The United States has long confused Iran for a rational actor with a low pain threshold, sensitive to battlefield losses and vulnerable to domestic unrest, which would bring it to the negotiating table. Each of those assumptions is wrong.
Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Iran war has been defined by a sustained effort to avoid direct entanglement. That restraint was notable given Riyadh’s position as Iran’s principal Gulf rival, its close security relationship with Washington, and its exposure to regional escalation. The kingdom made clear that it would not permit its territory or airspace to be used by any party for military action against Iran, avoided rhetorical alignment with Israel, and preserved the diplomatic channels with Tehran that were restored in 2023.
It has become a commonplace for Americans to describe our current war with Iran as stuck in a kind of limbo, neither full war nor real peace. We’re not the only ones. Iraq finds itself caught in a limbo of its own, between America and Iran, between the tolerable and the intolerable, between progress and relapse.
In many ways, the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran and the war in Gaza that preceded it seem transformative. After decades of shadow warfare, Iran and Israel have now attacked each other’s homelands directly. And Israel and the United States have joined forces in a genuinely novel way to wage war against Iran.
It is now clear the United States is sinking into the quagmire of its war with Iran with no clear idea of how to get out. More than five months of intermittent bombing of Iran have not brought Tehran any closer to surrender. Recurring threats by US President Donald Trump to launch a massive military campaign against the country aren’t causing Iran to submit to US demands.
Something more consequential than another oil market disruption is underway. The Iran war has exposed and accelerated an institutional weakness within OPEC that had been building for years. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the UAE’s departure, Iraq’s brief flirtation with exit, and the continued rise of U.S. oil production all point to a deeper question about the cartel’s durability. The issue has shifted from OPEC’s ability to manage crises toward whether its model of collective discipline can withstand mounting structural strain.
At the recent Lianhe Zaobao Singapore-China Forum 2026 in Singapore, Professor Joseph Liow, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and chairman of the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore, suggested that the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) may be entering a “new normal”, one in which Iran — and perhaps Oman — could justify charging vessels fees for transiting one of the world’s most important waterways.
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is on something of a diplomatic roll at the moment. Having concluded a weeklong visit to the United States on July 19, 2026, during which he charmed President Donald Trump, al-Zaidi is now expected to head to Tehran to do the same with Iran’s new leaders. Trips to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Syria all figure on his itinerary, too.
This past June, I had the opportunity to visit Ukraine and see a bit of a war I heretofore had only read about. The contrasts with the Middle Eastern wars I had experienced were stunning, as was, in particular, the juxtaposition with the current Iran conflict and the ongoing threat to our Gulf allies. There are lessons to be learned about commitment, intensity, self-reliance, and the importance of alliances. They could serve our allies and ourselves well in both theaters.
With more than 80% of global trade by volume being transported by sea, maritime shipping lanes are indispensable to the world economy. That fact was starkly illustrated by the war in Iran, which saw Tehran effectively close the Strait of Hormuz to commercial traffic and Washington respond with a blockade of Iranian ports.
