Iran

When the US and Israel launched military action against Iran on February 28, 2026, it set in motion a chain of events that saw violence spread across the Middle East. Yet as the region found itself engulfed in conflict, Syria has experienced its most peaceful months in 15 years, and the government in Damascus appears determined to stay its course toward recovery.

More than 30 years after NATO overcame the threat from the Eastern Bloc, the alliance is struggling. Russia is waging war on Ukraine, the US is trying to pivot to Asia, and fresh conflict has erupted on Europe’s doorstep, with Russia and China both seeking advantage. Unexpectedly, for an alliance feeling unmoored, herein lies opportunity.

The war with Iran has not yet resolved the contest between Tehran and Washington, but it has already begun to reshape the Middle East — and nowhere as clearly in the United States’ favor as in Lebanon. The challenges in Lebanon have presented the US with a defining test: whether Washington and its partners have the determination to convert Iran’s material losses into lasting strategic change.

The 20-point plan for Gaza introduced before the war with Iran began has languished, with no meaningful recovery, reconstruction, Hamas disarmament, governance transition, or Israeli withdrawal. The diplomatic pivot back to Gaza in late July and early August suggests that the Iran war’s stubborn persistence may be causing the US and regional actors to seek wins on other fronts.

The American-Israeli campaign against Iran that began in February 2026 resulted in a regional conflict its authors never intended. The war’s chief product is not what the United States and Israel destroyed, though that was significant, but what Iran proved: that it holds a strategic lever over its neighbors, the world economy, and the US.

The major wars Iran fights become the prism through which its leaders interpret future threats and opportunities. For four decades, Iranian foreign policy has reflected lessons learned from the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88. Similarly, the US-Israeli wars of 2025 and 2026 will shape how Tehran thinks about deterrence, diplomacy, regional relationships, and the use of military power.

It has become a commonplace for Americans to describe our current war with Iran as stuck in a kind of limbo, neither full war nor real peace. We’re not the only ones. Iraq finds itself caught in a limbo of its own, and like our own muddled state of affairs, theirs too is one largely — but not solely — of our devising.

Six months after the war began, Iran is neither collapsing nor returning to the order that existed before Israel and the US struck on February 28. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed, senior commanders and scientists were assassinated, and military, energy, and nuclear infrastructure were hit hard. The state kept functioning anyway. What that survival has obscured is how much shifted underneath it.

There may be no near-term resolution to the conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran. The cease-fire and memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on June 18  have broken down, there is little diplomatic engagement, and new flare-ups in early September indicate a further round of escalation. Gulf states may have no choice but to protect their assets and populations while trying to deter Iran by finding mechanisms of both containment and accommodation.

Across the Gulf, views differ widely on how the Iran war can and should end, and what the region will look like once it does. Yet on the crisis over the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the view is near-unanimous that a repeat is not only possible but likely. That expectation, more than any single incident over the past year, is becoming a major driver of decision-making in industry and policy circles alike.

When Iranian drones struck two Amazon Web Services data centers in the UAE on March 1, 2026, and damaged a third in Bahrain the same morning, many thought this could spell the end of the Gulf’s AI ambitions. Whatever the intent, the attacks highlighted the new reality that data centers have now become targets in inter-state wars.

When President Donald Trump ordered US forces into war against Iran, the administration’s ambitions reached well beyond Tehran’s nuclear program. Trump openly encouraged Iranians to topple their government. Israeli leaders spoke of reshaping the Middle East. The war’s architects got their wish — only not in the way they intended.

Egypt, which is not party to the war on Iran, has become a target as well as an intermediary in the conflict. As a result, the war has affected Egypt’s future calculations, particularly in three major areas: its economy, its security, and its regional alliances. 

The conventional framing of China’s role in the Middle East in policy discourse centers on a familiar question: what challenge does Beijing pose to US primacy? The answer is often framed as a largely linear story in which expanding economic influence gradually translates into geopolitical leverage.  Yet this view captures only part of the reality.

Europe did not choose the war with Iran, and most European governments still resist describing themselves as participants in it. But six months of military basing, missile-defense drawdowns, energy shocks, sanctions pressure and planning for possible migration crisis have made that distance harder to sustain.