المشرق العربي

While there is no shortage of rhetorical opposition to Israeli annexation from all corners, the question now is whether any of them intend to follow up their strong words with concrete actions.

This precedent, along with the implementation of the Caesar Bill, guarantees the future isolation of the Syrian regime.

Basma El Husseiny (Action for Hope) and Samar El Yassir (Anera) join guest host Lyne Sneige to discuss the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on refugee communities and the NGOs that work with them.

The April 20 Netanyahu-Gantz agreement legitimized the possibility of an Israeli law that will act as a unilateral annexation of parts of the West Bank to start as early as July 1, based on the controversial Trump Middle East plan. Articles 28 and 29 of the deal condition such annexation on the “consent of the Trump administration” and note that such a move would only be possible if the annexation preserves “the security and strategic interests of the state of Israel including the need to keep regional stability, keep existing peace agreements, and pursue future peace agreements.”

Officially, Syria has just 42 COVID-19 cases, all but one of them in regime-held areas, as testing capacity is almost non-existent elsewhere. The actual number is certainly higher, but there appear to be few severe cases at the moment. Yet, interviews with doctors and NGO workers conducted over the phone and via messaging apps across all areas of control in Syria — from regime-held areas and the northeast to Idlib and the Turkish-controlled region — paint a grim picture of a health care sector utterly unprepared for a pandemic.

There is certainly no shortage of writings on Turkey today regarding that country’s “drift” away from its Western orientation. Some who espouse this argument frame the consequences in terms of Turkey’s increased ties to China. While Turkey itself has launched an “Asia Anew” policy, the outsized focus on this and other alleged signs of Turkey’s “drift from the West” distracts from the very palpable effects of its adventurism in the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s increasingly reckless foreign policy is on full display — from weaponizing refugees to extort the European Union to exporting mercenary Jihadist fighters to Libya. These are hardly the actions of a responsible regional power, much less a key member of the NATO alliance. 

Lebanese citizens are growing increasingly frustrated with a lack of concrete results from Diab’s self-styled “government of independent experts.”

When the American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured the village of al-Baghouz in late
March 2019, ISIS’s self-proclaimed “caliphate” came to an end. The largest multinational military
coalition in modern history spent four-and-a-half years methodically rolling back ISIS’s control of an
expanse of territory the size of Britain, stretching across Syria and Iraq.

With the coronavirus sucking almost all of the oxygen out of the world’s news, it’s no wonder that Israel’s ongoing political crisis hasn’t received more coverage. But while the outside world is otherwise occupied, Israel, besides battling corona itself, is serving as a poster child for dysfunctional (yet democratic) government.

This is not the time to hang out the “Mission Accomplished” banner for the MFO. At a nominal cost to the U.S. in money and manpower, for nearly 40 years, the mission has been a phenomenal success. At a time when the U.S. commitment to the region is being viewed with increasing skepticism, the MFO is a prime example of U.S. capacity to organize and lead a multinational effort to support regional security and stability.

President Recip Tayyip Erdogan has sought to dramatically reorient Turkey’s role and relationships in the region. Gradually at first but then abruptly, he has pivoted from the Republic’s historical status as a key member of the transatlantic alliance towards new partnerships – including Russia. Erdogan has consistently aimed for freedom in executing his foreign policy agenda, of which energy concerns are pivotal. It remains to be seen whether this hard-sought autonomy will be limited or expanded by Turkey’s domestic energy needs and its prime position as a hydrocarbon transit state.

Immediately after the Syrian regime and its allies captured central Syria in late 2017, ISIS began waging an effective and deadly insurgency in the area. It first targeted urban centers along the western Euphrates before shifting focus in spring 2018 to the transport lines and mountains running along the M20 from Khunayfis to Shoula. These wide-ranging operations have killed a minimum of 860 pro-regime fighters of all ranks, units, and types. This report tracks self-reported regime losses in the region, as indicated on loyalist Facebook pages, community pages, and unit pages, from Nov. 10, 2017 through March 31, 2020.

Both the coronavirus crisis and Israel’s year-long political crisis seem set to continue for the unforeseeable future.

The ingredients that fueled ISIS’s explosive expansion in Syria in 2013-14 are not only still present today, they are worse.