China has perfected the role of concerned onlooker as the Middle East conflict spreads across the region.
President Donald Trump said that the war against the Islamic Republic of Iran that he launched with Israel could last for four to five weeks with “the capability to go far longer than that.” Trump even left the door open to putting U.S. troops on the ground.
With the Iranian regime weakened by relentless American and Israeli missiles, Washington is eyeing a familiar U.S. ally in the Middle East to help push the Islamic Republic over the edge: the Kurds.
The recent escalation of the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict upends China’s westward economic expansion. With neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan willing to subordinate their core security objectives to Beijing’s connectivity agenda, will China find itself unable to push forward on its regional strategy? US academic John Calabrese ponders this quandary.
Today’s decision taken by the Lebanese government — to declare all of Hizballah’s security and military activities illegal — is a landmark development. But how the government and the Lebanese Armed Forces implement this directive now that a new round of attacks has actually taken place will be the ultimate test of their credibility.
As the third and seemingly decisive round of talks in Geneva concluded, the Trump administration had avoided diplomatic deadlock — but only by narrowing negotiations to the nuclear file.
The latest cycle of U.S.-Iran escalation has followed a familiar script: sharpened rhetoric from the United States, calibrated military signaling by Iran in the Persian Gulf, indirect diplomacy through Oman, and Israeli warnings that remain deliberately ambiguous but unmistakably real. Yet beneath this choreography lies a more consequential development inside Tehran. The current crisis is forcing Iran’s political class to reassess its central foreign-policy wager of the past decade: that deepening alignment with Russia and China would provide strategic insulation against Western coercion.
US President Donald Trump takes to the podium tonight to deliver the first State of the Union address of his second term.
“It’s going to be a long speech because we have a lot to talk about,” Trump said ahead of the address. The State of the Union—an annual speech delivered by the US president to Congress—typically focuses heavily on domestic policy issues, and that’s likely to be the case with tonight’s speech as well. Concerns about the health of America’s economy and growing public controversy about the Trump administration’s immigration policies are two of the domestic policy issues Trump will likely address.
While it may not have been perfect, the Trump administration achieved a considerable amount in the first year of its second term, and there is reason to be optimistic that additional dividends will accrue in 2026.
China is becoming harder to ignore in the Middle East. Yet the gap between economic presence and strategic power remains wide, even as American policy swings, argues US academic John Calabrese.
The United States is Israel’s closest ally, and its support is a central pillar of Israel’s national security. The US provides Israel access to purchase advanced weapon systems, ammunition and weapon emergency supplies in times of war, intelligence sharing, opportunities for cooperation in defense technology, and crucial diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council and elsewhere. It also provides Israel with regular security aid, to be spent in the United States, currently at an annual rate of $3.8bn (under an MOU that expires in 2028). Since October 2023, the US also offered active military support, in a break from the historical norm. It contributed substantially to Israel’s defense against Iranian ballistic missiles, in conjunction with Arab regional partners, and bombed nuclear sites in Iran in support of Israel’s campaign in the “12 Day War” of June 2025.
The Abraham Accords have represented a remarkable shift in U.S. Middle East policy. They reframed Arab-Israeli normalization as a result of shared interests – within the Middle East and directly with the US, rather than as a byproduct of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Signed in September 2020, on the last leg of the first Trump administration, the Accords brokered by Washington normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, followed by framework agreements with Morocco and Sudan. From the American perspective, the Accords were intended to break decades of diplomatic stagnation in the Middle East in order to establish a regional framework aligned with American strategic objectives.
Trying to capture US President Donald Trump’s proudly unpredictable approach to foreign policy in fixed policy documents is inherently difficult. Surprise, leverage and improvisation are not bugs in Mr Trump’s world view; they are features. Yet the administration has now attempted this exercise twice: with the release of the National Security Strategy last December and the National Defence Strategy this January.
