Wars don’t just end. They get interpreted, reinterpreted, and turned into strategic doctrine. That is what happened after the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, a conflict that saw the United States back Tehran’s Iraqi adversaries. The war taught Tehran three lessons it never unlearned: that Washington wants the Islamic Republic gone, that Iran stands essentially alone in the world, and that it cannot survive a direct, overt fight with the U.S. and Israel.
Within 48 hours this week, Iran filled six of the most important posts in its battered military and security establishment. Read together with the biographies and mandates behind them, the appointments show how Tehran is drawing lessons from successive wars and preparing for a prolonged period of insecurity, without proving it has abandoned negotiation.
In an August 9 interview with Axios, when asked about the endless swings of the Iran standoff, he shrugged it off as familiar territory. “It’ll work out in the end. It always does. It’s like a chess game.”
Since 1967, Israeli settlements in the West Bank have been a contested feature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The ultimate disposition of the settlements and ongoing activity related to their growth have repeatedly defied agreement in negotiations over a resolution to the conflict.
The Houthis are a political-military faction and Zaydi religious movement founded in northwestern Yemen in the 1980s. A key member of Iran’s Axis of Resistance with links to other militant organizations in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, the group has continued to pose a threat to Western interests on a global scale.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a proposed multinational infrastructure initiative aimed at upgrading connectivity between the three regions through integrated trade, energy, and digital networks. Announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, IMEC is envisioned partially as a counterweight to China’s international infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative.
After a decade of post-Arab Spring isolation, Turkey’s leaders have recognized that their ambition to position the country as an agenda-setter on the world stage requires active engagement in all directions. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s consolidation of executive authority has centralized foreign policy decision-making and tied it to his domestic political priorities, transforming the country’s revisionist approach to one shaped primarily by personal and pragmatic interests.
المدونات الصوتية
التركيز على الشرق الأوسط
البودكاست الأسبوعي الرائد لمعهد الشرق الأوسط حول السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية والقضايا السياسية والاجتماعية المعاصرة في الشرق الأوسط.
Malaysian Foreign Fighters from Past to Present: Different Pathways to Terror
This essay briefly examines Malaysia’s past experience dealing with jihadist activities and profiles four Malaysian foreign fighters from the current period. The central argument is that, even though Malaysians constitute a relatively small number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, they pose a major problem for Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries and are a complicating factor in the conflicts in which they are involved.
Representatives of the Kurdistan Regional Government (K.R.G.) are currently in the process of shaping the information environment ahead of a desired referendum on Kurdish independence. Aside from a lobbying campaign strongly focused on Washington—the K.R.G. has spent more on lobbying in the United States than Pakistan—leaders have been making provocative statements regarding territorial ambitions.[1] K.R.G.
Monday Briefing: India FM to Visit Iraq and Syria; Iran-Turkey Relations After the Failed Coup; Afghanistan's Fractured Government
In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts Zubair Iqbal, Alex Vatanka, and Marvin G. Weinbaum provide analysis on issues including India’s Middle East policy as its foreign minister is set to visit Iraq and Syria, the opening of relations between Iran and Turkey following the latter’s recent failed coup, and the latest signs of tension within Afghanistan’s shaky unity government.
The G.C.C. and China’s One Belt, One Road: Risk or Opportunity?
China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative does not provide an equal opportunity for all states, and, in the case of the Gulf, it is Iran that will likely benefit over all others. The states of the G.C.C. also factor into Beijing’s plan, just not to the same degree―and that is the problem. Yet, as this essay shows, using OBOR and existing comparative advantages will allow the states of the G.C.C. to balance Iran’s potential windfall.
The Battle for Aleppo: Political and Security Repercussions
August 8, 2016 – A conversation with MEI Senior Fellow Charles Lister on the siege of Aleppo and the dynamics within Syrian opposition groups. Hosted by Paul Salem, vice president for policy and research at The Middle East Institute.
Remembering Mohamed Khan—the Leader of Egypt’s Neo-Realist Cinema
Of the numerous artists claimed by the grim reaper this year, the sudden death of veteran Egyptian filmmaker Mohamed Khan at 73 was among the most impactful. Widely considered as one of Egypt’s greatest directors, the vivacious, imposing Khan had a voracious appetite for life that concealed his real age. He was a man who always seemed to be bigger than death.
This essay discusses China’s responses to the jihadi threat. It shows that Chinese strategies have been influenced by whether the terrorist threat is perceived to be domestic or foreign. Internally, the Chinese approach has focused on protection and policing, resulting in confrontation with the Uighur minority in the far western province of Xinjiang. Externally, it has been less confrontational, with a preference for political and peace-building approaches.
Monday Briefing: Erdogan Reaching Out to Russia; Update on Battle for Aleppo
In this week’s Monday Briefing MEI experts provide analysis on recent and upcoming events including Turkish President Erdogan’s trip to Russia tomorrow, Iranian President Rouhani’s upcoming meeting with President Putin in Baku, the ongoing battle for Aleppo, strains in U.S.-Pakistan relations over the Haqqani Network, and what’s next for Tunisia’s political transition following the vote of no confidence in the current government.
U.S.-European nuclear-related sanctions on Iran in 2011 resulted in a major reduction of Japanese crude oil imports from Iran, which were largely offset by increased purchases from other Middle Eastern producers. This pattern remained more or less intact through the end of 2015.[1]
South Korea is the world’s fifth-largest crude oil importer and sixth-largest oil refining country. In June 2012, South Korea suspended all oil imports from Iran in response to a European Union insurance ban on tankers carrying Iranian crude oil.[1] South Korea subsequently obtained a waiver and resumed importing Iranian crude oil. However, the average annual volume of crude oil purchased by South Korea from Iran during the period 2012-2015 was 40% lower than in 2011.
تُعد المجلة الرئيسية لمعهد الشرق الأوسط أقدم مطبوعة محكّمة مكرّسة لدراسة الشرق الأوسط الحديث، وتغطي المجلة الرئيسية في المعهد السياسة والمجتمع والثقافة في المنطقة.
