Much work lies ahead, but the June 26 agreement is a rare act of constructive statesmanship in the Middle East.
After nearly four months of war, the US and Iran have signed a 14-point memorandum of understanding declaring the conflict over, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and beginning talks toward a final deal. Alan Eyre, MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow and a core member of the 2015 JCPOA negotiating team, joins host Alistair Taylor to unpack the deal’s implications for both countries, its ripple effects across the region, and what a lasting settlement would take.
Unconditional surrender of an adversary is possible only if the victor conducts unconditional war, which the American public clearly was not prepared for in the conflict with Iran. Ending this conflict was always going to entail some compromises. The U.S.-Iran MOU is being oversold by virtually everyone. The tangible parts of it are a ceasefire, sanctions relief for Iran and the reopening of Hormuz. Everything else in the agreement is conditioned to good faith negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program.
After months of deadlock following the November 2025 elections, Iraq’s parliament approved a new government under Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi on May 14, 2026 — just as the country has become a battleground in the US-Israel-Iran war. Zaidi inherits a daunting brief: reviving a struggling economy, reining in armed factions, and steering Iraq through a perilous regional landscape. Dr. Renad Mansour, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme and director of the Iraq Initiative at Chatham House, joins host Alistair Taylor to discuss the war’s impact on Iraq — from Iran’s militia networks to the surge of attacks on the Kurdistan region — and how it’s reshaping Baghdad’s ties with Tehran and Washington.
A Turkish court has taken a dramatic step that could reshape the country’s political landscape. It annulled the results of the CHP’s 2023 party congress, effectively overturning the election of Özgür Özel as leader of Turkey’s main opposition party and potentially paving the way for former chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to return.
ISIS appears to have collapsed in Syria in the wake of the SDF’s military defeat and subsequent integration, followed by the withdrawal of US troops. To the extent that the US prioritizes the group’s enduring defeat in the country, a relationship centered in Damascus is the best way to achieve it.
In March, there was talk of armed Kurdish fighters opening a second front in Iran’s northwest, but it never happened — for several very good reasons.
When Iranian drone strikes hit two of Amazon’s data centers in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in early March, amid the ongoing US-Israeli war with Iran, much of the media’s reflex was to declare it the end of the Gulf’s artificial intelligence (AI) ambitions. That read is misguided, and it misses why what Iran was trying to accomplish failed.
As Syria moves toward reconstruction, the country’s new authorities have already made a consequential decision about who will control the postwar economy. Last June, President Ahmed al-Sharaa enacted Investment Law 114 by presidential decree, granting sweeping and permanent concessions to investors. Yet rather than make those incentives broadly accessible, the law preserves the country’s longstanding model of state-mediated market access.
