الأبحاث والتعليقات

The religious make-up of Iran’s population is marked by a paradox: while many religions and sects are present, the overall picture is one of homogeneity, as over 99% of Iranians are Muslims, and of these somewhere between 75% and 90% adhere to Twelver Shi‘ism, Iran’s official state religion for the last five centuries. However, the exact numbers are unknown, since Iranian censuses ask citizens for their religious affiliation but allow only four choices: Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism, the latter three constituting the “recognized” minorities.

By the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, Iran was forced to cede its dependent khanates north of the river Aras to Russia. The majority population of both North (Russo-Soviet) and South (Iranian) Azerbaijan belong to the same ethnic group within the Turkic linguistic family. Many Azerbaijanis tend not to differentiate between the modern republic and Iranian Azerbaijan; they consider the Iranian Azeris “kith and kin.” In fact, many Azerbaijanis actually have family on the other side.

Revolutions, though essentially domestic affairs, cause a tear in the very fabric of the prevailing international system, disrupting the balance of power and the normal flow of diplomacy. Iran’s religiously inspired revolution has been no exception. On the one hand, it undid the intricate international web that had sustained the Pahlavi monarchy, and on the other it brought forth a series of priorities more consistent with the perceptions and values of the new elite and the ideological regime that the revolution had spawned.

Iran’s political culture is most compatible with a proactive foreign policy based on “patriotic cosmopolitanism,” a kind of doctrine with two apparently antithetical components: the idea of global citizenship, regardless of people’s political affiliation; but also political committment to sustain one’s own values — in this case, Iranian values. Ideally, this formulation should appeal to religious intellectuals and pro-Mossadeq nationalists.

Revolutions either expand to export their ideologies or preserve themselves from the outside world. The 1979 Islamic revolution of Iran is no exception. A careful reading of Iran’s actions in the region shows how and why Iran has shifted its policies to meet the latter aim. Since the revolution, Iran’s leaders have faced the challenge of balancing their ideological (idealism) and geopolitical (pragmatism) approaches to foreign policy.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued, as have other post-revolutionary states, certain principles and ideals that were revered in the movement that led to the revolution. Although Iran’s foreign policy during the past three decades has had an ideological component, this has not prevented it from translating ideology into operational policy in its foreign relations.

Originally posted, January 2009

Educational attainment has improved considerably in the Islamic Republic of Iran over the past three decades. During this period the improvement for women has been greater than for men. In recent years, women have gained access to education at different levels and in many fields.

The author, Bidjan Nashat, is a consultant on international development and Middle Eastern affairs at the World Bank and for German political foundations. He has studied at the Hertie School of Governance and at the universities of Tübingen, Georgetown and Yale and holds a Magister Artium in International Relations and Iranian Studies, and a Master of Public Policy.

Iranian universities are undoubtedly experiencing their hardest period since the Cultural Revolution of 1980-1982.^[1]All this is taking place in the name of “Islam” or “religion,” with little attention paid to the complexities of their definitions, nor indeed to those of “non-religion,” “non-Islam,”

Kurdish issues have been an important part of the myriad political and socioeconomic problems that have preoccupied the Islamic Republic of Iran since its inception. The Kurdish factor has also been an important determinant of Iran’s regional foreign policy in the past three decades. Shortly after the onset of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, the Iraqi government began to woo the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) as potential leverage in its war effort.

Next to the Arab-Israeli conflict, perhaps few other topics in the history of the modern Middle East have captured the interest of policymakers and scholars alike as has post-revolutionary Iranian-Lebanese Shi‘ite relations, particularly the creation of Hizbullah. Although both groups have come to this topic with a set of similar questions — namely, what is the impact of this transnational network among Lebanese Shi‘ites and how does it operate? — thankfully, they have arrived at very different conclusions.

The history of modern Persian literature is closely aligned with some of the oppositional movements that culminated in the 1979 revolution. The origins of modern Persian writing are inseparable from a preoccupation that literature speak to the concerns of the masses. Mohamad Ali Jamalzadeh, the reputed father of modern Persian prose, was among the first and most influential advocates of this view to overcome the elitist language and style of early 20th century literature.

In the news media and the prevailing political discourse, Iran is often portrayed as a closed society. Characterizations of Iran as a theocratic state, fundamentalist society, and a rogue nation depict Iran as an “Islamic” totalitarian state devoid of any freedom and trappings of “civil society.” At the same time, cinéphiles the world over applaud the work of Iranian filmmakers. One can cite numerous other examples of robust cultural activities in Iran.

Bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran have been marked by relative peace and stability for the past four centuries. Since the founding of the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923 and the creation of an absolutist monarchy in Iran in 1925, the ruling regimes of both countries have sought to consolidate their domestic power and to pursue an independent foreign policy. Neither Turkey nor Iran has viewed one another as an immediate threat to the attainment of these vital objectives.

Iranian society has changed dramatically over the past 30 years, and bears little resemblance either to the expectations of or the picture painted by the leadership of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, as much as the ruling clerics like to project self-confidence and the ability to predict the future, they could not have envisaged a society with these characteristics. While many of these surprising developments have occurred because of the policies of the Islamic Republic, others have occurred despite or regardless of them.