Research & Commentary Results

As a result of the Iran war, Turkish thinking about nuclear weapons appears to be shifting. Iran’s emergent ability to threaten regional states (and possible determination to acquire a nuclear weapon itself), growing concern about Israeli aggressiveness, doubts about US security guarantees, and greater Saudi nuclear autonomy are all pushing Ankara to consider a future nuclear option.

In less than two decades, a string of offshore discoveries has turned the Eastern Mediterranean into a significant gas-producing region, making Israel an exporter, twice lifting Egypt into the ranks of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporters, and giving Cyprus finds it has yet to bring to market. This backgrounder explores the potential and challenges of exploiting and managing LNG resources in the region.

On August 7, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Défense Agreement, a collective-defense pact widely compared to NATO’s Article 5. This essay argues that the comparison is misleading. Mecca borrows NATO’s language of solidarity without yet possessing NATO’s institutional machinery, and the Houthi offensive against Saudi Arabia in September 2026 provided an early and revealing test of what the agreement actually means in practice. Neither Pakistan nor Turkey automatically entered the fight on Saudi Arabia’s behalf, and Washington, despite an initial reluctance to strike directly, remained indispensable through intelligence support and a major proposed F-35 sale. Drawing on realist alliance theory — Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, Glenn Snyder, and Steven David — and on the precedent of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the essay contends that the Middle East is not dividing into rival blocs but moving from hierarchy toward a looser, overlapping geometry of hedged partnerships, in which American exclusivity is eroding considerably faster than American primacy.

When Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan agreed to a mutual defense pact in August, it was principally seen as a political commitment. The “Mecca alliance,” as it was dubbed, stipulated that an armed attack on one would be treated as an attack on all three, accompanied by deeper military cooperation.

In February 2026, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan suggested that shifting international dynamics could push Turkey to acquire nuclear weapons. That rhetoric, combined with Turkey’s civilian nuclear energy and research programs and its indigenous surface-to-surface missile development projects, has fueled concerns that these capabilities could eventually form the backbone of a Turkish nuclear weapons program.

Turkey has become a major player in Africa, with a particularly strong footprint in the Horn. While economic and energy interests’ matter, one sector now stands at the center of Ankara’s regional activism: defense.

I was a teenage Afghan refugee in Pakistan’s tribal areas when the Twin Towers fell. Almost nobody around us understood the politics of what had happened, but we knew that something had changed for good. Afghanistan, which until then had been our private tragedy and our first exile from Taliban rule, had suddenly become the world’s concern, with the United States leading the response.

Turkish ambitions to develop nuclear weapons are not new, but the changing security environment is strengthening Ankara’s motivations and rationale for moving away from its longstanding role as a champion of nonproliferation and toward a strategy of preserving the option to build nuclear weapons without actually pursuing them. The challenge for Washington is to manage the nuclear trajectory of regional powers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia rather than preventing them from acquiring greater nuclear capabilities altogether.

Sometimes the only thing more frightening than Afghanistan’s problems is the Taliban’s solutions and the recently signed Russia-Taliban military-technical agreement may be the most alarming one yet. The partnership signals that Afghanistan’s security architecture is being rebuilt without the United States, and increasingly by America’s rivals. Washington should pay close attention because the deal hands one of the world’s most repressive regimes a pathway to becoming more capable and deeply entrenched in a regional order where Russian influence is expanding at America’s expense.

A Turkish court has taken a dramatic step that could reshape the country’s political landscape. It annulled the results of the CHP’s 2023 party congress, effectively overturning the election of Özgür Özel as leader of Turkey’s main opposition party and potentially paving the way for former chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to return.

Pakistan is not merely reacting to the current phase of the 2026 Iran war; it is functioning as a system-adjusting intermediary within a rapidly reordering regional landscape. As established channels of diplomacy, trade, and financial coordination have fractured under wartime pressure, Islamabad has emerged as a critical node through which regional and extra-regional actors are progressively rerouting engagement, commerce, and influence.

As Washington and Tehran edge closer to escalation, the most critical line of communication keeping the crisis from spiraling is being run not by polished diplomats, but by an unlikely figure: a Pakistani general. Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s powerful army chief, has quietly become the key intermediary in the U.S.-Iran standoff, managing what may be the most important backchannel between the two sides. The mediation has thrust Pakistan to the center of the crisis while exposing it to enormous risk.

In 2025, jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan made a historic call for the group to disarm and dissolve, raising hopes of ending a 40-year conflict that has shaped Turkey and the wider region. Months later, the PKK symbolically laid down arms in what many viewed as a breakthrough moment for the peace process.