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Geoffrey Aronson writes about Middle East affairs. He consults with a variety of public and private institutions dealing with regional political, security, and development issues. He has advised the World Bank on Israel’s disengagement and has worked for the European Union Coordinating Office for the Palestinian Police Support mission to the West Bank and Gaza.
The Second War for Palestine has continued longer than any Israel-Palestinian conflict since Israel’s establishment. Neither Gamal Abdel Nasser’s army nor Hafez al-Assad’s tanks fought as long as the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades still battling in Gaza.
The international community is focused on “the day after” in Gaza, built on the comforting but illusory assumption that Oct. 7 never happened. In contrast, Israel and Hamas alike are engaged in a zero-sum contest to build a new system created out of blood and fire. When we consider the options for Gaza, the most instructive point of departure is the day before — that is, the evolution of Israeli occupation policies in the half century since the June 1967 war.
Even as the United States continues the strategic pivot to the Pacific inaugurated by the Obama administration, the competition for security and control of maritime space in the Red Sea and eastern Mediterranean is intensifying.
In the 19th century, the Gulf was a British lake. In the 20th century, American warships played an all but unchallenged role securing the safe and unfettered passage of oil to the West. As the 21st century progresses, the transition to a new era is unstoppable.
The understandings reached between Washington and Jerusalem half a century ago establish the critical context for the Biden administration’s current effort to restore the JCPOA, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu fiercely opposed during its adoption by the U.N. Security Council in July 2015 and which he still bitterly contests today.
Not too long ago, the Mediterranean was described as “NATO’s lake” — a sleepy backwater in a world dominated by conflict. Today, Israel’s quarrels with Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria are viewed — and minimized — as legacy conflicts, overshadowed by a new and unstable strategic environment centered upon competing visions of offshore energy and security in the eastern Mediterranean.
The Sinai-based Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) will soon celebrate its 41st anniversary. Like most of what the MFO does, recognition will be low key and understated. The MFO has always operated under the radar, but this may soon be changing.
What was President Donald Trump thinking when, on June 24, when he announced a historic revision of U.S. security policy in the Gulf?
As Washington slept, Trump tweeted that “China gets 91% of its Oil from the Straight, Japan 62%, & many other countries likewise. So why are we protecting the shipping lanes for other countries (many years) for zero compensation. All of these countries should be protecting their own ships on what has always been a dangerous journey. We don’t even need to be there in that the U.S. has just become (by far) the largest producer of Energy anywhere in the world!”
Competition for security and energy is at the center of recent developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. Countries from Egypt to Turkey are moving to secure, exploit, and market their (not always fair) share of the game-changing offshore natural gas reserves. Russia, China, and Iran are securing port facilities, and in the case of Russia, drilling rights, in Lebanon and Syria.
Sometime in June the UN Security Council will vote to approve another six-month renewal of the mandate of the 1000-strong UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) deployed in the Golan Heights. For more than four decades, the UN Security Council has unanimously renewed the mission’s mandate to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria, but this will be the first time it has come up for a vote since President Donald Trump signed a proclamation recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the area of the Golan Heights on March 25th.
In the days before his recent election victory, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu raised the prospect of Israel’s formal annexation of the West Bank settlement areas where close to half a million Israelis reside. For more than half a century Israeli governments of all parties and constellations have been enthusiastic partners in policies of occupation and settlement of territories conquered in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.
That the relationship between the Ba’ath regime in Syria and the ayatollahs of the Islamic Republic is one of loveless realpolitik is no secret to anyone with a passing familiarity with the history of Damascus-Tehran ties. The end of the war in Syria has already begun to expose faults in the unlikely marriage between a militant secular Arab regime rooted in the independence politics of the colonial era and the revolutionary rule of the wilayat al-faqih.
Washington devised the recent Middle East summit in Warsaw in the hope of mobilizing a broad front against Iran. In the end though, it was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who reaped the greatest reward.
Israel is set to hold national elections in early April, and all indications suggest that the contest is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s to lose. Current polls indicate that he will form the next government, leading a coalition spearheaded by his Likud Party with 30 seats in the 120-member Knesset.
President Donald Trump is doing the right thing on Syria — removing U.S. forces — but for the wrong reasons. As a consequence, the value and import of his decision will be less than might otherwise be the case.
