الدفاع والأمن

Turkey’s relations with its Western allies are at an all-time low while its partnership with Russia is flourishing. Since Russia began delivery of its S-400 advanced aerial defense system in July, questions have abounded about Turkey’s future in the NATO alliance. Such concerns are not baseless. Turkey-Russia ties have never been closer. The two countries cooperate closely not only on energy and trade but also in the defense sector. But fears of a Turkish withdrawal from the alliance overlook the continued tension between Ankara and Moscow, which makes NATO an indispensable partner for Turkey.

Keynote address at MEI’s 73rd Annual Conference on November 13, 2019 in Washington, D.C.

East Ghouta is perhaps the darkest example of renewed Assad regime rule over former opposition territory. 18 months after the regime recaptured the area, its security forces and intelligence apparatus continue to terrorize Syrians there. Night-time raids on homes, mass arrests, and forced disappearances are common occurrences across the region. Intelligence forces assert themselves in every aspect of daily life, especially at the ubiquitous checkpoints where personnel extort residents for bribes when they pass, subjecting them to security checks that can lead to civilians either being arrested on the spot or conscripted into military service. In addition, residents of East Ghouta are facing a humanitarian crisis amid a total lack of basic services, from sewage to schools and hospitals, and the basic pillars of the local economy remain in total disrepair.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is set to meet with his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, in Washington on Wednesday. While there are doubtless other items for discussion on the agenda, at the top of the list is, at least on Turkey’s side, Syria — or more specifically, what U.S. policy is and should be in Syria.

After more than two months of Saudi-mediated indirect talks between the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), the two sides finally reached a deal on Nov. 5. The Saudi effort, which culminated in the signing of the Riyadh Agreement, is aimed at resolving the conflict within the Arab coalition-backed front and uniting the two parties in the fight against the Iranian-backed Houthi militias. The agreement, which spans political, economic, security, and military arrangements, involves restructuring the executive, military, and security branches of the ROYG, partial disarmament of STC-loyal forces, and the demilitarization of Aden — all of which will be phased in over the next three months.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall 30 years ago, ties between Western and Eastern Europe were renewed. In the same period, another wall crumbled — between the Middle East and the former Soviet states. And yet, to this day, U.S. national security institutions continue to view these two regions through a Cold War lens, separating how they are handled. This approach needs to change; integrating research and policy toward the Middle East and the bordering states of the former Soviet Union would improve analytical understanding and help identify new policy options.

On Nov. 4 Daily Sabah, a strongly pro-government English-language daily in Turkey, published a scathing editorial with a title that says it all: “Al Jazeera English: A threat against the Turkey-Qatar alliance.” According to the editorial, Al Jazeera English slandered Turkey over its recent military incursion into northern Syria, and thus jeopardized the future of the Turkey-Qatar alliance. Given the close relationship between the Turkish government and Daily Sabah — and indeed the broader media environment in Turkey — it is highly unlikely that such a fiery editorial, which directly threatens Qatar, would have been published without a green light from “the palace.”

With ongoing protests, potential sectarian clashes, and threats of terrorism in the region looming, the country’s armed forces need propping up now more than ever.

After violent confrontations with the government of Yemen and repeated struggles for autonomy, members of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which represents a political movement that calls for secession, appeared satisfied with the terms of a deal that will be signed with the government of Yemen in Riyadh on Oct. 31. The Saudi-brokered agreement united the conflicting parties in their fight against the Iran-backed Houthis, with a strong vision aimed at stopping any side-show that could endanger this effort.

The Trump administration inherited a number of complex problems in the Syrian file from its predecessors in the White House. In dealing with the Syrian crisis, the Obama administration had three main priorities: not disturbing Iran in Syria during the process of nuclear negotiations, working with Russia toward a ceasefire in various parts of Syria (without trusting that Russia could deliver or should have the upper hand), and, most importantly, carrying out a limited military intervention in the northeast to defeat ISIS — an issue it considered separately from the Syrian crisis.

Oct. 26, 2019 marked the 25th anniversary of the signing of the peace treaty between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel. A quarter-century on, relations between the two countries remain mired in disputes and difficulties, and no special celebrations were planned despite the significance of the event. While the challenges facing the two states are complex, both sides benefit from the agreement. The fact that the peace treaty has endured for two and a half decades amid the chaos and unrest afflicting the region is certainly a cause for celebration and gives grounds for optimism.

Russia is clear in its policy toward northeastern Syria: The future of the region will be determined through talks between the representatives of the Kurds, who traditionally live in the area, and Damascus.

The launch of Turkey’s military incursion into northern Syria on Oct. 9 represents an existential threat for the Autonomous Administration in Northeast Syria (AANES) and Kurdish parties in Syria as a whole, prompting Kurdish political factions, both within Syria and abroad, to reevaluate their survival strategies and alliances. This report explores the various political factions within the Kurdish coalitions in Syria as they functioned under the AANES and the major rifts between them. Even under these dire circumstances Kurdish political factions in Syria have responded to the Turkish invasion independently.

While the Iranians would have preferred it if the Turks had not invaded Syria, it does not change their most immediate policy objective, which is the survival of the Assad regime. As long as the Russians keep the Turks away from Assad’s forces, Tehran will, at least in the short term, be able to manage the consequences of Ankara’s actions.