Research & Commentary Results

Brian sits down with MEI Senior Fellow Jaser AbuMousa to assess the situation on the ground in Gaza three years after October 7 and a year into the ceasefire. Drawing on his own personal experience, Jaser explores the toll that the war and continued destruction have taken on Gaza’s residents, the implications of the recent Israeli and US elections, and the difficult path forward.

Gulf states and their partners are increasingly looking beyond their most immediate interests of containing the war with Iran. While recent talks between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran have kept de-escalation on the agenda, a broader regional security framework and non-aggression pact has also emerged, envisioning a longer-lasting solution to regional conflicts. The talks have yet to produce a settlement, but they reflect a growing recognition that Gulf security cannot depend entirely on Washington. Iran will still be there, and its neighbors will have to find ways of living with it.

The war with Iran is hardly over, but the debate over the shape and nature of the post-conflict American posture in the Gulf region is just beginning. Undoubtedly, how the war ends will affect how the United States adjusts its role. While this debate is still in its early stages, something of a conventional wisdom is already developing in policy circles that could seriously compromise American influence in the Middle East.

Wars are decided by those who hold military power, but their costs are increasingly borne by those who have little or no voice in the decisions that start them. The US–Iran war shows this imbalance very clearly. Its economic consequences have gone far beyond the battlefield and have disrupted energy markets, trade routes, food supplies, public finances and investment in the Gulf, Europe, Africa and Asia. The most striking feature of the conflict, however, is not only the size of the damage but its very unequal distribution.

Geopolitical influence over trade increasingly rests on controlling the systems that make them work. The Middle East illustrates the stakes. US ports, cable corridors, cloud facilities, artificial intelligence (AI) investments, and maritime routes connect regional economies to global commerce while exposing them to external decisions and disruptions. For the United States, the challenge is to translate technological advantage into resilient networks rather than rely on centrality that can itself become a source of vulnerability and coercion.

Crude oil is flowing out of the Gulf again, but the market is no better prepared for another disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. It has assembled a temporary system for managing one. Crude exports from the Gulf, excluding Iran, returned to pre-war levels in September, while total Gulf shipments reached 15.5 million barrels a day, more than 80% of the pre-conflict volume.

As a result of the Iran war, Turkish thinking about nuclear weapons appears to be shifting. Iran’s emergent ability to threaten regional states (and possible determination to acquire a nuclear weapon itself), growing concern about Israeli aggressiveness, doubts about US security guarantees, and greater Saudi nuclear autonomy are all pushing Ankara to consider a future nuclear option.

In less than two decades, a string of offshore discoveries has turned the Eastern Mediterranean into a significant gas-producing region, making Israel an exporter, twice lifting Egypt into the ranks of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporters, and giving Cyprus finds it has yet to bring to market. This backgrounder explores the potential and challenges of exploiting and managing LNG resources in the region.

A year after world leaders gathered in Sharm el-Sheikh to mark the end of the war in Gaza, Israel controls about 70% of the Strip, Hamas retains its arms, and reconstruction has yet to begin. Meanwhile, in the West Bank, record settler violence and settlement expansion are colliding with a Palestinian Authority on the brink of fiscal collapse. Hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj are joined by MEI Associate Fellow Tahani Mustafa to discuss why the Gaza peace plan is deadlocked, an increasingly emboldened Israel in the West Bank, Mahmoud Abbas’s postponement of Palestinian elections, the Palestinian Authority’s deepening economic crisis, and what role the US could play.

The Israeli government’s plan to build 3,401 housing units in the 12-square-kilometer E-1 corridor, between Jerusalem’s municipal boundary and the Israeli settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, would cut the West Bank in two. Israeli officials are under no illusion about the implications. Announcing the plan’s approval in August 2025, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich called it a “significant step that practically erases the two-state delusion.”

Proponents of the war with Iran have taken recent increases in crude-oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz as proof that the US strategy is finally working. President Trump is so confident in this that he recently rejected a seven-day plan, set forward by Iran’s foreign ministry, to end the war and open the strait. The United States is “winning tremendously,” Trump boasted.

Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline is back in operation after a drone attack from Iraq, blamed on Iran-backed militias, shut it down for nearly two weeks. The pipeline is the kingdom’s main way to export oil while the Strait of Hormuz is closed, so the shutdown dealt another blow to global energy markets. How vulnerable is this route, and what does that mean for the kingdom and the world economy? This episode of Middle East Focus features a recent MEI Virtual Briefing in which Director of Communications Zeina Al-Shaib is joined by MEI Senior Fellow Colby Connelly and MEI Affiliate Yesar Al-Maleki. They examine the new geopolitical risks facing the oil market, what further losses of global supply could mean for Saudi Arabia and the world economy, and which buffers outside the Persian Gulf could ease the pressure.

On August 7, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Défense Agreement, a collective-defense pact widely compared to NATO’s Article 5. This essay argues that the comparison is misleading. Mecca borrows NATO’s language of solidarity without yet possessing NATO’s institutional machinery, and the Houthi offensive against Saudi Arabia in September 2026 provided an early and revealing test of what the agreement actually means in practice. Neither Pakistan nor Turkey automatically entered the fight on Saudi Arabia’s behalf, and Washington, despite an initial reluctance to strike directly, remained indispensable through intelligence support and a major proposed F-35 sale. Drawing on realist alliance theory — Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, Glenn Snyder, and Steven David — and on the precedent of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the essay contends that the Middle East is not dividing into rival blocs but moving from hierarchy toward a looser, overlapping geometry of hedged partnerships, in which American exclusivity is eroding considerably faster than American primacy.

When Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan agreed to a mutual defense pact in August, it was principally seen as a political commitment. The “Mecca alliance,” as it was dubbed, stipulated that an armed attack on one would be treated as an attack on all three, accompanied by deeper military cooperation.