Defense and Security, Democracy and Human Rights, Energy, Governance, Reform, and State Capacity, Great Powers in the Middle East, Nuclear Proliferation, Terrorism, Iran, Turkey
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Iulia Joja is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute (MEI), where she focuses on European and Black Sea security, with particular attention to defense, strategic cultures, and transatlantic relations. She is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and George Washington University, teaching European affairs and security.
Before joining MEI, Dr. Joja served as an adviser to the Romanian president and as a deputy project manager at NATO Allied Command Transformation in Virginia. She has also worked with the Romanian delegation to the United Nations, the European Parliament, and the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Dr. Joja has held prestigious academic positions, including as a visiting scholar at the Center of Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed Forces in Potsdam/Berlin and as a German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) post-doctoral fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
She holds a PhD in Strategic Studies from the National School of Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest, an MA in International Conflict Studies from King’s College London, and a BA in Political Science and International Relations from Freie Universität in Berlin.
She is a native Romanian speaker.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Attempts at deterrence by sanctions have failed. The question now is: Does the West expect sanctions to change Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actions? We think not — and the world should have given up years ago on expecting them to dissuade him.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.
On Dec. 13, 2021, at a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting, a draft resolution that would have recognized climate change as a security threat was rejected. The resolution, co-sponsored by Niger and Ireland, would have incorporated climate change as a security risk within the U.N. framework of conflict prevention strategies. What are the potential implications of this and what comes next? We asked seven experts to weigh in with their thoughts.
For months, Ukraine has been a central focus for Western foreign policy as Russia has continued its military buildup on the border, reaching 100,000 troops. Moscow has threatened to carry out a military attack and has now issued an ultimatum for the United States to bless a Russian sphere of influence over sovereign democratic countries such as Ukraine. But as consultations between the U.S. and Russia take place throughout the week, the West should bear in mind that Ukraine is only one part of the broader Russian problem. It is about all independent former Soviet states and essentially about the entire European security architecture. The U.S. and NATO cannot go over the heads of independent states and give into Russian demands; instead, they should buy time and invest in long-term European security, while refraining from rhetoric and ultimatums.
Last week, one day before the European Council, the sixth Eastern Partnership summit took place. For weeks, questions about a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine have been asked around the world. But the Eastern Partnership summit declaration, signed by Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, includes no mention of Russia. The Partnership appears hesitant to commit to more security (or integration), perhaps because some members were hoping for a greater European Union commitment to Black Sea security.
Under the Biden administration, calls for a NATO Black Sea strategy have amplified. A gamechanger for the much-needed regional strategy is Georgia’s and Ukraine’s path to membership. NATO’s strategic reassessment, to be finalized next year at the Madrid summit in June, will likely fall short of granting Ukraine and Georgia the desired Membership Action Plan. Nevertheless, NATO’s strategic reassessment offers the opportunity of a partnership upgrade for one or both countries.
Conflicts are enormously destructive. They destroy lives and property, uproot communities, and reduce the economic potential for all involved. This devastation often has an unaccounted cost, both in terms of the obvious direct destruction of lives and assets, as well as the indirect costs that weigh on economies, often for years to come. This is true of all conflicts, and has certainly been true, and visible, during Russia’s unjustified and illegal invasions of its neighbors, Georgia and Ukraine.
Lashet and Baerbock represent two very different German foreign policies with large-scale implications for Europe’s Eastern front.
The Memorandum of Understanding signed recently by Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine on enhanced cooperation toward European Union (EU) membership highlights both progress and overall shortcomings of the EU’s Eastern policy. Despite the Union enlarging to the East in 2004 and 2007 – and the fact that Russian aggression has long been felt on EU territory – the bloc’s Eastern policy still does not reflect realities on the ground. However, the recent buildup of Russian military in Ukraine, as well as the deployment of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ in Nagorno-Karabakh, has created momentum for an urgently needed rethink of the Union’s Eastern neighborhood policy.
The recent visit of Secretary Anthony Blinken and Under Secretary Victoria Nuland to Kiev demonstrated the urgency of Ukrainian security and Russian aggression. The visit, however, occurred on shaky grounds, with three main obstacles preventing Ukraine from making significant progress in its partnership with the U.S. First, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s limited progress on democratic reforms. Second, Western Europe’s lukewarm support for Ukraine and against Russian aggression. And third, Russia’s diversionary policy.
There are three clear steps the Biden administration must take if it hopes to de-escalate the crisis with Russia in Eastern Europe without being drawn into conflict. First, recognize that the Normandy Format has failed. Second, take the lead on peace negotiations with Russia. And third, shape a strategy for the Black Sea region.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
