As the war with Iran consumes regional attention, Gaza is again being pushed aside. That is not just a humanitarian failure. It is a strategic mistake that could squander a rare opening for political transition while allowing Hamas to weaponize abandonment once more.
Disarmament is necessary in Gaza. It is the only way to realize the goals articulated in the internationally endorsed 20-point plan laid out by the Trump administration. But a policy approach that makes disarmament a prerequisite for action on governance, recovery, freedom of movement for Gazans, and any credible political horizon is structurally and strategically counterproductive.
Brian is joined by Dana Stroul, Director of Research and Shelly and Michael Kassen Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, to examine US objectives in the Middle East in the midst of the ongoing war between the US, Israel, and Iran. Drawing on her extensive experience in US policymaking, most notably as the Pentagon’s top civilian official responsible for the Middle East from 2021 to 2023, Dana offers an insider’s perspective on this strategic moment. Together, Dana and Brian unpack the rapidly developing situation in Iran, the fragility of the ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, the shifting landscape in Syria after Assad, and the United States’ role in a region that may be on the cusp of transformation.
Today’s decision taken by the Lebanese government — to declare all of Hizballah’s security and military activities illegal — is a landmark development. But how the government and the Lebanese Armed Forces implement this directive now that a new round of attacks has actually taken place will be the ultimate test of their credibility.
On February 28, the US and Israel launched coordinated military strikes on Iran. MEI defense experts weigh in on the military and regional consequences.
While it may not have been perfect, the Trump administration achieved a considerable amount in the first year of its second term, and there is reason to be optimistic that additional dividends will accrue in 2026.
The United States’ rapid military buildup across the Gulf has triggered a familiar anxiety in Tehran, but the Iranians’ reading of American intentions has grown sharper and more layered than at any point in recent years.
US President Donald Trump hosted an idiosyncratic gathering of global representatives in Washington on February 19 that included some key Middle East figures meeting under the banner of peace to discuss the next steps in Gaza just as the US was sending more military forces to the region to pressure and possibly target Iran.
Hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Senior Fellow Natan Sachs to discuss Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s February 11 visit to the White House, Israel’s anxieties surrounding the ongoing US-Iran talks, and the domestic political dynamics Netanyahu is operating under. Taylor, Czekaj, and Sachs unpack what Netanyahu hoped to achieve during the visit, particularly regarding Iran, and what his relationship with President Donald Trump can tell us about the relative coordination and policy alignment between the US and Israel. They also examine Netanyahu’s political standing at home, two and half years since the October 7 attacks, as the 2026 election campaign begins in Israel. Finally, Sachs assesses what lies ahead for Israeli politics.
The United States is Israel’s closest ally, and its support is a central pillar of Israel’s national security. The US provides Israel access to purchase advanced weapon systems, ammunition and weapon emergency supplies in times of war, intelligence sharing, opportunities for cooperation in defense technology, and crucial diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council and elsewhere. It also provides Israel with regular security aid, to be spent in the United States, currently at an annual rate of $3.8bn (under an MOU that expires in 2028). Since October 2023, the US also offered active military support, in a break from the historical norm. It contributed substantially to Israel’s defense against Iranian ballistic missiles, in conjunction with Arab regional partners, and bombed nuclear sites in Iran in support of Israel’s campaign in the “12 Day War” of June 2025.
The Abraham Accords have represented a remarkable shift in U.S. Middle East policy. They reframed Arab-Israeli normalization as a result of shared interests – within the Middle East and directly with the US, rather than as a byproduct of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Signed in September 2020, on the last leg of the first Trump administration, the Accords brokered by Washington normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, followed by framework agreements with Morocco and Sudan. From the American perspective, the Accords were intended to break decades of diplomatic stagnation in the Middle East in order to establish a regional framework aligned with American strategic objectives.
In November 2025, the United States sought and obtained approval for a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 2803) endorsing the formation of a Board of Peace (BoP) and International Stabilization Force (ISF) to support the implementation of the 20-point peace plan agreed to by Israel and Hamas the previous month. The ISF’s stated role is to help secure and demilitarize the Gaza Strip, primarily by facilitating the decommissioning of weapons, protecting civilians, and training and advising burgeoning Palestinian police forces. In the intervening months, however, progress on standing up the ISF has stalled, and conflicting messaging from US officials provides more questions than answers.
Donald Trump’s first year of his second presidential term has been a roller coaster of twists and turns both at home and abroad—particularly in the Middle East. His regional focus was driven by two main factors: first, Trump’s own ego and sense of possible place in history; and second, the volatile, dynamic events driven by actors in the region.
In the first year of his second term in office, US President Donald Trump focused considerable time and energy on the Middle East, but the results so far have been uneven. This report assesses the US government’s actions in the region over the past 12 months, from January 2025 through January 2026.
