Research & Commentary Results

A year and a half into Donald Trump’s second administration, the Middle East is far from where the president had hoped or expected it would be.

US President Donald Trump recently proposed that Syria intervene militarily against Hizballah in Lebanon. Is that a good idea? This episode of Middle East Focus features a recent MEI Virtual Briefing. Director of Communications Zeina Al-Shaib is joined by Ambassador David Hale, MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow and Charles Lister, MEI Senior Fellow. Together they examine the prospects and implications of renewed Syrian involvement in Lebanon, the potential impact on US relations with both countries, and how evolving dynamics in Lebanon and Syria could reshape the regional balance of power and affect countries such as Turkey and Israel.

President Trump’s family businesses are once again in the spotlight as a new financial disclosure showed they earned $2 billion in income in 2025 — a dramatic increase on the year before, with much of it coming from Gulf entities, raising emoluments concerns. Mounting perceptions of corruption, combined with unresolved crises in Iran and Israel-Palestine, are eroding trust among key partners in the Middle East. With the 2026 midterms approaching, these entanglements could represent a major political vulnerability and further undermine America’s already-strained standing in the region.

Much work lies ahead, but the June 26 agreement is a rare act of constructive statesmanship in the Middle East.

As the US and Iran move to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the war’s real lesson lies in how Gulf states rapidly adapted — building pipelines, ports, and rail to bypass the chokepoint. Washington should seize this momentum, pursuing a “long game” of regional connectivity that serves shared security and economic interests.

Syria’s shattered energy sector is being rebuilt at a moment of unusual strategic flux across the Middle East, one defined by Iran’s military degradation following sustained U.S. and Israeli strikes in February and March; Russia’s prolonged absorption in its war in Ukraine; and China’s preference for commercial caution over political risk. Together, these shifts have weakened or distracted the external powers that once dominated Syria’s trajectory. The Gulf states have moved in to decisively fill the opening.

Since 1967, Israeli settlements in the West Bank have been a contested feature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The ultimate disposition of the settlements and ongoing activity related to their growth have repeatedly defied agreement in negotiations over a resolution to the conflict.

ISIS appears to have collapsed in Syria in the wake of the SDF’s military defeat and subsequent integration, followed by the withdrawal of US troops. To the extent that the US prioritizes the group’s enduring defeat in the country, a relationship centered in Damascus is the best way to achieve it.

A tentative U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding appeared close to completion in late May, but Iran’s decision to suspend indirect talks over Israel’s expanding operations in Lebanon has thrown the process into uncertainty. What had looked like an emerging framework now appears less a pathway to settlement than a reminder of how fragile the ceasefire remains.

In the early hours of Sunday, May 3, Jordanian F-16 fighter jets crossed into Syrian airspace and launched strikes on at least six locations in the southern province of Sweida. In a statement issued hours later, Jordan’s military said that “Operation Jordanian Deterrence” had targeted “factories, facilities and warehouses used by trafficking groups as launch points for smuggling operations into Jordan.”