China’s power in the Middle East has hard limits
China is becoming harder to ignore in the Middle East. Yet the gap between economic presence and strategic power remains wide, even as American policy swings, argues US academic John Calabrese.
China is becoming harder to ignore in the Middle East. Yet the gap between economic presence and strategic power remains wide, even as American policy swings, argues US academic John Calabrese.
The Abraham Accords have represented a remarkable shift in U.S. Middle East policy. They reframed Arab-Israeli normalization as a result of shared interests – within the Middle East and directly with the US, rather than as a byproduct of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Signed in September 2020, on the last leg of the first Trump administration, the Accords brokered by Washington normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, followed by framework agreements with Morocco and Sudan. From the American perspective, the Accords were intended to break decades of diplomatic stagnation in the Middle East in order to establish a regional framework aligned with American strategic objectives.
In November 2025, the United States sought and obtained approval for a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 2803) endorsing the formation of a Board of Peace (BoP) and International Stabilization Force (ISF) to support the implementation of the 20-point peace plan agreed to by Israel and Hamas the previous month. The ISF’s stated role is to help secure and demilitarize the Gaza Strip, primarily by facilitating the decommissioning of weapons, protecting civilians, and training and advising burgeoning Palestinian police forces. In the intervening months, however, progress on standing up the ISF has stalled, and conflicting messaging from US officials provides more questions than answers.
Hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Distinguished Military Fellow Mick Mulroy to discuss the Trump administration’s new National Defense Strategy (NDS) and its implications for the Middle East. While serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for the Middle East from 2017 to 2019, Mulroy helped prepare the 2018 NDS, giving him an insider perspective on US defense planning. Together, Taylor, Czekaj, and Mulroy unpack what the new strategy means for US priorities globally and for the Middle East in particular, including how it could be reflected in a potentially looming military strike on Iran.
MEI Senior Fellow Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to discuss the latest developments in Gaza. Nearly four months after the Israeli government and Hamas agreed to President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, Washington has announced that phase two of the process is now underway. Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Taylor, and Czekaj examine the humanitarian situation in the devastated coastal strip, assess what phase two could entail, break down how international actors are responding, and explore what would need to happen to realize the plan’s aspirations.
Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban has shifted from open sponsorship in the 1990s to a silent partnership following 2001 to alienation and belligerence since 2021. Their current conflict, which comes at great cost to both countries and seems to have no easy military or political resolution, also poses a threat to the stability and prosperity of neighboring states. Although American strategic interests in the region greatly diminished following the United States’ military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the region’s altered political dynamics have prompted a growing American engagement with Pakistan and tentatively with Afghanistan. At the same time, the US has become a factor in how both Islamabad and Kabul have come to form their national security strategies.
Since Israel’s 12-day war against Iran, Tehran and its network of regional proxies and non-state allies, the so-called Axis of Resistance, have entered a phase of strategic dormancy — an outward calm concealing rearmament, financial adaptation, and ideological renewal.
One year after the fall of the Assad regime, Syria is still in very fragile phase of its transition to a new political order. The country faces monumental reconstruction challenges, estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars, well beyond the capabilities of the new Syrian government. Without sustained American leadership and investment, Syria’s transition will be slow, fragile, and dangerously reversible.
This backgrounder provides an overview of the Axis of Resistance, a loosely aligned network of armed groups and state actors led and supported by Iran to project its influence and military strength across the Middle East.
This backgrounder provides an overview of the history of Hamas, its ideology and leadership, military capabilities and goals, the October 7 attack, relevant US government policies and legislation, and the group’s future in Gaza.
The United States plans to submit a resolution on Gaza to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by the end of November. Reportedly, the latest draft endorses President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, recognizes the Board of Peace (BoP) as a “transitional governance administration,” and authorizes the BoP to establish an International Stabilization Force (ISF). The UN resolution is a first step to achieving buy-in from potential ISF contributors. In turn, a viable ISF will be one key to moving beyond the cease-fire to securing the 20-point plan’s envisioned Hamas disarmament, further Israeli military withdrawal, and a path to Palestinian governance. The US faces several dilemmas as it seeks to transition from cease-fire to stabilization and beyond.
For years, the prevailing assumption was that the Houthis’ survival depended on battlefield victories and Iranian support. Both are essential, but there is a third critical and often overlooked factor: the weaponization of international engagement. In a pattern that continues to repeat itself, engagement without accountability strengthens rather than moderates Houthi behavior.