Research & Commentary Results

While a negotiated agreement by the parties to deescalate militarily and return to the negotiating table would be the preferred outcome, there’s little or no reason to believe that the Houthis, who have responded to their losses in Shabwa by escalating their attacks, are yet interested in talking. Rather, by issuing pleas for de-escalation, the international community risks sending the Houthis yet another message that their intransigence, which is the root cause of the humanitarian crisis afflicting Yemenis, will be rewarded by new pressure on the Saudi-led coalition to limit its response to Houthi aggression. In this regard, the Biden administration, with its international partners, risks repeating the failed strategy of 2021.

إن التوترات الاقتصادية والسياسية القائمة منذ فترة طويلة بين الولايات المتحدة والصين تستمر في الامتداد إلى قطاع التكنولوجيا، حيث جعلت القوتان العظمتان هذه الصناعة الحيوية أكثر من أي وقت مضى مسرحًا لحرب باردة جديدة. يبدو أن حدة التوتر ستزداد سوءًا في الفترة القادمة، مما قد يؤدي إلى ما وصفه البعض بانشقاق العديد من العُقَد المترابطة فيما يتعلق بتصنيع التكنولوجيا وتطويرها.

On Jan. 10, the governor of Shabwa announced its liberation from the Iran-backed Houthis. This victory followed a seemingly successful Houthi military campaign over the past couple of years to expand their influence around the city of Marib, weaken the internationally-backed government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and solidify their grasp on strategic northern areas. However, while significant, the victory in Shabwa is unlikely to be replicated in the rest of the country, given the very specific political and regional dynamics that helped to bring it about. Moreover, the Houthis’ drone attack on Abu Dhabi on Jan. 17 presents a further challenge to the advance of pro-UAE forces into Marib.

Look to the people of the region first, then the evolving competition among regional states and global powers, for signs on what to expect.

On Jan. 17, the Houthis perpetrated another attack, targeting an Emirati oil facility in Abu Dhabi, killing three international citizens, and damaging infrastructure. The story here is unfortunately all too familiar and begs a coherent response now. After all, what is becoming routine in the Gulf will likely be copied and repeated in other locations.

Recently, the Iranian regime’s anti-Israel campaign scored an own goal when various hard- line regime news outlets targeted former Iranian national soccer team captain Mehdi Mahdavikia with severe criticism and condemnation. Mahdavikia’s crime? Wearing a jersey at an international exhibition soccer match arranged by FIFA in Qatar that featured the flags of all 211 FIFA members, including Israel.

إن استراتيجية المملكة العربية السعودية لزيادة محفظتها من الأصول النظيفة والمتجددة قد تم تعزيزها في عام 2021، حيث شهدت المملكة العديد من عمليات تمويل المشاريع في قطاع الطاقة الشمسية وأطلقت صندوق البنية التحتية الوطني لتنويع اقتصادها.

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have been the main competitors in a struggle over who — and in what manner — should act as the patron of Muslims in the Balkans. These three countries are very different in terms of their historical footprint, economic and political presence, and local networks. What they share, however, is the use of Islam to exert soft power. This paper will discuss how they are seeking to wield influence, how regional actors respond to their overtures, and whether these three countries are meeting their objectives in the region.

Debates on a military solution to Iran’s nuclear program are heavily polarized between those arguing that a threat of war and a preventive non-proliferation military strike can be a solution and those arguing that military action will only accelerate Iran’s nuclear program. The truth is that it is highly unlikely that Tehran would abandon its nuclear program after a military strike.

Saudi Arabia’s leviathan sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), has recently sold a 5% stake in the Saudi Telecom Company (STC). The firm is the largest and most profitable in the regional telecoms sector. The 3.2B USD sale, completed in early Dec. 2021, is yet another step in Riyadh’s privatization drive as part of its Vision 2030 agenda, and highlights the growing role of the Kingdom’s domestic financial sector.

Saudi Arabia’s strategy to push through its portfolio of clean and renewables assets was further strengthened in 2021 as the kingdom witnessed several project financings in the solar sector and launched the National Infrastructure Fund (NIF) to diversify its economy.

هذا هو الجزء الأخير من سلسلة مكونة من ثلاثة أجزاء

عندما توفي آية الله روح الله الخميني، مؤسس جمهورية إيران الإسلامية، عن عمر يناهز 89 عامًا، تمتع هو والنظام الذي أسسه بدعم معظم رجال الدين رفيعي المستوى في البلاد.

لكن خليفته، المرشد الأعلى آية الله علي خامنئي، البالغ من العمر 82 عامًا، يواجه وضعًا مختلفًا للغاية. فمن الواضح أن معظم كبار رجال الدين لا يؤيدونه، وقد تسبب “انحراف” الجيل الجديد من رجال الدين في مخاوف متزايدة داخل النظام.

تكوين المراجع الدينية

Contents:

Istikharah or divination, according to Islamic definitions, means to seek goodness and to consult God in various affairs. Istikharah is very common among Shiites, including bibliomancy, which involves randomly opening the Qur’an and reading the first verse on the page, or rosary divination. The use of istikharah has a long history in Iran, not only among the common people, but also among its rulers, who have used it to make decisions on the governance of the country, and this continues to the present day.

In September, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian spoke of the “unlimited” potential to expand Tehran-Havana ties, and both sides have highlighted the fields of medicine and agriculture as ideal areas for cooperation. While that might be the case, there is no denying that the Iran-Cuba partnership represents the coming together of two entirely different political models that above all rests on shared conflict with the United States.