the Mediterranean will prove extremely difficult for Moscow. And part of the problem with pursuing the latter option, particularly if in Libya, is that it would require a full-on transformation of Russia’s military presence model — from more traditional bases designed to establish deterrence by showing the flag in the region to building up a military and logistical operation inside a security “gray zone.”
At last month’s Summit of the Future, the more than 190 UN member countries agreed to unprecedented new commitments on behalf of future generations, and they pledged to build a long-term future perspective into their mechanisms of governance, domestically and multilaterally. MEI’s Strategic Foresight Initiative program director Steven Kenney reflects on attending the summit and its outcomes.
Excluded candidates, marginalized dissent before Tunisia’s presidential elections
Before Tunisian voters have their say in the presidential election on Oct. 6, state institutions have already had their say. The security services, judicial authorities, and the High Independent Electoral Authority (ISIE) have either obstructed or officially barred over a dozen potential candidates from running. Of the three eligible candidates officially approved by the ISIE, only President Kais Saied and former Saied supporter Zouhair Maghzaoui remain outside of prison. Candidate Ayachi Zammel was arrested on Sept. 6. Many other potential candidates attempted to run from prison or were jailed for alleged technical violations of election laws. By restricting the list of potential candidates effectively to two, state institutions have embraced their historically paternalistic, modernizing role toward a distrusted citizenry.
Change and continuity in EU’s foreign policy in the MENA region: What to expect from the new political cycle in Brussels
In the corridors of power in Brussels, it is common to hear that the position of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is an impossible job. It may actually become even more difficult for the outgoing Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, who is set to succeed the Spanish Josep Borrell as the European Union’s foreign policy chief in the coming weeks.
Algeria’s 2024 presidential elections: Keeping up with populist authoritarianism
Algeria is poised for a presidential election on Sept. 7 that, while seemingly predetermined, reveals the complexities of a political landscape profoundly shaped by popular disillusionment following the failure of the 2019 Hirak protest movement. Five years on, incumbent Abdelmadjid Tebboune is promising a second term based on the “continuation of the social state,” but his attempt to renew a social contract based on populist promises of a neoliberal economic renewal is colliding with the lack of institutional reforms necessary to achieve them.
Brokering a solution to the Libyan Central Bank crisis
The ongoing effort by various factions in Libya to gain control of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) poses a clear and present danger for the entire country, threatening its safety and security as well as its economy.
As the Middle East becomes more autonomous and empowered domestically, the leaders in the region might consider more synergetic relations with each other and prepare national long-term plans that provide a balanced and integrated approach to social, technological, environmental, economic, and political development and progress.
French embrace of Moroccan autonomy plan underscores broader shift on Western Sahara dispute
Macron announced that France views Morocco’s autonomy proposal not only as a viable solution, but the most viable solution to the conflict. This semantic shift is a significant change of French foreign policy and, coming after a similar shift in Spain’s position, could prompt other European countries to follow suit.
Djibouti dodges scrutiny despite China, Iran, Houthi ties and links to illicit activities
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea through the Gulf of Aden, is a crucial chokepoint for global maritime commerce. Despite the strait’s importance, the waters around it have long been plied by smugglers of weapons and other illicit goods. Djibouti today is an important player in trade in the Horn of Africa region, but it also serves as a conduit for Chinese influence, has been linked to malign actors like Iran and the Houthis, and has faced allegations of involvement in various grey and black market activities, including money laundering, illicit finance, oil smuggling, and weapons trafficking.
Russia and China’s differing engagements with the Houthis
Although Russia and China are in regular dialogue with the Houthis, the motivations that undergird the engagements of both countries differ markedly. The Houthis regard both Russia and China as partners against American unilateralism but have a warmer relationship with Moscow.
The geopolitical implications of Houthi attacks and Israeli retaliation
The Houthis’ strategy of escalation has the potential to upset the fragile balance of power in the Middle East and underlines the ability of smaller actors to influence larger geopolitical outcomes through calculated risks and alliances.
The situation in the Red Sea is not getting better
The current situation is not only intolerable – it is unsustainable. It is time to recognize that the Houthis, with strong and persistent support from Iran, are in a position to hold not only the US but virtually the entire global system hostage.
